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Abstract

In recent years, the term globalization and the global economy have caught the attention
of scholars and popular media. Many of the aspects of globalization serve to create push and pull
factors that encourage labor migration about the globe as individuals seek to establish some form
of economic stability. The sending of money back to country of origin or remittances is often a
result of this movement. This study uses data from the New Immigrant Survey to examine the
characteristics of United States immigrants who have received “green cards” (granted legal
permanent resident status) and who engage in remittance behavior. The study also seeks to
bridge a gap between macro- and micro-approaches to understanding the willingness of
immigrants to remit as well as examining the dollar amounts returned to country of origin and
the propensity to use in-kind remittances or the sending of goods to friends and family who
remain in the immigrant’s country of origin.
In an effort to examine the global and local aspects of remittance sending, predictors
were chosen from both Demography studies and Globalization theory. These predictors of
remittance behavior were analyzed in separate models and in combination. The results suggest
that a holistic approach to understanding remittance behavior rather than a discipline specific
approach provide a better understanding of immigrants and the characteristics that promote
remittance sending. The results also suggest that cash remittances and in-kind remittances
represent two distinctly different approaches and means to providing for friends and family left
behind. Cash remittances are seen as a method of economic survival and possible advancement
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in country of origin but in-kind remittances represent more of a gift-giving activity by
immigrants with greater levels of expendable income.
Both migration and remittance decisions are complex decisions that involve numerous
individuals with in the household of those encouraged to migrate. An expanded knowledge of
this process will help scholars and policy makers develop useful and efficient programs in the
future.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

The term globalization is used to describe the movement of capital, goods, and labor
around the globe but these movements also have an effect on localities. These human
activities cannot be separated from a larger picture encompassing the interaction between
global and local. The term “globalization” gained popularity during the mid-1980s and 1990s
(Ritzer 2004, Kellner 2002, Connell 2000, Robertson 1992). However, the use and meaning
of the term as well as the period of time to which “globalization” applies, remains contested.
Many scholars suggest that globalization began when humans began migrating across the
globe (Steger 2003, Williamson 2002, Mazlish 1998) although others maintain that
globalization is a relatively recent phenomenon beginning in the 16th century with the advent
of European expansion and the growth of capitalism (Katz 2001, Chase-Dunn, Kawano and
Brewer 2000, Portes 1981). Marx (1848) wrote, “The need of a constantly expanding market
for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the entire surface of the globe. It must nestle
everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connexions everywhere.” The sentence is a
description of what many scholars call modern “globalization.” Globalization has not only
chased capital around the globe but has chased people as well. Wallerstein (2004) suggests
that by the end of the 20th century the capitalist economy had penetrated every corner of the
world and Bauman (1998) believes that at the beginning of the 21st century humans had no
choice but to become a “tourists” or “vagabonds” moving with the global economy. Tourists
and vagabonds often move due to economic pressures from both sending and receiving
economies. This study explores one aspect of migrant behavior in this global movement:
remittance behavior.

Remittance behavior or the sending of monies and goods back to one’s country of
origin has long been documented in migration research. However, most approaches to
remittance behavior have been framed as a macroeconomic process and have failed to
examine microprocesses that inform both migration and remittance behavior. I do not make a
case for or against remittance sending, but, instead, I seek to expand upon our current
understanding of the factors that underlie the remittance sending process. I also attempt to
bridge a portion of the micro-macro gap by exploring characteristics and variables suggested
(but not previously tested) by globalization scholars as motivation for remitting.
The purpose of this work is to identify the use of remittances as a global/local
phenomenon and to determine and clarify various characteristics of remittance behavior by
examining respondents to the New Immigrant Survey (NIS). An additional purpose to the
work is to examine the predictors of the size of capital flows and non-capital flows. I argue
that the study of remittance flows can offer an opportunity to analyze micro-dimensions of
globalization while reflecting upon the macro-level impacts. The work addresses a growing
phenomenon often viewed in a Global North/ Global South or industrial/ less developed
framework as demonstrated by the growth of both foreign-born populations and remittance
outflows experienced in the United States. For the purpose of this study, I used Chomky’s
(2007) classification of migrants and immigrants.
“Migration refers to any movement of humans (or animals) from one area to another.
Immigration refers to such movements by humans when they involve crossing
established state boundaries and are regulated by the governments of the territories
they involve.” (p. vii)
Therefore, migrants include individuals who move but immigrants represent
individuals who cross established national borders for various reasons. Understanding
2

immigration and remittance flows offers policy makers and scholars information, and
provides an understanding of modern globalization.
Remittance flows have steadily increased as the number of migrant workers displaced
by global economics has increased but much of the research examining this process has been
limited to macrodimensions of globalization such as the use of remittances as national
development funds (Wimaladharma, Pearce and Stanton 2004). However, like migration,
remittance decisions represent a complex interaction between individuals, households,
nations, and the globe and each of these dimensions are intertwined in the process of
globalization (Robertson 1992).
Demographers have analyzed the characteristics of immigrants as they are related to
their propensity to remit (International Monetary Fund 2006, Vanwey 2004, Conway and
Cohen 1998, Jones 1998, Lianos 1997, Itzigsohn 1995, Lucas and Stark 1985). They have
used a variety of indicators such as age, gender, educational attainment, and others to identify
the likelihood that immigrants will send money back to their country of origin. From the
consistency of significant findings using a variety of samples, it is clear that these
characteristics have a significant impact on the willingness to remit and on the amounts of
remittances delivered to various countries of origin. Globalization theory may provide insight
into various micro-level processes defined by local interactions and structures (Sassen 2007,
Bauman 1998) and identify additional characteristics that inform migrants’ willingness to
return portions of their income.
As Sassen (2007), Portes and Walton (1981) and Robertson (1992) indicate, a number
of socio-historical and cultural values from the local are incorporated into a response to the
3

global. Immigrants do not abandon socialized behaviors and beliefs that they developed in
their country of origin when they migrate but they take these values with them. Origins and
values such as the desire to return home to their country of origin serve as indicators of
feelings of responsibility and obligation to individuals left behind. Local factors such as the
ability to earn income and sources of income also predict the willingness and the ability of
immigrants to engage in a remittance process. The chapters that follow examine the
remittance process and its relation to migration both from a sending and receiving facet.
Chapter two provides an overview of the entangled relation of the global and the local
framed in the concepts of “glocalization” (Robertson 1992) and the transmigrant (Schiller
1999) approach. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 review the theories and literature concerning
globalization and its definitions, the effects of globalization on migration, and finally, the use
of and engagement in remittance behavior. Chapter 6 discusses the need for new approaches
to understanding remittance behavior and suggests several hypotheses that may be developed
using globalization theory. Chapter 7 describes the methodology used to create the models
tested here and introduces the reader to the basic format of the 2003 New Immigrant Survey
(NIS). Chapters 8, 9, and 10 report the results from the statistical analyses of the propensity
to remit, the dollar amounts remitted, and the propensity to engage in in-kind remitting
(sending of goods) among NIS respondents. Chapter 11 presents conclusions and suggestion
for crating a more holistic view of immigration and remittance behavior in a global setting.
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Chapter 2

The Global and the Local

The term globalization is used to describe the movement of capital, goods, and labor
around the globe but these movements also have an effect on localities. These human
activities cannot be separated from a larger picture encompassing the interaction between
global and local. Globalization represents a stretching of social and economic connection that
establishes a worldwide network in such a manner “that local happenings are shaped by
events occurring many miles away and vice versa [so that] the local neighborhood is likely to
be influenced by factors …operating at an infinite distance away from that neighborhood
itself (Giddens 1990: 64).” Key to understanding this relationship of the global and local is
an understanding of the people who move about the globe both through coercion and
voluntarily.
Glocalization
Robertson (1992) described “glocalization” as a “real world attempt to bring the
global in conjunction with the local (p. 173).” The term “glocalize” or dochakua originated in
relation to Japanese entrepreneurship and describes “global localization” as an explanation of
the increasing complex relation of the local and the global (Khondker 2004, Robertson
1992). Canclini (1995) describes the phenomenon as “a new ‘entrepreneur-world’ structure
whose culture articulates information, beliefs, and rituals deriving from the local, the
national, and the international (p. 749).” Glocalization provides a way to analyze how
individuals construct their identities and activities within the context of globalization
(Giulianotti and Robertson 2006) and how their activities are informed by the perceived
cultural needs, values, and beliefs of the local. Giulianotti and Robertson (2006) suggest four
5

features are involved in glocalization. These features include the transplanting of local
culture into new context, the creation of intracultural identities and practices, the
establishment of intercultural practices, and the potential reproduction of “glocal” identities
in future generations. The result of these features is a blending of the local and the global
(Khondker 2004) in which the global reconstructs the local (Castillo and Nigh 1998) and the
local reconstructs the global (Giulianotti and Robertson 2006). Glocalization, therefore,
frequently involves “migrant groups who are constantly relating to mobile local identities”
(Giulianotti and Robertson 2006:174) as they move about the globe. Immigrants create new
identities in their host country while maintaining an identity with the location of origin, thus
giving rise to the transmigration approach.
Transmigration
Traditional migration approaches divided immigrants into two classifications (Castle
2002): the settler who was abandoning their old country to live in a new one (Schiller 1999)
and the temporary migrant who emigrated for a time period but intended to return to their
country of origin (Chew and Lieu 2004). Globalization, however, has focused attention on
the networks that exist in immigrant communities (Castle 2002, Schiller 1999) and the
complex relationship between immigrants and the family and friends left in their country of
origin. Schiller (1999) suggests an approach that “posits that even though migrants invest
socially, economically, and politically in their new society, they may continue to participate
in the daily life of the society from which they emigrated but which they did not abandon” (p.
94). This approach is generally used in the transnational/transmigration approach to the study
of immigration. However, the close and maintained relationship between immigrants and
6

individuals who remain in the immigrant’s country of origin is not a new phenomenon but
was evident in the late 19th and early 20th century as recorded by the use of remittances and
return migration (Schiller 1999). The “transmigrant” simultaneously has relationships and
connections in two or more states and may use a series of visits to maintain these
relationships (Schiller 1999). The features of transmigration include movement across
international borders, the settlement and establishment of social relations in a new state, the
maintenance of social relations in the old state, the living of lives that crosses international
borders, and the establishment of “transnational social fields.” Castles (2002) posits that
assignment of immigrants as settler and temporary is limited due to the following reasons:
 Migration tends to increase and migrants become more diverse in social and cultural
characteristics
 New developments in technology have increases temporary, repeated and circular
migration
 An increasing number of migrants orient their lives to multiple locations
 An increase of the strength of informal networks has taken place
These factors have resulted in a “deterritorialization” as production, consumption,
politics, and identities have become detached from the local (Kearney 1995). Described as an
“implosion of the peripheries into the center, effected [sic] by transnational migration, global
marketing, electronic media, and tourism (Kearney 1995: 550),” the local has become
difficult to separate from the global. Evidence of these multiple connections may be viewed
through the lens of immigration and remittance behavior.
Connected to Home
According to Pido (1985), “The extent to which a more realistic understanding of
immigrants and their networks and relationships develop will depend on a more holistic
7

orientation and approach [to migration]” (p. 5). This “more holistic” approach includes an
understanding of migration through macro- phenomenon such as historical colonialism and
neocolonialism as well as micro-phenomenon such as individual goals, aspirations, and
societal values that have been shaped and defined by socialization. Remittance behavior is
one representation of the relationships maintained with the country of origin by immigrants.
Schiller (1999) describes the social and economic responsibilities of US Haitian immigrants
evidenced by the financing of education, weddings and funerals for relatives left in Haiti.
Filipino immigrants also strive to maintain familial, cultural and sentimental ties and linkages
to their country of origin (Pido 1985) through visits, tourism, and return migration. Sana
(2005) also sites visits and the financing of weddings, baptisms, and funerals as a use of
remittances to maintain contact with the immigrant’s country of origin. Although remittances
may be viewed as an obligation or a contract between the immigrant and family and friends
left behind, they play a major role in the formation of global/local identities. Immigrants
living abroad are able to participate in local culture and maintain a sense of belonging to the
local community while participating in the essentially global experience of migration. As
individuals move about the globe for various reasons, the sending of monies home represents
a blurring of the global and the local. Ultimately, despite the fact that agreement on a single
definition may be difficult to establish, globalization is increasingly a process defined by
varied, transnational networks.

8

Chapter 3

Globalization

3.1 Globalization: Approaches and Theories
The term “globalization” gained popularity during the mid-1980s and 1990s (Ritzer
2004, Kellner 2002, Connell 2000, Robertson 1992). However, the use and meaning of the
term as well as the period of time to which “globalization” applies, remains contested. Many
scholars suggest that globalization began when humans began migrating across the globe
(Steger 2003, Williamson 2002, Mazlish 1998) although others maintain that globalization is
a relatively recent phenomenon beginning in the 16th century with the advent of European
expansion and the growth of capitalism (Katz 2001, Chase-Dunn, Kawano and Brewer 2000,
Portes 1981). A third view suggests that globalization is a contemporary phenomenon
traceable to the mid-1970s (Harvey 2005, Steger 2003, Mazlish 1998, Portes 1997). Each
approach rest upon the concept of a shrinking “globe” and a growing interdependence of its
inhabitants thus producing one “globality” (Sassen 2007, Ritzer 2004, Shew 2004, Steger
2003, Giddens 2003, Kellner 2002, Katz 2001, Mazlish 1998, Wallerstein 1998, Bauman
1998, Robertson 1992, Salt 1992). A broad working definition of globalization is provided by
Steger (2003:10) who states, “[globalization] refers to a multidimensional set of social
processes that create, multiply, stretch, and intensify worldwide social interdependencies and
exchanges while at the same time fostering in people a growing awareness of deepening
connections between the local and the distant.” Historically globalization may be viewed as
a centuries old process and divided into various periods or epochs. According to Mills
(1959), “Knowledge of …history is often indispensable to understanding” (p. 150) and it is
important to understand historical phases and historical reasons for current phenomenon.
9

Historical approaches
Steger (2003) divides historical globalization into five distinct periods of
development defined as the prehistoric period (10,000 BCE until 3500 BCE), the pre-modern
period (3500 BCE until 1500), the early modern period (1500 until 1750), the modern period
(1750 until 1970), and the contemporary period (1970 until present). Each period represents
marked changes in the distribution of humanity, increases in knowledge, technological
advancement, and a continuous integration and interdependency of the globe. However,
Williamson (2002) confines his classifications to four distinct periods beginning in 1492 and
representing two globalization periods or epochs and two anti-global epochs. Epoch 1
represents an anti-global period lasting from 1492 until 1820. Although discoveries and
transportation experienced improvement, tariffs, trading monopolies and wars restricted the
flow of capital and labor. Both capital and labor immigration increased during the global
epoch lasting from 1820 until 1913 as commodity markets were expanded and global capital
became more integrated. Defined by Williamson (2002) as the “First Global” century,
immigration was unrestricted as capitalism began its march around the globe. Complaints
from domestic workers and trade policies marked an end of Epoch II while creating a second
wave of anti-global behavior or Epoch III that lasted from 1913 until 1950. The “Second
Global” century (1950 until present) is marked by restricted immigration, lessened trade
barrier, and policy domination by the United States. During this period, industrialized
countries have benefited while less developed countries have not faired as well. Robertson
(1992) views globalization as a long-term process also beginning in the 15th century but one
that has coalesced and accelerated in the last half of the 20th century. Robertson’s (1992:58)
“temporal-historical path” is divided into five phases including the Germinal phase (15th to
10

mid-18th century), the Incipient phase (mid-18th century to 1870s), the Take-off phase (1870s
to 1920s), the Struggle-for-Hegemony phase (1920s to 1960s), and the Uncertainty phase
(1960s to 1990s). The later phases represent increased interdependence, cooperation,
competition, and communication on a global level. Mazlish, however, suggests that a
difference exists in world history and globalization history.
Mazlish (1998) suggests that a difference exists between world history and global
history and that the distinction has produced a fragmented approach in the discipline of
history. While world history embraces large-scale historical processes that create interlinkages among individuals around the world, its focus remains on the nation-state and the
systems constructed by world trade as described by Fernand Braudel, the mentor of
Immanuel Wallerstein. Wallerstein would later propose World-Systems Analysis
(Wallerstein 1974) as a theoretical approach to globalization. A qualitative difference is
present in Mazlish’s distinction of world history and global history. Mazlish (1998:389)
states “the history of globalization…takes the processes encapsulated in the factors of
globalization and traces them as far back as seems necessary and useful…processes that are
best studied on a global, rather than a local, a national, or regional level.” Mazlish qualifies
his definition by identifying seven aspects of globalization which are: 1) People of the earth
are linked in unprecedented fashion; 2) Environmental problems that refuse to conform to
lines on a map; 3) Multinational corporations that increasingly dominate economic lives; 4)
Global consumerism; 5) Human rights issues; 6) Displacement of international political
systems; and 7) Diffusion of culture.

11

Mazlish’s definition and qualifications, as well as his proposal that demarcation of 1st ,
2nd, and 3rd worlds represents a recent method of discerning development, give credence to
viewing globalization as a recent phenomenon and examining globalization as an outgrowth
of 16th century capitalism or as a product of changing world-views established in the later
half of the 20th century. These various approaches define globalization as a process that
occurs in various time frames based upon the writer’s perspective and reinforces the fact that
approaches to globalization can be quite fragmented but often exhibit common ideas such as
the needs of capitalism and the movement of labor.
Karl Marx anticipated globalization in the Manifesto of the Communist Party (Katz
2001) when he stated
“The need for a constantly expanding market for its products chases the Bourgeoisie
over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere,
establish connexions (sic) everywhere. The Bourgeoisie has through its exploitation
of the world-market given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in
every country…raw materials drawn from remote zones; industries whose products
are consumed, not only at home, but in every quarter of the globe [and]…we have
intercourse in every direction, universal inter-dependence of nations” (Tucker
1978:478)
The advent of globalization, thus, becomes synonymous with the necessity of
capitalism to expand (Katz 2001, Wallerstein 1974). Marx (Tucker 1978) suggests that class
division creates the need for the capitalists to pursue technological change and to change
methods of production as well as to develop new markets for their products. Citing America
as an example of expanding capitalism from a European base, Marx views flows of people
and capital as a example in the development of world markets and the process of
globalization. Capitalism can not rest until it has dominated and changed the world as
demonstrated by the statement by Marx: “It [capitalism] compels all nations on pain of
12

extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to introduce what it
calls civilization into their midst, i.e. to become bourgeois themselves. In a word, it creates a
world after its own image” (Tucker 1978: 477). Wallerstein (1974) echoes these sentiments
when describes globalization as a capitalist oriented phenomenon that began around 1500.
Various other scholars including J.A. Hobson, V. I. Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg, Andre Frank,
and Arghiri Emmanuel also view globalization as associated with capitalistic expansion
(Katz 2001, Portes 1981).
Hobson indicated a qualitative shift between industrialized and nonindustrial societies
that resulted in massive export of capital and identifying the “central problem of the
advanced countries as the growth of massive surplus capital lacking outlets in the domestic
economy for profitable investments” resulting in the “rise of financial capitalism over
industrial and commercial capitalism [that] changed [the] role of the nonindustrial world
from a source of cheap foodstuff, raw materials, and a market for manufacturers to a
receptacle for surplus capital (Portes 1981: 5).” Luxemburg described the nonindustrial world
or periphery as a receptacle for excess goods produced in the industrial nations who were
suffering from overproduction and underconsumption (Katz 2001). Lenin echoed these
sentiments by relating the expansion of capitalism as “financial imperialism” and a direct,
logical response to what Marx described as the “laws of motion of capitalism” (Katz 2001,
Portes 1981). Trotsky (Katz 2001) also described the “creation of a unified world market” as
“a widening of the gulf between developed and underdeveloped countries” (Katz 2001: 7)
that represents a form of imperialism. Categorization as developed or underdeveloped will
later give rise to the concept of “unequal exchange” which is addressed by Frank and
Emanuel who view unequal exchange as a source of underdevelopment, changing economic
13

structure, and labor migration (Portes 1981). Many of these perspectives predict dire
consequences for less industrialized nations and coincide with a contemporary or post-1970s’
view of globalization.
The contemporary view of globalization has roots in the 1950s and the economic
agreements of Bretton Woods (Steger 2003). Many scholars address economics, politics,
cultural, and ideological changes as they relate to this time period. The emergence of a truly
global economy (Steger 2003) is the results of rapid advancements of technology and capital
flows thus creating new markets for goods and services. Although sharing similarities with
other historical approaches to globalization, the contemporary approach have a strong focus
on economic determinates. The United States and Britain met at Bretton Woods in New
England following World War II to create and establish “binding rules on economic
activities” (Steger 2003) and as a result, the United States and Britain created three
organizations to oversee international economic activity. The prevailing economic model was
Keynesian, which favored government intervention in economic matters and rejected a
laissez-faire approach. The organizations created were the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), and the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that would be replaced in 1995 by the
World Trade Organization (WTO). The IMF was designed to administer an international
monetary system while the World Bank was to help in the reconstruction of war-damaged
Europe and the development of various countries by providing funds for large industrial
projects. The GATT and WTO were charged with the enforcement of multilateral trade
agreements. These agreements operated for three decades but changed radically in the 1970s
when faced with economic insecurity and a change in economic models to what would
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become known as “neoliberalism” (Steger 2003, Chase-Dunn, Kawano, and Brewer 2000).
Historical approaches such as these have led to numerous perspectives and theories in an
attempt to explain and define globalization.
Perspectives and Theories
The contemporary approach to globalizations has prompted the creation of a variety
of theoretical approaches to attempt to understand and explain globalization and its features.
A few of the perspectives are reviewed below. However, these represent a sample of
available theories and are by no means exhaustive. All can be succumbed under an
overarching theoretical approach: World-Systems theory.
Kellner
Kellner (2002) employs a contemporary version of critical theory that approaches
globalization from a dialectical standpoint. ”The fundamental transformations of the world
economy, politics, and culture [must be placed] in a dialectical framework that distinguishes
between progressive and emancipatory features and oppressive and negative attributes
(Kellner 2002: 286).” Although globalization is often imposed from above, it is also
contested and reconfigured from below thus creating a complex, contradictory, and
ambiguous set of social relations and institutions. Networked societies require a theory that
views globalization and an intertwining of economic, political, and cultural features which
are the product of “technological revolution and the global restructuring of capitalism”
(Kellner 2002: 286). Globalization must be seen as a continuation of previous social
tendencies and as a co-evolution of science, technology, and capitalism. A failure to envision
the interaction of technological advancement and the restructuring of capitalism leads to
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reductive and one-sided approaches to understanding globalization. Kelner (2002: 292)
states,
“Consequently, it is important to present globalization as a strange amalgam of both
homogenizing forces of sameness and uniformity and heterogeneity, difference and
hybridity, as well as a contradictory mixture of democratizing and antidemocratizing
tendencies. On the one hand, globalization unfolds a process of standardization in
which a globalized mass culture circulates the globe creating sameness and
homogeneity everywhere. On the other hand, globalized culture makes possible
unique appropriations and developments everywhere, thus encouraging hybridity,
difference, and heterogeneity to proliferate.”
Kellner refers to the synthesis of technology and capital as technocapitalism. New
configurations and contradictions of society found in the globalized world are explained by
technocapitalism and a dialectical approach.
Giddens
Giddens’ approach to globalization reflects his thinking of modernity as a juggernaut
(Ritzer 2004). Emphasizing the role of the West and the United States, Giddens envisions
globalization as a two-way process that “squeezes sideways” (2003) producing new areas of
economy and culture that cross national borders as well as remaining within the nation.
Giddens describes globalization as emerging in an “anarchic, haphazard fashion [and]
carried along by a mixture of influences (2003: 19)” The influences of this process result in
global and local changes in everyday life. Giddens suggests that globalization needs to be
managed and accompanied by social and economic reform. Although entertaining the
possibility that the United States enjoys economic dominance, Giddens poses what he
describes as two key questions: Is it true that global inequality is increasing? Is the increase
due to globalization? Nations that have embraced being apart of the global economy have
16

experienced growth while those that did not have experienced no growth according to
Giddens. When considering globalization, “the biggest difference is in the level of finance
and capital flows. Geared as it is to electronic money---money that only exists in
computers—the current world economy has no parallel in earlier times (Giddens 2003: 9)
Beck
Beck (2000) makes a distinction between globalism, globality, and globalization. He
describes globalism as the world that is dominated by economics and the emergence of
hegemony of the capitalist world market and neoliberal ideology that causes monocausal and
linear thinking. The multidimensional developments of the globe are improperly reduced to a
single economic dimension. Globality embraces the illusionary aspects of closed spaces due
to the process of globalization that suggests an undermining of the sovereign nation state due
to the movement of “transnational actors with varying power, identities, and networks.
Although transnational processes have existed, Beck (2000) suggests globality is new for the
following reasons:
 Its influence over geographical space is far more extensive.
 Its influence over time is more stable allowing it to continue form one time period to
another.
 There exists a far greater density of transnational networks, relationships, and
network flows.
 Globality has various other distinctions:
 Everyday life and interaction across national borders in being profoundly affected
 There is s self-perception of transnationality in realms of media, tourism, and
consumption.
 Community, labor and Capital are increasingly placeless.
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 There is a growing awareness of global ecological dangers and a sense that actions
must be taken to deal with them.
 Global culture industries are circulating at unprecedented levels.
 The number and power of transnational actors, institutions, and agreements is
increasing.
Beck (2000) refers to globality as the second modernity with the first modernity
located with the nation-state.
Bauman
Bauman (1998) views globalization as a “space war” where the winners are those
who can obtain mobility and move about the globe. Mobility becomes the most coveted and
powerful stratifying mechanism and its use allows individual to create meaning for
themselves. The losers of the global world are unable to move and find themselves trapped in
environs that are unbearable and inhospitable. Bauman divides individuals into tourists and
vagabonds. Tourists are on the move because they desire to be and move toward objects of
attraction while vagabonds are on the move involuntarily as they try to flee their unbearable
conditions. Globalization is geared toward the ideals and dreams of tourists but a side effect
is the creation a quantity of vagabonds. However most individuals exist between the
extremes, thus, globalization causes uneasiness. Bauman (1998: 77) states, “Nowadays we
are all on the move [with] less and less reason to stay anywhere in particular.” The “quest for
profits and greater profits” has lessened the significance of geographical location creating a
globe where distance is insignificant and natural borders do not matter. Bauman (2003: 89)
describes this world on movement in the following statement:
“For the inhabitants of the first world—the increasingly cosmopolitan, extraterritorial
world of global businessmen, global culture managers, or global academics, state
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borders are leveled down, as they are dismantled for the world’s commodities,
capital, and finances. For the inhabitants of the second world, the walls built of
immigration controls, of residence laws, and of ‘clean streets’ and ‘zero tolerance’
policies, grow taller; the moats separating them from the sites of their desire and
dreamed-of redemption grow deeper, while all bridges, at first attempt to cross them,
prove to be drawbridges...The second travel surreptitiously, often illegally, sometimes
paying more for the crowded steerage of a stinking, unseaworthy boat than others pay
for business-class gilded luxuries---and are frowned upon, and if unlucky, arrested
and promptly deported.”

A great divide exists between the haves and have-nots of Bauman’s globalization.
Appadurai
Five global flows or landscapes and their accompanying disjuncture serve as the basis
of globalization (Appadurai 1996). Appadurai defines the scapes as: 1) Ethnoscapes
consisting of mobile groups and individuals who play an important role in the world and
whose moves may be factual or fantasy, 2) Technoscapes that are ever-fluid configurations
of technology that move at high speeds across previously impenetrable barriers, 3)
Financescapes involve the currency of global markets, 4) Mediascapes that provide the
global production and distribution of information, and 5) Ideoscapes consisting of sets of
images which frequently posses state ideological characteristics and are often political in
nature
Appadurai (1996) finds each of these scapes to be partially dependent on the nationsate and the location of global flows.
As can be seen by these various approaches, the definition and understanding of
globalization can present difficulties. A common element that appears in these and other
theories is the concept of capitalism and the economy as a source of expansion and
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stratification. World-Systems theory (Wallerstein 1974) offers what is arguably the best
overarching synthesis of the role of capitalism in the development of globalization because
he defines globalization in terms of expanding capitalism in his world-systems theory.
World-System theory
World–system theory views globalization as a process that originated around 1500
and reached completion during the 20th century. World–system theory represents the spread
of a capitalist world-system across the globe (Wallerstein 1974). Wallerstein (1974: 390)
defined “a world system [as] any historical social system of interdependent parts that form a
bounded structure and operate to distinct rules.” Historically, the world capitalist economy
originated in Europe and through superior military strength and means of transportation
helped to establish centers or cores of accumulation (Lechner and Boli 2007, Wallertstein
1974). Core nations spread across the globe creating an occupational and geographical
division of labor in which peripheral destinations were reserves for cheap labor and
extraction of raw materials and core area were reserves for capital-intensive production
(Wallerstein 1974). The results of these efforts were unequal development with two extremes
and a small buffer zone consisting of semiperiphery nations. The process continued until the
whole of the globe is devoted to accumulation and profit seeking. International trade became
not a trade between equals but one in which stronger economies (core) received “surplusvalue” from weaker economies (periphery) and core nations benefited from “unequal
exchange.” Although Wallerstein (1974) sets the beginning of the process around 1500, he
states “The modern world-system became geographically global only in the last half of the
nineteenth century, and it has only been in the second half of the twentieth century that the
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inner corner and most remote regions of the globe have all been effectively integrated”
(Wallerstein 1998: 9). Therefore, Wallerstein views the march of capitalism has reach
completion resulting with most goods as commodities and most labor as wage labor.
However, the expansion of capitalism has not been a linear process.
The expansion of capitalism has occurred in cycles of multi-decade waves (Lechner
and Boli 2007). The spread of world–capitalism followed a pattern of innovation and
expansion periods that reached a point of market exhaustion and a reduction of profits.
Reduced profits and limited markets produce periods of stagnation and can result in recession
but are generally followed by a new period of accumulation and thus, the pattern repeats
continuously. The expansion across the globe has created a system facing more intense crises
but is less able to address them. Wallerstein traces these cycles and accompanying hegemons:
the Netherlands, followed by the British, followed by the United States. The United States
hegemony has been in decline since the 1970s (Lechner and Boli 2007) and Wallerstein
believes the system has entered a new crisis period in which response is uncertain but in
which transformation of the system may present the only possible answer.
World–systems views the modern world system as a capitalist world-economy that
gives priority to endless accumulation and goes beyond political structures and homogenous
cultures. The world-economy consists of “a large geographic zone within which there is
division of labor and hence significant internal exchange of basic or essential goods as well
as flows of capital and labor” (Wallerstien 2004: 23). The setting for this exchange and flow
is the autonomous state that exists in a larger interstate system. The state seeks to construct
boundaries within which it can increase power, maintain sovereignty, and control its borders.
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Reciprocal recognition of these rights is fundamental to the modern interstate system
(Wallerstein 2004). The state defines the rules that allow capital, commodities, and labor to
cross its border. The movement of people has always been the most tightly controlled
(Wallerstein 2004). A shift to the neoliberal economic model in the mid-1970s has given
international financial institutions an immense power to influence states and their economic
activity within the world or global economy.
3.2 Post-1970s Globalization and Neoliberalism
The United States and Britain faced economic challenges during the 1970s with a
change in economic policy led by Paul Volcker of the United States Federal Reserve,
Margaret Thatcher of Britain, and Ronald Reagan of the United Sates (Harvey 2005).
Though deliberate and planned activity, Volcker hoped to revitalize a stagnant economy by
curbing the power of labor, deregulating of industry, increasing agriculture and resource
extraction, and by liberating the power of finance locally and globally (Harvey 2005).
Neoliberalism became the dominant economic model and was based upon “a theory of
political economic practice that proposes that human-beings can best be advanced by
liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework
characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade” (Harvey 2005:
2). Neoliberalism marked a significant departure from previous economic models.
The dominant economic model for the first half of the 20th century was supplied by
John Maynard Keynes and was based upon the propositions that the private economy may
not reach full employment and that government spending could spur the economy into filling
the gap (Buchholz 2007). Keynes wrote The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and
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Money in 1936 and provided a new framework for macroeconomics. Prior to Keynes, Say’s
Law stated that producing goods generated enough income for workers and suppliers to
purchase all the goods produced but neglected the question: What happens when consumers
save? Classic economists tied savings by consumers and investment by business together
and viewed the buttress of Say’s Law to be flexible wages and prices (Buchholz 2007).
Keynes denied the savings/ investment link and scoffed at flexible wages and prices. The
cause of recession was savings or a reduction in spending and the antidote was to stimulate
spending or as Keynes stated, “We can inject spending into the economy, which will multiply
throughout and cure recession by filling the original gap between output and sales”
(Buchholz 2007: 220). The Keynesian “we” represented the government. The national
economy could be compared to the operation of an automobile with spending and taxes
representing the accelerator and brakes. Higher government spending and lower taxes
provided the accelerator while lower government spending and higher taxes provided the
brake. The Keynesian model dominated United States economic policy until one United
States president remarked, “We are all Keynesian now” (Buchholz 2007). Milton Friedman
and the monetarist opposed the Keynesian approach.
Monetarists argue that the government makes a lousy driver and fiscal policy has
little to do with the acceleration or braking of the economy; the money supply is the key to
the economy (Buchholz 2007). The monetarist approach contends that government spending
and taxation are not the tools to stimulate the economy but the Federal Reserves’
manipulation of the money supply is the key to economic growth. The Federal Reserve
manipulates the money supply by controlling the percentage of deposits that banks can lend,
by lending money to banks, and though the buying and selling of government securities. As
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money held by the Federal Reserve is not considered in the money supply, the Reserve can
increase the money supply by buying bonds and reduce the supply by selling bonds. Reagan
and Thatcher urged adoption of a monetarist model in the 1970s and promoted the
“neoliberal” ideology of privatization, deregulation, and a reduction of government
involvement in welfare programs.
Neoliberalism stresses the importance of the free market and encourages greater
geographic range thus leading to globalization (Harvey 2005). “The assumption that
individual freedoms are guaranteed by freedom of the market and of trade is a cardinal
feature of neoliberal thinking, and it has long dominated the United States stance toward the
rest of the world” (Harvey 2005: 7). The neoliberal approach is characterized by:
 A confrontation with labor especially organized labor
 Rollbacks of commitments to social welfare
 Privatization of public enterprises
 Reduction in taxes, and
 Encouragement of entrepreneurship the creation of favorable business climates to
attract foreign investors
The World Trade Organization was created, as neoliberal policy became the
prescribed answer to global problems by the mid-1990s. International financial organizations
gained economic and political power thus exercising the ability to subject loan applicants to
structural adjustments programs as a requirement for loan criterion.
Chase-Dunn, Kawano, and Brewer (2000) identify three aspects of contemporary
globalization. Structural globalization identifies changing densities in global and
international interaction while economic globalization identifies the greater integration of
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production, distribution, and consumption in a world economy. Political globalization
examines the institutional forms of global and interregional political/military organizations
and their relation to the nation state and smaller political actors. Included in political
globalization are economic organizations such as the IMF, World Bank, and WTO. These
economic organizations exert significant influence in the economies of the world, especially
with the growth of transnational corporations (Steger 2003, Chase-Dunn 2000). Trade
agreements have established global trade and markets while creating powerful transnational
corporations that exert influence rivaling the nation-state. The IMF, WTO, and World Bank
create and enforce rules that control and affect the global economy. Since the perceived
collapse of communism, the economic institutions have promoted a neoliberal agenda to
create integrated markets and deregulation. Loans to developing countries are often tied to
“structural adjustment programmes” (SAPs) that cut public welfare programs and serve as a
new mechanism and model of colonialization. Neoliberal policy created a clear road for the
expansion of capitalism (Portes 1997) and had a dramatic effect on those countries
considered to be less developed. The contemporary approach to globalization often suggests
that globalization has benefited the developed countries while exploiting workers in both
developed and developing countries (Steger 2003, Chase-Dunn et al 2000).
The neoliberal approach was implemented in areas such as Latin America though the
seven basic steps (Portes 1997) that follows:
1. Unilateral opening to foreign trade
2. Extensive privatization of state enterprises
3. Deregulation of goods, services, and labor
4. Liberalization of the capital market with extensive privatization of pension funds
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5. Fiscal adjustments based on drastic reductions or public outlays
6. Restructuring and downscaling of state-supported social programs
7. The end of “industrial policy” and a concentration on macroeconomic management
Structural Adjustments Programs
The structural adjustment era was ushered in by conservative politicians and the
ability of US banks to gain a monopoly on the recirculation of petrodollars into the world
economy (Sachs 2005, Harvey 2003). Harvey (2003) suggests that a decline in the US
hegemony in production forced a move to financial hegemony and the necessity of open
markets in general and especially capital markets. Efforts to devalue labor and a degradation
of the working-class in industrial nations helped create a larger working-class in the
developing world. A global downward pressure on wage rates and labor conditions created a
low-wage workforce that was now combined with the geographical mobility of production.
These conditions are the essence of neoliberal economics (Harvey 2003). As a result, US
finance capital took center stage in the global economy and “whole economies [were] raided
and their assets recovered by US finance capital [and] unemployment and impoverishment
were the results for millions of people” (Harvey 2003: 66). The resulting financial crisis
forced a number of developing countries to turn to the IMF and World Bank for loans.
Financial crisis is viewed by the international financial institutions as a result of poor
government management (Sach 2005) and recovery and development can only take through
foreign investment (Samatar 1993).
Structural adjustment programs now accompanied loans to developing countries as a
means to accomplish recovery and development. SAPs were designed to address four areas
of concern (Sach 2005): poor governance, excessive government intervention in the markets,
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excessive government spending, and too much state ownership. Crisp and Kelly (1999: 534)
state “Structural adjustments loans typically included demands for fiscal discipline, new
public spending priorities, tax reforms, financial liberalization, competitive exchange rates,
trade liberalization, increased foreign direct investment, [and] privatization and
deregulation.” As a result,
“Prices of goods and services rise as subsidies for food, transport, energy, and other
items are removed. The devaluation of currencies leads to real price increases on
imported goods. In addition, unemployment increases both because public sector jobs
are eliminated and because domestic industries scale back to face the foreign
competition to which they are being subjected to for the first time. Finally,
government service, of particular value to the poor, decreases as a result of general
fiscal austerity” (Crisp and Kelly 1999: 542)”
As a result, the needs of global capitalism are met by creating an environment for the
global transfer of labor, goods, services, and capital (Lingan 2005).
Samatar (1993) describes three positions that are held toward SAPs and their effects.
The “internalist argument” suggests that SAPs create poorly conceived and inappropriate
policies that are designed to overcome perceived failures of the government. A “middleground” approach states that a side effect of SAPs is a negative impact on vulnerable groups
such as the poor and the “radical critics” suggest that SAPs emphasize production for export
while offering little support for domestic production for local consumption. A common view
of SAPs is that the effects of these adjustments are disproportionately absorbed by those in
poverty (Lingan 2005, Sach 2005, Crisp and Kelly 1999, Samatar 1993, Summers and
Prichett 1993). The consequences are marginalized individuals in developing countries
migrating to places “where their labor will yield more returns to enable them to live
comfortable lives” (Donkor 2005: 30).
27

Development, the described goal of SAPs, was defined as success in the global
marketplace (Portes 1997), but it resulted in a premature rise in consumption standards, a
bifurcation between those able to consume and those aware of, but excluded from
consumption, and heightened migratory pressures. Individuals and families often attempted
to gain economic success through migration to the source of economic prosperity of
developed nations such as the United States.
The “most under-researched of the global flows” (World Bank 2002: 82) is the
human resource. The number of international migrants in 2005 reached approximately 190
million with 115 million living in developed countries and 75 million living in developing
countries (United Nations 2006). Migration is not only a South-North process but also a
South-South process as middle-income nations use migrants from lower-income nations to
fuel the workforce for expanding economies. The export of global labor as a primary
commodity is only second to oil (Salt 1992, World Bank 2003). Salt (1992) states,
“All countries now engage in migration systems growing in size and complexity” and
“many of the processes that create and drive these systems operate on a worldwide
basis, the consequence of economic globalization, capital mobility, the activities of
international business corporations and the wide spread realization that human
resources can be traded for profit like any other resource” (p.1080-1081).
Bunker and Ciccantell (2005) make the following observation:
“…That in each extractive economy, the physical features of the natural resource
itself...directly determine both the economic organization and the ecological effects of
its extraction and export. In other words, the local conditions that produce the
resource directly shape international strategies to export it” (p. xi).
A no more accurate description can be applied to immigrant labor that seek a better
life in an “environment of stable relative wages” (World Bank 2002: 82) and who are
comparable to other resources that are extracted from a less developed country (LDCs). The
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ebbs and flows of economies of developed countries and the desire for both skilled and
unskilled labor have the potential to increase the flows of humans in a global system.
Neoliberal policy and changing demographics of developed countries often affect migratory
patterns. Immigrations to the United States reflect these patterns.

29

Chapter 4

Migration and Immigration

Much of the literature and research concerning the movement of resources around the
globe centers upon natural resources such as timber or oil. The focus of many research
projects is the flow of these resources out, the flow of produced goods in, and the impacts
upon the sending country. The “most under-researched of the global flows” (World Bank
2002: 82) is the human resource. As stated previously, the export of global labor as a primary
commodity is only second to oil (Salt 1992, World Bank 2003) and the flow of the human
resource can be examined similarly to the natural resource. The ebbs and flows of economies
of developed countries and the desire for both skilled and unskilled labor have the potential
to increase the flows of humans in a global system.
4.1 Migration
The United Nations’ report on International Migration and Development (2006:23)
describes migration as “complex because it is a process, not a single event, and because it can
be repeated several times over the lifetime of an individual.” The report also suggests that
migration exhibits a number of variations depending on the individuals who decide to
migrate and the State controls that determine who will be allowed to enter or depart and how
such activities will be carried out. Globalization has affected both the nature and the impact
of migration flows.
Globalization is neither a recent nor unique process (Bunker and Ciccantell 2005)
nor is migration. Migration is as old as human efforts to obtain food for survival but
international migration is a relatively new phenomenon as the number of nation-states has
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increased. Recognized nation-states numbered 43 in 1900 but had grown to 191 by the year
2000 (Martin, Abella, and Kuptsch 2006). Each state creates regulations to determine the
ability to cross its borders and thus regulates immigration flows both as a sender and as a
receiver. Salt (1992) indicates the existence of a number of macroregional systems in which
migration flows take place. Such systems are represented by the flow of migrants from
Mexico to the United States, from Turkey to Germany, and from India to Saudi Arabia.
Migration systems are often characterized by the movement of individuals from less
developed countries to more developed countries and are influenced by a number of factors
including needs of advanced economies, the availability of cheap transportation, improved
communications, and encouragement by governments relying on remittances (Martin et al
2006, United Nations 2006).
The world population currently increases at the rate of 83 million persons per year
with 82 million of these individuals being born in LDCs (representing 97% of world
population growth) but the number of immigrants is increasing faster than the world
population (Martin et al 2006). The aging population in advanced economies provides one
explanation for the growth of immigration. The population of advanced economies in 2006
had 142 individuals aged 20-24 for entry into the workforce for every 100 individuals aged
60-64 retiring from the workforce but this ratio is expected to decrease to 86 per 100 in the
next decade (United Nations 2006). In contrast, developing countries have a ratio of 342
entrants per 100 individuals of retirees. Shortfalls of domestic workers (Salt 1992) in
developed countries serve as a factor in attracting the over abundance of workers in LDCs
that may be experiencing economic slowdowns and high unemployment. Another
explanation for the increase in immigrant flows is the shift of rural farmers to urban jobs that
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provide greater economic rewards. Migrant farmers are much more likely to accept 3D jobs
or jobs that are dangerous, dirty, and difficult (Martin et al 2006, United Nations 2006) and
adaptation to urban environments is essentially the same both in and out of the farmer’s
country of origin making emigration as attractive as out-migration.
Cheaper transportation costs and the ability to keep in contact with family members
through improved communication networks have created a more inviting environment for
immigrant workers. The United Nations (2006) classifies migrants as “settler migrants” and
“migrant workers,” differentiating those who plan to stay from those who are intending to
migrate temporarily, and Martin, Abella, and Kuptsch (2006) classifies migrants as economic
and noneconomic, differentiating those who migrate voluntarily from those who do not. The
United States, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada represent developed nations that are
willing to accept settler migrants. Settler migrants are offered the opportunity to apply for
permanent residence and are accorded the same social and economic rights as native citizens.
The usual criteria for acceptance as a settler migrant include having relatives already living in
the receiving country, possessing a needed skill, or migrating on humanitarian grounds.
Immigrant workers on the other hand are admitted for the sole purpose of temporary
economic activity and are usually attached to a specific job or employer. Immigrant workers
are usually admitted for a specified time period that is often less than a year (United Nations
2006). Most individuals migrate for the purpose of economic activity (World Bank 2002) and
criteria such as these coupled with globalization have created a squeeze in immigrant demand
thus producing an hourglass shape as migrants are drawn from highly skilled groups such as
Indian programmers or low or unskilled workers such as Mexican farm laborers. A diverse
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group of individuals classified as migrants is created and a variety of motivations and goals
are involved in the decision to migrate.
Decisions to Migrate
Itzighohn (1995) identifies several characteristics that may be present in families
pursuing migration as a means to economic survival. Larger families and those in a late stage
of the family cycle can afford to send migrants both emotionally and economically. Migrant
families also tend to have higher incomes than neighbors and better educated members thus,
supplying a higher human capital. Therefore, migration decisions are not random acts but the
migrant represents a rational agent who is constrained by loyalty and commitment to the
family (Lianos 1997). The positive and negative consequences of this framework are highly
contested among scholars. The United States is the destination of 20% of the world’s
immigrant population and 60% of migrants live in high-income or developed economies
(United Nations 2006).
Massey (1999) suggests an examination of four basic facts should be used in an
attempt to determine and understand migration flows. Researchers and policymakers must
consider “the structural forces in developing societies that promote immigration (push
factors); the structural forces in developed societies that attract immigrants (pull factors); the
motivations, goals, and aspirations of the actors responding to these forces by migrating
internationally; and the social and economic structures that arise to connect areas of out- and
in- migration” (Massey 1999: 303-304). Contemporary migration flows originate from the
social, political, and economic transformation that occurs as capitalist markets penetrate
nonmarket or premarket societies (Massey 1999). Entrance into the global economy can
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disrupt social and economic structures and produce forms of displacement. This displacement
often creates a population of mobile workers who are attracted to the higher wages offered in
urban, developed nations. Migration can also serve as a type of social insurance and allow
families remaining at home to manage risks and overcome market failures during periods of
development. Simultaneously, receiving countries attempt to regulate the number and the
characteristics of immigrants arriving. Economic changes tend to shift immigration policy in
both receiving and sending nations. “Immigration policy is the outcome of a political process
through which competing interests interact within bureaucratic, legislative, judicial, and
public arenas to construct and implement policies that encourage, discourage, or otherwise
regulate the flow of immigrants”(Massey 1999:307). The pressures of globalization have
promoted the movement of labor in search of economic security.
4.2 Labor Migration
The human face of globalization resides in the perpetual movement of individuals
across borders (Terry and Wilson 2005) and the result is a redrawing of the global labor
market map. “Workers move abroad to support family members and protect their futures at
home” according to Terry and Wilson (2005: 6). Stalker (2000) suggests that the main reason
most individuals move abroad is the prospect of earning more money and that migrants are
generally aware of the location of potential jobs and the likelihood of finding one. Manpower
Inc., one of the largest contract-worker suppliers, states
“By far, the vast majority of workers are moving for better economic opportunities,
either to a wealthier nation where the same work offers a better reward, moving to
where there are more opportunities for individuals with their specific skills because
the work is no longer available in their current location, or moving to where there are
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shortages of their skills and rewards are greater due to the laws of supply and
demand” (Manpower 2008: 4).
The US Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 established the
Commission for the Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic
Development. The commission found that “the main motivation for [immigrants] coming to
the United States was economic” (Bacon 2008: 52). Both skilled and unskilled workers have
become an indispensable part of a flexible, global workforce that allows employers to
respond quickly to global market changes.
The “net return of migration” as described by Stalker (2000) is dependent on four
factors; wage differentials, the likelihood of finding work, the chances of being deported if
the immigrant lacks documentation, and the financial and psychological cost of migrating.
These four factors determine whether or not the individual will seek to migrate and wage
differentials can play a large part in making the decision to migrate. In a 1996 survey of
deported workers from Mexico, workers reported earning $278.00 per week in the United
States in contrast to earning $31.00 per week at their last Mexican job. Table 1 reflects the
potential advantages and disadvantages involved in migration decisions. Disadvantages in the
country of origin are generally referred to as push factors, while advantages in the country of
destination are referred to as pull factors.
Stalker (2005) points out individuals classified as refugees or asylum seekers also
play a part in the migrating workforce. The conflicts that produce refugees also create
poverty and economic disruptions that force individuals to flee their country of origin and the
international flow of labor is mixed with the flow of refugees. Seeking asylum may offer an
alternative to bypass immigration controls and enter the workforce. Stalker (2005) states,
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“A few asylum seekers succeed. But even those who fail often become immigrant
workers. It may take months or years to process the claims of asylum seekers, and in
the meantime, many are allowed to work” (Stalker 2000: 32).
All of these factors have created a global workforce that is essential to the global
economy and that is constantly on the move. Bacon (2008) attributes much of this migratory
labor activity to the close relationship between trade and immigration policy, especially when
related to United States trade policy, the power of International financial institutions such as
the IMF and World Bank, and the development of transnational corporations.
Bacon (2008) cites trade agreements such as the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), the use of “structural adjustment programs,” and the establishment of
export processing zones (EPZs) as factors creating the need for workers to migrate. Not only
have these created a migratory workforce but they have created new calls for “guest worker”
programs and the establishment of “contract labor” as a means of flexibility for employers.
Financial crashes and economic disasters have driven millions of workers abroad in order to
earn enough to keep families at home together. EPZs have required a quantity of workers that
“cannot be met by natural population growth” (Bacon 2008: 71). All of these factors have
created a need for additional workers all over the globe thus making “labor migration a truly
global phenomenon” (Stalker 2000: 31).
Workforce Needs
Manpower Inc. (Manpower 2008) represents a leader in the employment services
industry. Established in 1948, the US company is worth $21 billion and specialized in
“temporary and contract recruitment” as well as “outsourcing and consulting” in the global
labor market. Manpower claimed 4,500 offices in 80 countries and five million permanent,
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temporary, and contract workers worldwide in 2007. In 2007, Manpower conducted a survey
on the need for “foreign talent” entitled the “2008 Borderless Workforce Survey” that
surveyed 28 thousand employers located in 27 countries.
The results suggest, according to Manpower Inc., that more individuals are living and
working in a country other than their country of origin than at any other period in history and
that movement is not a one-time, one-way migration (Manpower 2008). Stalker (2000)
argues that the quantity of people on the move may not be greater than previous periods, but
he agrees that the character of migration has changed and flows are more diverse with a great
deal of back and forth movement. Manpower also recognizes economics as a driving force in
labor force movement and suggests the ability to send remittances is a “huge factor” in
driving immigration. Noting that almost all population growth takes place in less developed
regions and that the population of developing countries is increasing six times faster than in
industrialized countries, the survey indicates that “rapid population growth combined with
economic difficulties push people to move away, and declining and aging populations force
countries to accept migrants” (Manpower 2008: 3). One of the defining global issues of the
early twenty-first century is labor migration. Manpower describes this as “brain
globalization.” Brain globalization suggests “there is a significant movement of both people
to work and work to people as multinational organizations attempt to adapt their businesses
to be close to their strongest consumer markets or, to find less expensive talent and reduce
their costs to compete. At the same time, individuals move to where the best jobs and career
opportunities are available, further exaggerating the effects of brain globalization”
(Manpower 2008:7). The report also recognizes the efforts of governments to export
individuals with the intention of receiving remittances and thus contributing to the GDP of
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their country of origin. This phenomenon is termed “brain export.” The United States has
historically depended on immigrant labor (Bacon 2008) and has viewed the immigrant labor
force as a workforce that could easily be increases or decreased as business demands.
Between 1996 and 2000, the foreign-born constituted almost one-half of the net
workforce increase in the United Sates (Mosia 2002) and currently 20.3 million immigrants
compose 14% of the US total workforce (Nguyen 2008). Immigrants filled 38% of the new
jobs created between 1990 and 1998 (Nguyen 2008) and offer a solution to the ageing and
skill problems threatening the US workforce as both high and low skilled workers are
needed. Many new jobs in the twenty-first century will be knowledge- based and require
postsecondary, vocational, or higher educational training (Nguyen 2008). Nguyen (2008)
indicates that as many a 30% of immigrants hold an undergraduate degree and as many as
12% hold advanced degrees. International migration represents the only population
component that can have a significant impact of the future workforce needs of the United
States and other advanced countries experiencing population decline (McDonald and Kippen
2001). Reliance on immigrant labor and attempts to reconcile immigrant and domestic labor
is reflected in the history of US immigration policy and an understanding of a receiving
country’s policy is imperative to understanding of immigration (Donkor 2005).
4.3 United States Immigration History and Workforce Needs
Prior to 1875, there was no direct federal legislation restricting the admission of the
foreign-born to the United States did not exist (Smith and Edmonston 1997, Briggs 2003).
However, some federal and state regulations, designed not to limit the number of entrants but
the type of immigrant, were enacted. Restrictions applied to the destitute, the physically
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handicapped, certain races, and those engaged in immoral activities. Briggs (2003) states that
“an appreciation of historical circumstances is key to understanding the policy that governs
the scale and shape the composition of the immigrant flows at any given time.” (p.6)
Changes to United States immigration policy can be explained by an examination of a series
of “mass immigration” waves taking place over the last two centuries (Briggs 2003).
From 1788 until 1921, the United Sates imposed no annual restrictions existed on the
number of individuals allowed to enter the country. Consequently, the number of foreignborn increased steadily from 1790 until 1860 with the first wave identified between 18301859. From 1807 through 1830 the cumulative number of immigrants totaled approximately
one million persons and included both voluntary and involuntary migration (i.e. slavery).
Annual arrivals totaled less than twenty thousand with most individuals arriving from the
British Isles and Africa. In 1818, Congress denied a land grant request from the Irish and
declared that America would not become a “nation of nations” (Briggs 2003). As the East
experienced industrial and urban growth, five million immigrants arrived from 1830 to 1850.
Many of the immigrants arrived from Germany, Ireland, and French Canada but as
development began in the West, a large number of Chinese immigrants arrived in the 1840s.
The effects of mass immigration in the urban East were experienced by the labor force and
included wage suppression, a worsening of working conditions, and reduced pressure for
shorter working hours. The need for a growing labor force would fuel the second wave of
mass immigration from 1860 until 1890.
The destruction of the agrarian South during the Civil War of 1861-1865 was
accompanied by an accelerated growth of business in the North. Advances in mechanization
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of industry and a growth in infrastructure bought ten million immigrants to the United States
from 1861 until 1890. The foreign-born composed 14.8% of the United States population in
1890. Austria and Scandinavia joined the United Kingdom, Germany, and Canada as place of
origin for new immigrants while the Central Pacific Railroad continued to recruit Chinese
workers for the West. Many of these immigrants were unskilled workers who could be
trained for growing industrialization (Briggs 2003). In 1864, Congress passed the Act to
Encourage Immigration (Contract Labor Act) at the behest of business’s need for a larger
labor force. The act allowed private business to recruit foreign workers and pay for their
transportation to the United States and in return, immigrants pledged up to twelve months of
their wages as repayment. Transportation repayment combined with “maintenance” fees,
created an immigrant workers status similar to indentured servants. Soon, the public and
organized labor began to resist uncontrolled immigration. Resistance to rising number of
Chinese immigrants recruited by the railroads and fleeing China’s internal turmoil led to the
Congressional passage of the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act which represented the first
significant effort by the government to restrict levels of immigration. The 1882 Act was
followed in 1885 by the Allen Contract Act, which prohibited businesses from providing
financial assistance to immigrant workers. Although the Allen Contract Act was the first
attempt to limit immigration from Europe, rapid industrialization and strong economic
growth combined with the need for workers created a third wave of mass migration
from1890-1920 (Briggs 2003).
Immigration continued to rise, as manufacturing became the largest employment
sector in the United States replacing agriculture. Immigration flows reached over one million
persons annually during the years 1905, 1906, 1907, 1910, 1913, and 1914 (Briggs 2003).
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The origin for many of these immigrants was Eastern and Southern Europe and although
many came from agriculture backgrounds, a disproportionate number came to reside in the
industrialized cities of the Northeast. Immigration became a labor issue as wages became
depressed and working conditions worsened. The public and labor organizations began to
pressure the federal government for immigration restrictions. Since 1882, the federal
government had begun an oversight of immigration policy and had assumed complete control
over immigration policy in 1891 (see Table 2).
The Immigration Act of 1882 assigned the responsibility of examining new
immigrants to the Secretary of the Treasury. This was followed by the Immigration Act of
1891, which ended all state involvement in immigration issues and created the Bureau of
Immigration (BI) within the Treasury Department. However, the BI was moved in 1903 to
the Department of Commerce and Labor. The role of immigration enforcement was assumed
with the 1904 creation of a set of inspectors to patrol the Mexican border to stop illegal
immigration. In 1906, The BI became the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization and in
1913 was assigned to the Department of Labor. In an effort to understand immigration
impact, the 1907 United States Immigration Commission was created as an ambitious social
science project designed to establish a formal immigration policy. The Dillingham
Commission named for Senator William Dillingham was composed of three members of the
House of Representatives, three members of the Senate, and three outside experts and
produced a final report in 1911. The report suggested the definition of “superior” and
“inferior” races, rules governing selectivity and restrictions on immigration, and pointed to
economically adverse affects of unlimited immigration (Briggs 2003). A series of
immigration acts followed the submission of the report (see Table 2) which represented
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efforts to control immigration through screening, numerical quotas, and banning of selected
categories. The restrictions and quotas created by the Immigration Acts of 1917, 1921, and
1924 remained in effect until 1965 (see Table 2) and –in conjunction with the Great
Depression and two World Wars--slowed immigration growth. The foreign-born constituted
only 4.4% of the United States population in 1965. This figure represented the lowest in
United States immigration history (Briggs 2003) although the United States had become one
of the most influential nations in the world.
The end of WWII brought about a series of global changes and the United States
became one of the most influential nations due to its military, political, and economic power.
Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy viewed immigration reform as a national
imperative but Congress refused to change the overall policies until the Johnson
administration (Briggs 2003). Tens of thousands from the “wrong countries” (Briggs 2003)
desired to emigrate. The failure to change overall immigration policy resulted in a series of
ad hoc programs designed to assist people fleeing from communism. The Civil Rights
movement became an additional factor influencing the call for new legislation as President
Johnson attempted to build “the Great Society” (Briggs 2003). Overt racial bans could no
longer be tolerated and in 1965, the Immigration Act lifted national quotas, centered
immigration policy on family reunification, and established a seven category visa program
(see Table 2). The goal of the Immigration Act of 1965 was not to increase the number
immigrants but to reunite families and follow the example of a 1952 program designed to
attract workers whose skills were needed. Inadvertently, the Act set off a fourth wave of
immigration that currently continues. Once again, in an effort to gain control over both legal
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and illegal immigration, Congress passed a series of Immigration Acts (see Table 2).
However, labor needs, once again, influence legislation.
Temporary Workers or Guestworkers
A large portion of immigration legislation and a number of ad hoc programs have
addressed the necessity for temporary workers or non-immigrants to fill positions in the U.S.
workforce. The Immigration Act of 1819 offered the first definition of non-immigrants but
the first reporting requirements were not established until the Act of 1855 (Briggs 2003,
USCIS 1997). The Immigration Acts of 1924 and 1952 enhanced the definition of nonimmigrants and reporting methods by dividing temporary visitors into distinct categories
based upon purpose for entry. Non-immigrants were officially designated as all persons who
are not United States citizens but who seek to enter the United States for a temporary period
of time, not for permanent residence (USCIS 2005). Miller (1982) and Bartram (2005)
indicate that the temporariness of non-immigrants or guestworkers may be a primarily
fictitious idea as many of the workers remain indefinitely or apply for permanent residence.
Employers who become dependent on foreign workers often do not seek alternative labor
sources and workers who are accompanied by family tend to establish local roots over the
time period of employment. Although most non-immigrants do not intend to stay, reasons
such as this increase the tendency to remain in the host country (Bartram 2005). However,
the long history of recruiting and employing temporary workers by United States business
has had the support of the federal government and has been accompanied by a series of
policies and programs.
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A labor shortage provided the enactment of most historical guestworker programs.
Pressure from Southwest agriculture growers in 1917 led to the enactment of the First
Bracero Program and granted a provision for the entry of “temporary” workers while lifting
the literacy requirement of the Immigration Act of 1917 (Briggs 2004). Although the war
ended in 1918, the program was extended until 1922. No longer justifiable, the program
officially ended in 1922. However, enforcement was lax and WWII brought the assertion of
another labor shortage. Growers requested a new contract labor program in 1941. In 1942,
the Mexican Labor Program known as Public Law 45 (P.L.45) was attached to an
appropriations bill. The Mexican Labor Program was limited to agriculture workers and was
set to expire in 1947. The program continued informally and without regulation until 1951.
The advent of the Korean Conflict produced an extension known as P.L.78 which was
renewed three times and continued the Mexican Program until 1984. The height of the
program witnessed the annual arrival of 439,000 braceros as temporary agriculture worker.
Employers were required to provide prevailing wages, adequate housing, and reasonably
priced meals as well as transportation cost from government reception centers. The Federal
government determined the state allocation of workers. Individual states were responsible for
distribution of workers to towns and cities. Although President Truman’s Commission on
Migratory Labor found an inverse relation between the supply of immigrant workers and
agriculture wages in 1952, the program continued until the American Federation of Labor
(AFL) launched a successful drive to repeal P.L.78 in 1984 (Briggs 2004).Other programs
such as the British West Indies Program (BWI) for Eastern growers, the Virgin Island H-2,
and the Guam Program introduced large numbers of temporary workers and created social
and infrastructure problems in the areas where these workers were utilized. The Immigration
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Act of 1952 established a number of visa categories including the H-2 visa for “other
temporary worker” to be used in the service sector (Briggs 2004). H-2 workers were allowed
to take jobs if no citizen was available to perform the work. The 1986 Immigration Act
further divided visa categories into H-1A for nonagricultural workers and H-2A for
agricultural workers. Current legislation focuses on the need for additional temporary
workers to fill United States jobs.
4.4 Current State of US Workforce
The United States currently has an aging workforce and population (McDonald and
Kippen 2001, Judy 1997) that creates doubts as to the ability to replace workers and supply a
future workforce to support an aging population. Aging populations often have higher
demands as services and care for the aging involve labor-intensive jobs.
“Healthy and well-to-do aged people will demand leisure and recreation services
while frail aged persons will need a wide array of care services. Some of these
services will be highly skilled (for example, sophisticated health services) but others
will be low skilled (for example, transport and distribution and household
maintenance tasks). Almost all of these services will be labor-intensive” (McDonald
and Kippen 2001: 5).
Forty percent of all US workers will be age 55 or older by 2010 and reaching retirement age
(Nguyen 2008). The severity of an aging population can be measured in the ratio of working
individuals to the retired elderly (McDonald and Kippen 2001). In 1950, the US old age
dependency ratio was seven working individual to one person 65 years of age or older
(Nguyen 2008) but currently, this has dropped to five working individuals per retired person.
The rate is expected to drop to three working individuals per retired person by 2030.
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All US “baby boomers,” defined as those born between 1946 and 1964 (Fullerton 1995), will
be 65 years old or older by 2030 (Bernstein and Edward 2008) and double the 2008 age 65
population (38.7 million) to 88.5 million residents by 2050. Residents 85 years old and older
will triple by 2050. Simultaneously, the percentage of “working age” population (age 18 to
64) will decrease to 57% of the population. Demographics are rapidly changing the face and
the needs of the workforce (Freeland, Fahlander and Scullion 2008). The National conference
of State Legislatures (NCSL) reported that in the 1990s there would have been a shortage of
500,000 workers in thirteen occupational categories without the availability of non-citizen
employees (NCSL 2005). In the 1990s, immigrants represented 1 in 9 United States
residents, 1 in 7 United States workers, and one-half of all new workers with one quarter of
immigrants occupying professional occupations and 20% occupying service industry jobs.
Businesses face a shortage of workers and in some areas is forced to cut operations and
services (Zezima 2008) if an immigrant population is unavailable to fill the empty labor pool.
Sixty million US workers will retire in the next 30 years and the shortages of workers will be
critical to the United State’s ability to compete in the global economy (Nguyen 2008).
Migration streams will be required to supply the United States with a much-needed
workforce (Nguyen 2008, McDonald and Kippen 2001). Labor needs of the United States
combined with economic needs of individuals in other countries has help create
circumstances in which migrations and the ability to send money “home” are viewed as an
opportunity for economic growth and stability. Remittances provide the opportunity for
immigrants to contribute to the financial well being of family and friends who remain in the
immigrant’s country of origin. Remittances also provide a means of maintaining social ties
with their community of origin.
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Chapter 5

Remittances

Remittances are often viewed historically as an economic survival strategy for the
poorer people of the world. Although the positive or negative value of this strategy is
debated, poverty serves as a strong push factor for immigrants and changes in historical and
theoretical explanations of poverty requires an understanding. Jones (1998) offers one
analysis of such historical and theoretical changes.
The impact of money transfers is best understood when framed by historical
economic and theoretical changes occurring at the end of the twentieth century (Jones 1998).
Jones (1998) cites the commonality of numerous theories focusing on global problems and
solutions and the tendency of these theories to change in focus with changing economic
environments. The use of remittances as an economic strategy and their role in development
varies theoretically with this changing environment. The literature of the 1970s (Jones 1998)
concentrated on sequences of change, inequalities, cultural change, and the efficient use of
resources and viewed government–controlled strategies as sources to lessen economic
dependency. From this perspective, the most promise lay in state-run socialism. However, the
economic crisis and restructuring of the 1980s and 1990s and membership in the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) created economic as well as theoretical shifts to the
right. Government funds decreased; leaving the poorest sectors suffering the most and
creating a shift to “alternative development” programs (Jones 1998). Grassroots strategies
focused on small-scale low-tech projects designed to preserve culture and local control.
Assisted by non-governmental organizations (NGO), these projects addressed social and
economic issues among the poor sectors of developing nations. Literature and theoretical
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perspectives again shifted to the left and informed much of the research involving the use of
migration and remittances as an economic strategy. The current environment termed “The
New World Order” (Jones 1998) is economically conservative with a concentration on
macro-scale trade and informed by trickle-down arguments for downscaling and
decentralization. The overall effect has been regressive rather than progressive for many
Third World countries. According to Jones (1998: 4) “[the migrants] are the safety net for the
poor left behind by the agglomerative behavior of international capital, by the preoccupation
of the international community with other matters, and by the indifference of their own
governments.” Remittances become a strategy for survival and mobility under these
circumstances.
5.1 Remittances and Development
The face of globalization is a human one and one facet that cannot be ignored is the
perpetual movement of people across borders (Terry and Wilson 2005). Remittances from
individuals may represent a small amount of capital but collectively the amount dwarfs
official development assistance and often surpasses the leading exports of receiving
countries. Atkinson (2005) reports that remittances are the second most important source of
external finance for developing countries with 65% of remittances flowing to countries
classified as developing and approximately twenty countries receive 80% of total worker
remittances. Remittances represent the “financial counter part of the out flow of people”
(Atkinson 2005: 178) generated by migration. “As millions migrate north, billions flow
south” (Terry and Wilson 2005: ix) generating opportunities for both local and national
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economies. Enrique V. Iglesisas, president of the Inter-American Development Bank
describes the power of remittances:
“…The scale and scope of remittance can be a powerful lever to open up financial
systems, mobilize savings, generate small business loans, and multiply development
impacts for local communities in many other ways [and] coupled with the right
incentives framework and technical capacities, these can be an important resource for
the development of poor countries” (Terry and Wilson 2005: x).
Despite this, the role and importance of remittances in the development process is
neither simple nor clear and the subject of much debate (Skeldon 2008, Haas 2007). A
consensus on definition of development is difficult to find (Skeldon 2008, Haas 2007).
Income growth has often served as a measure of development but others have argued that
development must encompass a wide range of societal issues (Skeldon 2008, Haas 2007,
Taylor 1999) that may be impacted by increased income. Instead of defining development in
terms of monetary growth, Sen (1999) suggests the use of “freedoms” as a measurement of
development. Freedoms represent the ability individuals or households to “lead lives they
have reason to value” (Haas 2007: 2) and the ability to change their quality of life. Rather
than using income growth as the test for development, the question that needs to be
investigated is whether people are able to establish more control over their lives. Thus, wellbeing rather-- than income-generating factors-- are the true measure of development. Hass
(2007) suggests that development views and policies have changed over time.
Haas (2007) defines four phases of migration, remittance, and development views and
policies, which are summarized in Table 3. Large-scale industrialization and capital transfers
occurred during the 1950s and 1960s and were viewed as a source of development and
modernization for poorer countries (Haas 2007). Migration from developing to developed
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countries gained momentum (Skeldon 2008) and was often encouraged by sending country
governments. The “developmentalist migration optimists” suggested that North-South
transfers would stimulate growth and that remittances as well as the return of immigrants
would help developing countries make rapid economic progress. Returning immigrants
would also supply much needed experience, skills, and knowledge that had been obtained
while abroad. However, this pattern viewed from a neoclassical theory of migration would
suggest that migration would eventually cease as wage differentials equalized. Economic
changes in the 1970s changed the migration/development approaches.
“Migration pessimist” (Haas 2007) began to focus on the possible negative impacts of
migration and remittance behavior and suggested that they might reinforce
underdevelopment. Frank (1966) suggests that the sustained expansion of capitalism requires
the destruction of precapitalist economies (Portes and Walton 1981). Frank (1966) describes
this process as his thesis of the “development of underdevelopment” and states, “If countries
became underdeveloped because of capitalist penetration from the centers, it follows that
those periods when they were least integrated into the world-economy networks would afford
the best changes for autonomous development” (Portes and Walton 1981: 9). Of course,
Frank is referring to Wallerstein’s (1974) world-systems theory which states that capitalism
necessarily has to penetrate every corner of the globe and that a dependency develops
between core and periphery nations. Capital penetration into periphery countries is often a
search for cheaper labor and greater profits (Portes and Walton 1981), and it creates “unequal
exchange” as laborers receive lower wages but are exposed to new levels of consumption.
Therefore, modern population movements are essentially displaced labor. Portes and Walton
(1981) suggest a need to look beyond push/pull factors and examine levels of structural
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inequality that exists between regions as a source of motivation to migrate. Three theories
inform this particular view. Equilibrium theory suggests that migration decreases population
in areas if economic low-growth and provides labor in areas of economic growth. Exposure
to Western-style values and forms of consumption motivate mobilization in order to obtain
these and thus, modernization theory indicates individuals move to the source. Causationdependency theory suggest that introduction of new production techniques into less
developed areas creates a surplus of labor which promotes the out-migration of impoverished
populations (Portes and Walton 1981). Factors such as these suggest the creation of
remittance dependent economies where people spend most of their remittance income on
immediate consumption. The exploitive periphery-core dependence is enhanced by migration
and remittances and in turn creates growing global inequality. The introduction of the new
economics of labor migration (NELM) in the 1990s offered a different view of migration and
development.
NELM suggests that migration and remittances decisions are best viewed not as
individual decisions but as household strategies (Stark 1991). In the context of “imperfect
credit (capital) and risk (insurance),” Stark (1991) states that the active decision to send
household members abroad represents an attempt to minimize risk. Poor people are not seen
as passive victims of the global economy but actively engage in activities that will improve
their livelihoods despite the constraints under which they live. Migration viewed through the
lens of NELM returns human agency and results in a structure-actor interaction explanation
of migration and remittance behavior.
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5.2 Current Views on the Development/Remittance Relationship
Decisions to Remit
The greater portion of remittances tends to move toward rural and poorer sectors of
Third World nations (Gupta et al 2007, Jones 1998, Itzigsohn 1995). However, the benefits
must be weighed against the cost. Lianos (1997) suggest that cost to labor exporting nations
includes a loss of labor supply, a distortion on age structure, and the depopulation of rural
areas which must be contrasted with reductions in social tension caused by unemployment or
underemployment in country of origin, skills gained in foreign countries by the immigrant,
and the economic impact of monies returned home. Economists primarily view the
remittance structure as positive while social scientists are more cautious in proclaiming the
virtues of migration and the economic impact of remittances.
A number of studies indicate that migration decisions and the return of capital to the
location of origin are often based upon economic and social discourses located at the family
level. Questions of who will migrate, to where they will migrate, and for how long of a
period will they migrate are calculated choices based upon the economic welfare of the
immigrant and the family (Vanwey 2004, Conway and Cohen 1998, Jones 1998, Lianos
1997). Itzigsohn (1995) states, “Remittances are a rational and important strategy for
subsistence and mobility under deteriorating labor market conditions” (p.636). Migration and
remittances become a private method to redistribute income among family members and
provide a method to access additional capital funds (Lucas and Stark 1985). Although
motivation may be altruistic in nature, migration and remittances may be viewed in a
contractual nature as a means of risk sharing and investment among family members. The
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migrant will adhere to the contract as long as it serves his or her interest. Typically,
remittances may fall over the span of the migrant’s time abroad but not within the first five
years (Lucas and Stark 1985) and Hass (2007) suggests that immigrants may maintain
remittance sending for 15-20 years. . However, NELM and transnational theories proposes
that remittance decay is not inevitable and depends on the household arrangements (Haas
2007). Transnational theory holds that migrants maintain ties to their country of origin and
are actively involved through established networks of connectivity (Haas 2007).
Vanwey (2004) and Lucas and Stark (1985) suggest three approaches in viewing
immigrant motivation to remit. First, a sense of family loyalty and caring may be an
underlying cause of migration but a purely altruistic motivation is empirically difficult to
measure. Secondly, pure self-interest can provide motivation by addressing an aspiration to
inherit, desire to invest in assets within the location of origin, or the intent to return home. In
each of these situations, the desire of the immigrant is to return to their place of origin with a
sense of security provided by economic assets that have been managed by trustworthy family
members. Social and public assets may also have been secured through the practice of
remitting income. A final approach to understanding immigrant remittance behavior is one of
tempered altruism or enlightened self-interest. This motivational approach defines a
contractual arrangement that is beneficial to both family and immigrant. An enlightened selfinterest represents a lessening of risk for the immigrant and his/her family and an investment
framework for economic security. Both the immigrant and his/her family serve as coinsurers
as support can be supplied to the immigrant during times of unemployment or
underemployment while the immigrant serves as the family’s insurance against times of
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economic deprivation such as droughts. The positive and negative consequences of this
framework are highly contested among scholars.
Remittance use and impact on Development
The greater proportion of remittance outflow is sent to developing countries and has
become a noteworthy source of external financing (Gupta et al 2007, Wimaladharma et al
2004, Kapur 2004). The use of remittances as a sustaining income source can be historically
documented. Remittances supported rural Irish communities during the Great Famine of
1846-1848 and became the most important source of capital for those communities
(Wimaladharma et al 2004). Kapur (2004) cites the following five important features of
remittance flow in the twenty-first century:





Remittances are a significant source of external funding.
The bulk of remittances do not accumulate to the poorest countries.
Remittances are the least unstable of financial flows to developing countries.
In smaller countries, remittances are the only viable income source outside foreign
aid and tourism.
 Remittances are attractive due to the failure of other development schemes.
Dubbed the “new development finance”, remittance flows can exceed international
trade and be significant in terms of a developing country’s GDP as witnessed in Tonga,
Lesotho, and Jordan where remittances account for 25% of the GDP (Wimaladharma et al
2004). As this crucial role and dollar amount increases, Wimaladharma et al (2004) suggests
the role of the state is to promote competition, increase the transparency of money
movement, and to set standards for the industry developing around money transfers. A
sophisticated informal network based upon trust is involved in numerous money transfers but
the official outlets such as banks, money transfer companies, and credit card companies have
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realized the fee potential in providing remittance transfer service. Transfer fees have
decreased, competition has increased, and many countries such as Mexico, Sri Lanka, and the
Philippines actively facilitate money transfers and emigration (Wimaladharma et al 2004,
Kapur 2004). Mexican consulates in the United States offer the matricula consular or
identity card. Although the card has no effect on immigration status, some United States
banks use the card as an identity source for banking needs. The Philippines offer incentives
to remitters in the form of investment opportunities, land purchases, and tax breaks. Various
countries have initiated other programs to encourage the practice of remitting thereby moving
remittances from a purely migration phenomenon to an economic one and a phenomenon that
has both micro- and macro-impacts upon receiving economies.
Micro-impacts of remittances are described in NELM as the ability of the household
and the immigrant to diversify risk and survive economic crises as well as enhancing their
standard of living by providing basic needs (Haas 2007, Stark 1991). Capital flows directly to
the people who need additional support. Capital flow from developed to underdeveloped and
developing countries represents a substantial source of income especially for poorer
populations of the receiving country (Gupta et al 2007, Vanwey 2004, CBO 2005). The
following prioritizes the distribution of remittances: 1. basic consumption and health needs,
2. education of other family members and the purchase of durable goods, 3. the buying of
land or housing, 4. paying debts or making investments, and 5. savings (Gupta et al 2007,
CBO 2005, Vanwey 2004, Conway and Cohen 1998). Positive family effects include 25-40%
higher household income (Itzigsohn 1995), security and social mobility (Jones 1998), the
education of potential new immigrants (Lucas and Stark 1985), and the preservation of rural
places and livelihoods (Jones 1998). National positive effects may be seen in increased
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spending outside of rural areas, reduction of inequality (Jones 1998), the provision of foreign
currency, contributions to the balance of payments, increased national income (CBO 2005),
and a reduction of individuals entering the workforce during times of unemployment or
underemployment (Itzigsohn 1995). However, increased inequality among households,
decreased agricultural production, increased land speculation, inflation, and an increased
demand for imported goods are negative national effects observed by Itzigsohn (1995). On a
national level, remittances provide a relatively stable source of external financing and prove
to be less volatile and less-cyclical. These factors increase the credit-worthiness of receiving
countries and may help reduce trade deficits (Haas 2007). Haas (2007) cautions that these
impacts both locally and nationally are often dependent on the stage of household migration
as described in Table 4 and future plans of the immigrant.
Although remittance use is often associated with immediate consumption by the
receiving family, many studies suggests that remittance–receiving households are more likely
to invest than non-immigrant households (Haas 2007) and the impact of remittances tend to
change over the lifetime of migration stages. Immigrants tend to be settled and maintain
relatively stable incomes at late stage immigration. Once basic needs such as food,
healthcare, clothing, primary education, housing, and debt payment have been satisfied,
remittance-receiving households may invest in commercial enterprises. All of these activities
can have an impact both on the household with immigrants and non-immigrant households.
At the early stages of migration/remittance flows, locally purchased materials and
construction of housing can provide a positive economic impact on communities. In addition,
social events such as feasts, weddings, and funerals can provide needed income for local
merchants. Late stage migration may contribute to commercial endeavors and business
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enterprises that extend the effects of remittances beyond the individual to the community
level. Many of these expenditures create a multiplier effect that increases the economic
productivity of the community as well as the remittance-receiving household but caution
must be used when identifying the effects of immigrant remittances.
Haas (2007) states that “there is a tendency to overestimate the magnitude of
migration and remittances” (p. 10) due to the selectivity of migration (Skeldon 2008). The
poorest of individuals are often unable to take advantage of international migration due to the
cost and risk associated with traveling abroad (Skeldon 2008, Taylor 1999). Also, middleincome countries receive the greater percentage of remittance income although remittances
are more important to low-income countries. In addition, the ability to use remittances
effectively relies on the structural environment available to the receiving household. In areas
of weak or non-existent markets, remittance impacts may be limited to the fulfilling the basic
needs of the receiving household thus explaining why remittances have a greater impact in
some communities or countries and limited or no impact in others (Haas 2007). Occasionally,
the local impacts occur through collective forms of remittances.
Diaspora and Collective Remittance
Skeldon (2008) states:
“The word migration gives the impression of a definitive move: to a destination
where the migrant will stay and eventually become a citizen of another country.
Diaspora, on the other hand, draws attention to looking back, to importance of linkage
between origins and destinations and to the fact that migrants may return or at least
continue their involvement with their countries of origin” (p. 12).
Transnationalism or the “transnational community” is also closely related to the idea
that individuals live and work in two or more countries while maintaining close links with
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their country of origin. Diaspora also includes co-ethnics who may have been born abroad.
Whether addressing “brain drain,” the loss of the highly educated to developed countries or
“brain gain,” the return of immigrants who have gained experience, education, and skills to
developing countries, development is enhanced as immigrants retain a sense of belonging to
their country of origin and participate economically and politically with their country of
origin. Hometown associations (HTAs) and remittance organizations reflect a cooperative
sense of belonging and a social responsibility to the communities of origin.
The activity of immigrants who pool their resources to send back to country of origin
has received little attention in the remittance/development literature (Schuttler 2008) but
collective immigrant organizations such as HTAs have multiplied in recent years (Orozco
2007). Orozco (2007) defines HTAs as “entities formed by immigrants who seek to support
their place or origin, maintain their relationships with local communities [in country of
origin], and retain a sense of community as they adjust to life in their new country of
residence” (p. 215). Membership in HTAs is not widespread among immigrants but HTAs’
development impacts can be noticeable when allied with appropriate government programs
and policies, companies, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Immigrants integrate
their community of origin and destination country in the global economy through their labor
and often produce “hybrid cultures” with transnational identities that are economically tied to
country of origin through four processes: remittances, demand for services and consumer
goods, capital investments, and charitable donations through organizations that are raising
philanthropic funds for the immigrant’s home community (Orozco 2007). Capital
investments and charitable funds are often associated with the activities of HTAs but only a
small number of remitters, however, participate in HTAs or other collective organizations
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(Schuttler 2008, Orozco 2007). Among Latin American and Caribbean immigrants, only
eight percent were identified by Orozco (2007) as members of HTAs and members shared
common characteristics not necessarily common to other migrants. HTA members were
better off economically, had greater ties to their country of origin; were generally older, were
US citizens who frequently visited their country of origin and possessed a mixed
commitment to both homes. The members of HTAs often pool their resources to fund
development projects in their community of origin. Such projects include road and school
building as well as other public infrastructure projects. Schuttler (2008), however, classifies
collective remittance behavior under three categories: collective donations, collective
investments, and collective savings.
Collective donations are generally associated with development infrastructure
projects and income-generating projects. The goal of this activity is to “harness the potential
of migrants for development” in their country or community of origin (Schuttler 2008) and
create a cooperative, participatory relationship with community members. Collective
investments represents a pooling of resources following an economic logic involving risk and
return on investments. Immigrants invest in projects to create jobs in their country of origin
with the expectation of a profitable investment. Schuttler (2008) points out that this may also
represent emotional and social ties to the country and that behavior such as this may enhance
the investor’s social standing in both their country of origin and among immigrants in their
country of residence. Collective saving represents a way for immigrants to participate in
development though microfinance institutions (MFIs). Collective deposits from diaspora
organizations provide funds for individuals in smaller cities or rural communities as MFIs
target micro-entrepreneurs and low-income individuals. However, as with individual or
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household remittances, the effectiveness of collective action is limited by the structures and
environment in the receiving area.
5.3 Current Remittance Levels
Worldwide Remittances
The International Money Fund (IMF) defines remittances as the international transfer
of funds sent by immigrant workers from the country where they are working to people in the
country from which they came (CBO 2005). Estimated formal and informal global
remittances in 2006 reached $300 billion with approximately $199 billion arriving in
developing countries (Mohapatra, Ratha, and Xu 2006). However, the total economic impact
according to the IMF must consider not only money transfers from immigrant workers but
also the assets of returning emigrants and the compensation of workers who remain less than
a year in a “host” destination (CBO 2005, University of California at Davis 2005). Using
informal estimates, worldwide remittances may be 50% higher and may have reached as
much as $400 billion for 2006 (Gupta, Pattillo, and Wagh 2007, Mohapatra et al 2006). Inkind remittances or the transference of goods such as computers and household appliances
are not included in these figures and may total as much as one-quarter of the cash figures
(Terry and Wilson 2005)
Remittances from the United States
The United States has continued to experience a growth in number of foreign-born
residents and as a contributor to immigrant remittances. Table 5 summarizes the growth of
both foreign-born residents and the volume of remittances leaving the United States since
2000.
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The United States represents the single largest source of global remittances and
accounts one-third of the global money flow measured (Mohapatra et al 2006, CBO 2005).
Money transfers increased from $4.1 billion in 1981 to $25.5 billion in 2003. Monies
transferred represent a figure higher than the official foreign aid or foreign investment in as
many as a dozen countries and have become a significant source of external funds in these
countries. In 2002, United States developmental assistance and development aid totaled
$15.6 billion while remittances from the United States equaled $23.1 billion the same year.
The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) estimates a remittance growth of 5.6% annually in
comparison to the 3.8% growth in the foreign-born population per year during the period of
1981 to 2003 (CBO 2005). Using all three forms of flow as defined by the IMF, outflow
from the United States equaled $33.7 billion in 2002. The United States global share of
outflow increased from a figure of 17% in 1981 to a level of 35% in the year 2003 (CBO
2005) with Latin America representing one of the largest recipients of remittance dollars. A
2004 survey of Latin Americans living in the United States indicated that 61% of immigrants
sent money to their country of origin with an average of three thousand dollars annually per
sender (CBO 2005). Significant ethnic variations are found in the amount of remittances
returned to country of origin and such factors as length of time in the United States, age of
the immigrant, and residence of minor children effect remittance amounts. Immigrants with
minor children residing in their country of origin are twice as likely to remit as immigrants
with no children (CBO 2005). As stated earlier, the flow of capital from immigrant workers
has a significant impact on the country of origin. Therefore, it is important to understand the
motivations for immigrants to engage in remittance behavior as well as the predictors that
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may indicate a willingness to send money to family and friends residing in their country of
origin.

62

Chapter 6

Models and Hypotheses

A broad working definition of globalization is provided by Steger (2003: 10) who
states, “[globalization] refers to a multidimensional set of social processes that create,
multiply, stretch, and intensify worldwide social interdependencies and exchanges while at
the same time fostering in people a growing awareness of deepening connections between the
local and the distant.” My purpose is to use theories of globalization to extend traditional
demographic models that predict remittance behavior among a cohort of legal immigrants to
the United States. The examination should verify previously established relationships
between demographic characteristics of immigrants and their remittance behavior while also
testing previously unexplored hypotheses of remittance behavior of immigrants suggested by
work on globalization.
6.1 Need for new models
Gouldner (1970: 94) states “society has been parceled out analytically among the
various social sciences” and that each has a “distinctive analytical interest.” Nowhere is this
more evident than in the attempt to understand migration and remittance behavior. Each
disciple has designed a particular approach to understanding these social phenomenons
(Wallerstein 2001); yet, some scholars suggest that a more holistic approach (Guarnizo 2003)
should be applied. Gouldner (1970) suggests, “the most basic change in any science
commonly derive not so much from invention of new research techniques but rather from
new ways of looking at data that may have long existed” (p. 34). This research attempts to
do just that. Understanding immigration and remittance behavior requires bringing global
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complexities to bear on what takes place at the local level (Sassen 2007). It is not easy to
disentangle the global and the local while continuing to grasp simultaneously the
implications of both. Sassen (2007: 4) states “the strength of the canon [of Political Science
and Sociology] poses difficulties when it comes to opening up to the possibility of global
formation and their multiscalar character” and “existing theory is not enough to map today’s
multiplication or practices and actors contributing to [these] rescaling” (p. 6). She suggests a
need to seek out alternative approaches to understanding global behavior while using existing
national and sub-national data sets designed to measure factors unrelated to globalization.
Spellman (2002) echoes this sentiment:
“It is perhaps useful to consider a wider range of variables when attempting to
understand international migration over the past half century, and into the next.
Individual calculations about a better lifestyle, household decisions to allow certain
members to migrate with the goal of assisting those back home (a form of insurance
in countries where there are no state-backed unemployment and insurance schemes),
fear or direct experience of persecution at the hands of intolerant regimes, response to
famine, and capitalist market penetration into previously stable agriculture societies –
all undoubtedly play a role in the complicated migration phenomenon.” (p. 221)
Remittance behavior has been a prime topic of research (Guarnimo 2003) and it often
reflects immigrant’s attachment to their country of origin (Massey et al 2006, Diaz-Briquets
and Perez-Lopez 1997) but simple demographic approaches offer only limited insights
(Guarnino 2003) and overstate the importance of certain variables as definitive rather than
associative (Boon 2006). I argue that to more fully understand remittance behavior;
researchers must incorporate variables from various areas of inquiry and create new models
that illuminate the complex nature of immigrant money transfers while producing a
generalized portrait of immigrants who remit (Boon 2006). Combining variables from
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demographic models and globalization theory should offer a broader understanding of
immigrant’s propensity to remit and the amounts remitted.
6.2 Models and Variables of Interest
For a number of years, demographers have analyzed the relationships between
characteristics of immigrants and their propensity to remit (IMF 2006, Vanwey 2004,
Conway and Cohen 1998, Jones 1998, Lianos 1997, Itzigsohn 1995, Lucas and Stark 1985).
They have used a variety of indicators to estimate the likelihood that immigrants will send
money back to their country of origin. Remittance behavior is often viewed as taking place
primarily at the local and at a national level but the global dimension is excluded (Guarnizo
2003). Demographic variables commonly used to estimate remittance behavior tend to focus
on local and national macroeconomic processes and fail to address various social variants.
Globalization theory can provide insight into those social processes defined by local
interactions and structures (Sassen 2007, Guarnizo 2003, Bauman 1998) and clarify
additional characteristics that inform immigrants’ willingness to return portions of their
income; thus giving a more holistic approach to remittance behavior.
Demographic variables
Massey and Akresh (2006) state “…the social world looks quite different to people
depending on whether they are male or female, young or old, and married or single..”(p.
958), therefore, demographic variables are usually considered when examining the attitudes
and behavior of people, including immigrants. Factors commonly included in demographic
models include gender, age, education, marital status, and years in host country (DeVortez
and Vadean 2006, Massey et al 2006, Vanwey 2004, Conway and Cohen 1998, Jones 1998,
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Lianos 1997, Diaz-Briquets and Perez-Lopez 1997, Itzigsohn 1995, Lucas and Stark 1985),
relationships abroad, and personal income (DeVortez and Vadean 2006, Massey et al 2006,
DeVortez and Vadean 2005, Menjivar et al 1998).
Demographic studies of remittance behavior among US immigrants find that men are
more likely to remit than women and that younger adults are more likely to remit than older
adults (Boon et al 2006). Income and employment status determined the financial capacity of
immigrants to send moneys back to relatives in their country of origin, although many
immigrants were willing to endure hardships to support relatives left in the country of origin
(Boon et al 2006). Certainly, the presence of close relatives in the country of origin is
associated with both the willingness to remit and the amounts remitted (DeVortez and
Vadean 2006, Massey and Akresh 2006, Menjivar et al 1998), and this appears to be true of
voluntary immigrants as well as refugees and asylum seekers (Menjivar et al 1998).
Globalization variables
A review of the literature on globalization and remittances suggests a number of
additional variables that might be employed to understand the effects on the movement of
individuals and capital around the globe on remittance behavior (Sassen 2007, DeVortez and
Vadean 2006, Vanwey 2004, Stark 1991). A well-specified globalization model recognizes
migration and remittance behavior not only as a global phenomenon but also as a local one
that reflects various levels of engagement in the country of destination and country of origin.
Therefore, I propose that an examination of development levels of country of origin,
rural/urban backgrounds, an attitude of sojourning, employment status, investments located
within and without the host country, and the ability to speak the host country’s language will
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provide insight into these multiscalar (Sassen 2007) practices reflected in remittance
behavior.
Immigration has traditionally been viewed as a movement from less developed
economies to more developed economies and as a risk diversion for households located in
weaker economies (Sana 2005, Massey 1999, Glytsos 1997, Salt 1992, Stark 1991). The need
for workers in stronger economies serves as a pull factor for immigrants and “labor globally
[is] the second most primary commodity after oil” (Sana 2005: 1088). Sana (2005) also
reports that in 2001, 83% of remittances flowed to developing countries many of which have
an agricultural base. A study conducted by Rwelamira and Kristen (2003) in rural Africa
found that a significant proportion of household income reported there was derived from
immigrant’s remittances and that “in the absence of formal capital markets household are
forced to self-finance investments” (p. 3). Emigration and remittances provide the necessary
investment while continuing ties between the immigrant and household members left behind.
These ties are rarely severed (Rwelamira and Kristen 2003), indicating that many immigrants
do not plan to settle permanently in their host country, implying that they are sojourners.
Thirty to forty percent of immigrants worldwide are likely to return to their country of
origin (Boon et al 2006, Diaz-Biquets and Perez-Lopez 1997). Short-term migrants are more
prone to remit and remitters are more likely to return than non-remitters (Sana 2005, 2008).
Plans to return home have a positive impact on both propensity and volume of remittances
(Menjivar et al 1998) and more funds are remitted when the purpose is savings and
investment in the country of origin (DeVortez and Vadean 2005). Glytsos (1997) also
suggests that many immigrants have a “target savings” predetermined and once the target is
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obtained, the immigrant plans to return home. The ability to reach these goals is determined
by the employment status and class (Boon et al 2006, Massey et al 2006, Sana 2005, DiazBiquets and Perez-Lopez 1997, Glytsos 1997).
As established in the demographic literature, the capacity to remit is determined by
the ability to earn income. Menjivar, DaVanzo, Greenwell, and Valdez (1998) state:
“Whether immigrants are able to remit and the amount that they send may also be
affected by their current employment status in the United States. Immigrants who are
employed full time would be in a better position to remit and remit more than those
who are not working or are working part time, because they have a more stable source
of income.” (p. 101)
Boon and his colleagues (2006) describe the capacity to earn as a key determinate in
the ability to send money home and to make investments in both country of origin and host
country. Both assets in the country of origin (Massey et al 2006, Sana 2005) and home
ownership in the host country (Sana 2008, Massey et al 2006, DeVortez and Vadean 2005,
Sana 2005, Menjivar et al 1998) are key indicators of remittance behavior. Investments
abroad indicate a “divested material interest” (Massey et al 2006) while home ownership in
the host country indicates a positive relationship and attachment to the country of destination
(Menjivar et al 1998) and both may be a reflection of the immigrant’s ability to speak
English.
English proficiency is a key indicator of labor market attainment (Menjivar et al
1998). A lack of English skills often relegates immigrants to the bottom rung of the
occupational status ladder thus affecting the capacity to remit (Sana 2005). A lack of earning
capacity and the failure to develop English proficiency may also indicate the immigrant’s
intentions to return home (Sana 2008).
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Immigration and remittance participation are complex issued that require a holist
approach combining various areas of inquiry. Theories and models from Demography and
Globalization provide two such areas of inquiry and variables taken from each of these areas
will provide a broader understanding of immigrants and remittance behavior. Table 6
represents the variables selected from Demography and Globalization that, in some form
(only one is suggested below), must be included in a fully specified remittance model.
6.2 Hypotheses
I hypothesize that globalization theory provides insight into various social processes
defined by local interactions and structures (Sassen 2007, Bauman 1998) that may also
explain remittance behavior.
Immigrants from less developed countries (LDC) are more likely to send money
home than immigrants arriving from moderately developed countries (MDC) or highly
developed countries (HDC). Remittances often are used as a survival tactic in the global
economy, especially in countries identified as less developed. Neoliberal policies (Steger
2003, Chase-Dunn et al 2000) and the use of “structural adjustment programs” by
international finance (Harvey 2005) remove state sponsored social assistance in LDCs and
force individuals and households to seek other alternatives to build social capital or to
survive. According to Jones (1998: 4) “[the immigrants] are the safety net for the poor left
behind by the agglomerative behavior of international capital, by the preoccupation of the
international community with other matters, and by the indifference of their own
governments.” Remittances become a strategy for survival and mobility under these
circumstances. Therefore, I hypothesize:
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H1: Controlling for demographic characteristics, US immigrants from less developed
countries (LDC) are more likely to remit than immigrants from moderately (MDC)
and highly developed countries (HDC).
Migration and remittances serve to replace lost state assistance for many rural and
urban immigrants from LDCs. A considerable number of immigrants are from rural areas
(Martin, Abella and Kuptsch. 2006) and they often use remittances to supplement income of
family members left in the country of origin (Itzigsohn 1995, Jones 1990). These facts would
suggest a greater propensity of individuals from rural backgrounds to send money back to
relatives in their home country. I hypothesize:
H2: Controlling for demographic characteristics, US immigrants originating from
rural backgrounds are more likely to remit than immigrants originating from urban
backgrounds.
The phenomenon of remitting to rural areas may also be related to ties with the land
and a desire to build social capital thorough the acquisition of property (Gupta et al 2007,
CBO 2005, Vanwey 2004). The building of social capital in the country of origin lends
credence to the thought that many immigrants intend to return home and that asset
accumulation in country of origin underlies remitting behavior (Airola 2007). Portes and
Walton (1981) assert that immigration does not encompass entire nations but particular
sectors, migration is not generally coerced but encouraged through inducements both
internally and externally, and immigration streams are composed of individuals moving to
sell their labor. Immigrants who return to their country of origin often or on a regular basis
are more likely to send money home. These factors would seemingly indicate that many
international migrants are sojourners, and that temporary immigration is a viable economic
strategy (Chew and Liu 2004). Immigrants who do not wish to permanently migrate and
assimilate tend to remit more and “to leave for prolonged visits overseas” (Massey and
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Akresh 2006: 957) and immigrants who wish to maintain a status in their country of origin
use remittances and visits to do so (Sana 2005).
I hypothesize:
H3: Controlling for demographic characteristics, US immigrants who return most
frequently to their country of origin are more likely to remit than those who
immigrate infrequently.
Many empirical studies of immigration and remittance behavior have ignored the
possible differences in occupational categories among immigrants, so there exists a need to
disaggregate the analysis of immigration and remittance behavior according to class of
worker (Brown and Connell 2006). Brown and Connell (2006) suggest that immigrants,
especially immigrants whose country of origin depends on remittances for economic reasons,
choose occupations for their remittance potential. Similarly, a 2002 survey of overseas
Filipinos (SOF 2003) found significant differences between occupation groups and amounts
remitted.
New immigrants enter into a spectrum of jobs ranging from unskilled workers who
may be unemployed or working for wages to professional that often enter into selfemployment (Alba and Nee 1999). Alba and Nee (1999) state, “Researchers agree that selfemployment constitutes an important aspect of the immigrant experience” (p.153) and
Massey (1999) observes that most immigrants begin as wage earners with a specific goal of
improving their status or well-being in their country of origin. Other research indicates that
immigrant entrepreneurs use capital earned in the United States as a method of capitalizing
business start-ups in their country of origin (Portes 1997). Not only do these practices inform
sojourning but they may also indicate the types of employment sought in the country of
destination. Self-employed immigrants may experience a conflict between good business
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practices such as reinvestment and the desire to remit. Self–employed immigrants may seek
additional wage-employment as a way to reconcile these contradictions thus indicating types
of employment may affect remittance behavior (Brown and Connell 2006, Portes 1997). I
hypothesize:
H4: Controlling for demographic characteristics, US immigrants who own assets in
their country of origin are more likely to remit than individuals with no assets in their
country of origin.
H5: Controlling for demographic characteristics, US immigrants who are employed
full-time are more likely to remit than immigrants employed part-time or not at all.
H6: Controlling for demographic characteristics, US immigrants who are selfemployed are less likely to remit than immigrants who work for others or who work
for others and self. Immigrants who do not work at all are less likely to send
remittances than the self-employed.
English proficiency also affects the ability to earn (Sana 2005, Menjivar et al 1998)
and immigrants who learn English may plan to stay longer in the country of destination and
thus, have weaker attachments to the country of origin (Menjivar et al 1998). A failure to
learn English is also associated with lower levels of assimilation (Sana 2008, Glytos 1997).
Consequently, I also hypothesize:
H7: Controlling for demographic characteristics, US immigrants who speak English
well are more likely to remit than immigrants who speak English poorly or who do
not speak English.
The use of theories of globalization to extend traditional demographic models of
remittance behavior among a cohort of legal immigrants to the United States should reify
previous demographic findings predicting remittance behavior while shedding light on
previously suggested but untested hypotheses of remittance behavior among immigrants. I
will test this assertion in the following chapters.
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Chapter 7

Methodology and Data

Data from this study are taken from the New Immigrant Survey (NIS).The NIS is the
first attempt at a national survey of legal immigrants in the United States, and it represents an
effort to fill the gap between existing data and informational needs concerning that
adaptation of immigrants (NIS 2003). The ultimate purpose of the NIS is the creation of a
public use database containing both pre- and post-immigration information. A collaborative
effort by RAND, Princeton University, New York University and Yale University, the NIS is
ultimately intended to be a longitudinal study. Currently, only the first wave of data is
publicly available.
The NIS sample for Wave I was drawn from a complete list of all immigrants
admitted to legal permanent residence (LPR or “green card”) by the United States Office of
Citizenship and Immigration (USCIS) and the Office of Immigration Statistics (OIS)
between May and November 2003. Respondents are adult immigrants 18 and older who hold
visas as principal immigrants or as accompanying spouses. Principals are defined as
immigrants to whom the United States grants visas because they have met the eligibility
criteria set forth for various classes of admission.
Respondents were interviewed between September 2003 and February 2004 (NIS
2003). The 8,573 completed surveys were drawn from four strata: spouses of United States
citizens, employment principals, diversity principals, and other immigrants. The sample
includes both “new-arrival” immigrants who arrive in the United States with documents
obtained abroad and “adjustee” immigrants who were already in the United States with a
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temporary nonimmigrant visa (NIS 2003). Many “adjustees” are immigrants who spent at
least some time in the United States as unauthorized immigrants.
Because immigrants demonstrate substantial geographic clustering in their settlement
patterns, most respondents were drawn from the 85 largest US metropolitan areas. Interviews
were conducted in person or by phone in seven languages with key concepts prepared in an
additional seven languages. Sixty percent of the interviews were made by phone; the
remaining interviews were conducted face-to-face.
The NIS provides data on demographic background, health measures, preimmigration history, family connections and structure, the use of transfers (financial
assistance), and economic history including assets abroad and in the United States for both
adults and children. Data are divided into various mergeable thematic files. Only adult
interviews were used for the analyses presented in this study. I used the September 2007
revised release from the following data files: demographic (file A), pre-immigration history
(files B and B-ppp), employment (file C), income (files G and G-ppp), assets (files H and Hppp), transfers (files I and I-ppp), social (file J), migration history (file K), appendum (file
N), roster, and the Office of Citizenship and Immigration Services pre-load file. The pre-load
file contains information taken directly from LRP applications and was not collected during
the survey. PPP files contain the currency amounts of various indicators converted to US
dollars using purchasing power parity over consumption (see Appendix B). The data in these
files allow, for the first time, an examination of remittance behavior among a nationally
representative cohort of legal immigrants that controls from pre-immigration conditions.
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Unfortunately, the sample limits the ability to generalize beyond a single cohort of legal
permanent residents to the United States.
7.1 Variables
Dependent variables
The characteristics that affect remittance behavior are the focus of the study. The
purpose is to determine who remits, how much do they remit, and what do they remit. In
order to do this, it is necessary to have an operational definition of remittances that has
content validity as a measure of remittance sending. This is not easy. Remittances have been
conceptualized as monies sent from the United States and by immigrants, which arrive in the
immigrant’s country of origin (CBO 2000). However, in many studies, any immigrant who
states that they transferred money anywhere is treated as engaging in remittance behavior
(DeVortez and Vadean 2006). This is exemplified by a 2006 Canadian study on remittances
and social relations by DeVortez and Vadean (2006: 11) who note “Data used in this study
does not allow us to differentiate between transfers sent inside or outside Canada.”
Consequently, they treat all transfers as remittances for the purpose of the study.
The NIS is designed to determine financial transfers that take place among the study
population. A series of questions were asked to determine to whom money was sent and how
much money was sent (see Appendix B). For example, a respondent might be asked,” During
the last twelve months, did you give any financial assistance (such as gifts, transfers,
bequests, or loans) to your spouse during periods when he/she was not living with you in the
same house?” followed by “How much did you give during the last twelve months to your
spouse during periods when he/she was not living with you in the same house? However,
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only portions of receivers are later identified by the respondent as living outside the United
States. Rather than treat all individuals who participated in financial transfers as remitters, as
previous scholars have done (DeVortez and Vadean 2006), I split my sample. All
respondents who send money to other people were designated as givers while respondents
who stated that they gave financial help to a spouse, children, or parents and identified those
people as living abroad were classified as remitters. Thus, using the precedent set by earlier
studies, I can analyze a population of individuals who transfer funds (see Appendix B), and I
can compare the factors that predict such giving to a category of “true remitters” for whom
we know the money is going overseas. It should be noted that neither analysis is ideal. On the
one hand, the sample of givers is inflated because it is drawn on the assumption that all
money sent to friends and relatives represents remittances. On the other hand, the sample of
remitters is biased, because it does not include sending to places that cannot be identified.
Some of these places may be outside of the United States. For simplicity, I describe the
methods of analysis below for the remitter subsample only; however, the same analysis will
also be replicated using the giver subsample.
Remittance behavior is examined through four dependent variables: cash remittance
(versus not), percent of wages remitted, goods versus cash remittance, and goods versus no
remittances. Cash remittance is a dichotomous variable indicating whether (=1) or not (=0)
the respondent sent cash in the last 12 months to any person known to be living abroad or, in
the case of the giver subsample, any person, regardless of their whereabouts.
Dollar amount remitted is operationalized as the amount of cash remitted , converted
to constant US dollars, where necessary. Earned income is constructed from four questions
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regarding the source and amount of income earned from self-employment, wages, tips, and
professional practice. The amount of cash remitted is constructed from direct questions
regarding amounts given to various friends and relatives.
Dependent measures were also created to examine the transfer of non-cash goods.
The variable goods versus cash remittance indicate that the respondent (taken from a subset
limited to respondents who sent either cash or goods abroad) sent only goods abroad (1)
versus sent only cash or goods and cash (0). The variable goods versus no remittance indicate
that the respondent (taken from a subset limited to respondents indicating they did not send
cash) sent goods (1) versus sent neither cash nor goods (0).
Demographic variables
The demographic control variables used in this study are age; sex; educational
attainment; marital status; residence of spouse, children, and parents; amount of time spent in
the United States; earned income; and refugee status. Most of these variables are direct
indicators that need no explanation. Residence of spouse, children and parents are each
dichotomous variables indicating whether (=1) or not (=0) the respondent’s spouse, any
children, or any parent lived outside the United States, respectively. Time spent in the United
States was calculated by subtracting the year of the interview from the year the respondent
reported arriving in the United States on their last entry, adding in additional time previously
spent in the country. The variable is topcoded at 25 years. Refugee status was taken from
records provided by US Citizenship and Immigration Services, indicating that the respondent
had been granted asylum or temporary protected status by the courts (=1) or not (=0).
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Because there is no straightforward measure of income in the NIS, more explanation
is needed. Although the NIS reports income from a variety of sources, there is no total
income measure. Because sources of income for all household members are not available, it
is not possible to add income from all sources to gain a single household income variable.
Additionally, although adding together all sources of personal income for the respondent can
theoretically, create total income, reported income from non-employment sources such as
Social Security, appear to be questionable. This limitation led to the less-than-ideal choice of
defining an earned income based on class of employment. Respondents were asked to
identify whether or not they had income from four sources: self-employment, professional or
trade activities, wages from hourly or salaried work, and tips, bonuses, and commissions.
Each of the questions was followed by a question about amounts earned and a series of
probes for respondents who were unsure of their earnings (see Appendix B). To impute
income based on probes, midpoints of probe categories (generally in $25,000 intervals) were
used. Respondents were encouraged to report earnings in their original currency. The
currencies were later converted to current United States dollars as indicated above.
Respondents reporting no income from any of the four work classes were considered to have
earned income of $0. The rationale for using earned income in this analysis is based upon the
fact that the capacity to earn, rather than simply having money, is a key indicator of
remittance behavior (Boon et al 2006, DeVortez and Vadean 2006, Massey et al 2006,
DeVortez and Vadean 2005, Menjivar et al 1998).
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Globalization variables
Variables of interest, derived from globalization theory, are level of development of
country of origin, rural background, sojourning, employment status, class of worker, assets
abroad, assets in the United States, and English proficiency. Development levels are based
on respondent’s reported country of birth. These countries were then designated as less
developed countries (LDC), moderately developed countries (MDC), and a highly developed
country (HDC) using a classification developed by Braun (1997, see Table 2.1) based on
World Systems Theory designations of core (HDC), semiperiphery (MDC), and periphery
(LDC) places. Individuals who stated that they lived in a rural area at age ten were
designated as immigrants from a rural back ground (=1). Both of these variables are limited
in their ability to fully operationalize their intended concept. The country of birth may not be
the country or countries to which the remitter is sending money, particularly if the immigrant
has moved several times. Similarly, an immigrant who lived in a rural area at age ten may
have moved to an urban area by age eleven. Such limitations are a frequently encountered
problem with using secondary data.
Many immigrants plan to return to their country of origin (Boon et al 2006, DiazBiquets and Perez-Lopez 1997) and the desire to return may be reflected in the number of
trips out of the United States (Massey and Akresh 2006, Sana 2005). Respondents were
asked about every international move they had made for a period of 60 days or longer, since
their first move and up to 40 moves were recorded. The sojourning variable created for this
study is based upon the number of moves from the United States to other countries (for 60+
days) and topcoded at six moves, creating a variable ranging from 0 to 6.
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Respondents reporting that they were employed more than 39 weeks out of the year
and usually worked more than 32 hours a week were classified as fulltime workers (=1).
Respondents who were not working or who were working only part-time were coded as 0.
Class of worker was determined based on four sources of earned income: self-employment,
professional or trade activities, wages from hourly or salaried work, and tips, bonuses, and
commissions. Respondents were coded as self–employed if they reported earnings from
either self-employment or professional or trade activities or both but reporting no earnings
from the other two categories. Respondents were coded as wages earners if they reported
earnings from hourly or salaried work, and tips, bonuses, and commissions but not from selfemployment and professional or trade activities. Individuals who reported earnings from
either of the self-employment categories and either of the wage categories were classified as
both self-employed and working for wages. Individuals reporting no earnings were coded as
not working (see Table 8). Class of worker is, thus, a categorical variable with self-employed
as the reference variable.
Respondents were asked to report if they owned homes in the United Sates and/or
abroad. They were also asked to report ownership of foreign real estate, businesses, farms,
and transportation equipment. Respondents were also asked whether or not they had accounts
in a foreign bank. Individuals reporting any foreign property or bank accounts were coded 1,
while those reporting none were coded 0. Likewise, individuals who reported owning a home
in the United States were coded 1, with all others at 0.
English proficiency was self-reported, with respondents classifying themselves as
“speaks English very well,” “speaks English well,” “does not speak English well,” and ‘does
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not speak English.” “ Does not speak English” is the reference category. Table7 summarizes
the variables used in this study and the expected relationship of dependent variables to
independent variables.
7.2 Missing Data
As with most datasets, it is important to guard against biases arising from missing
data. Table 8 presents a summary of the variables used, variable labels, descriptions of the
variables, and the percentage of missing cases. Respondents who refused to answer questions
or who answered “I don’t know” were coded as a missing values. Earned income is the only
variable where many respondents were unable or unwilling to respond. However, because the
NIS had a series of income probes for those who initially reported “I don’t know,” even in
that case there are no real missing cases. Hence, other than using the income probes to
impute income, no other measures were taken to control for missingness.
In some cases of dichotomous variables, individuals not answering in the positive to a
question were coded 0, if it made sense to do so. For example, respondents who were unable
to answer the question about children located abroad because they were unaware of children
or not sure of the location were coded as not having a child abroad, since it was assumed that
immigrants who have children are more likely to remit (to them) than those who do not.
Obviously, if a person does not know where their child(ren) are, they are unlikely to send
them money. It is important to note, however, as Table 8 shows, that such responses were
extremely rare.
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7.3 Descriptive Statistics
The original population of the NIS consisted of 8573 respondents. Listwise deletion
of missing cases and subsampling for certain analyses resulted in final sample sizes ranging
from 3,888 to 8,364, depending on the analysis being done. Male respondents accounted for
48.2% (4,133) of the population of which 68.3% (5,856) were married. The average age of
the respondents was 39 with the youngest being 19 years old, and majority had spent nine or
more years in the United States. At least 50% (5,231) of the population had a high school
diploma or higher degree with only 32% (2,745) reporting that they had not finished high
school. Only 18% (1,548) reported that they were unable to speak English while 52.8%
(4,530) reported an ability to speak English well or very well. Fifty percent (4,296) reported
no income and 75% (6,423) reported an income of less than $13,500 (see Appendix B).
Using the criteria for dependent variable creation discussed above, I was able to identify
14.6% (1,248) respondents who stated that they provided financial (cash) assistance to
someone, somewhere but only 9.9% (848) that could be classified as true (cash) remitters
(see Appendix B). Of those answering that they provide non-financial (goods) assistance,
only 2.7% (195) could be identified as remitters. Demographic results are summarized in
Table 9.
7.4 Analysis
Analysis 1: Characteristics of remitters
In the first analysis, I examined the characteristics that differentiate cash remitters
from non-remitters (and givers from non-givers). The sample for Analysis I consists of
immigrants who sent cash remittances in the last year versus those immigrants who sent
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nothing. Immigrants sending non-financial assistance (goods) only were eliminated from the
sample.
Because the dependent variable is dichotomous, I utilized logistic regression
techniques to model the general equation:
Logit (p) = b0 = b1X1 + b2X2 + b3X3 +….. +b kXk
where p is the probability of presence of the characteristic of interest (remitting), the bs are
the resultant regression coefficients, and the Xs are the various predictors added to the model.
Logits that resulted from the analysis were converted to logged odds using the identity
logit(p) = ln[p/1-p]
in order to provide a substantive interpretation to the findings, beyond simply direction and
significance.
Many studies have used logistical regression as an alternative to ordinary least
squares(OLS) regression when examining immigrant behavior (Frank and Aguilers 2004,
Hummer 2002) and particularly to identify characteristics determining the likelihood of
remittance behavior (Sana and Massey 2005, Menjivar et al 1998) because the latter is found
to be less than ideal when determining dichotomous outcomes (Peng, Lee and Ingersoll
2002).The design of logistic regression allows the researcher to analyze the relationship
between interval-level independent variable and a binary dependent variable (Pollock2006,
Acock 2006) such to remit or not to remit. Logistic regression predicts the probability or
likelihood of the behavior for each independent variable by creating an estimate called a
logit. Although the behavior’s relationship to the independent variable may be nonlinear, the
logit represents a linear relationship (Pollock 2006, Acock 2006). The formula:
83

Logit (p) = b0 = b1X1 + b2X2 + b3X3 +….. +b kXk
may have an appearance similar to OLS regression, but there is a definite contrast as the
coefficients of interest are expressed in terms of logged odds of the dependent variable,
remitters, in this study. Using the variable that identifies remitters (p), the constant (a) will
express the logged odds of remitting when all the variables of interest (X) are zero, and the
regression coefficient (b) will estimate the change in the logged odds for each unit change of
X (Pollock 2006). Unfortunately, logged odds are not easily interpreted in meaningful ways
until they are converted to odds ratios. Using the logit and logistic command in Stata 9, both
the coefficients and odds ratios can be determined for the independent variables. The odds
ratio gives a sense of the percent likelihood (or unlikelihood that a category of the dependent
variable will occur for each unit change in the independent variable. An odds ratio of 1
indicates no relationship or no change in the dependent variable for each unit change in the
independent variable while an odds ratio greater that 1 indicates a positive relationship and
an odds ratio less than 1 indicates a negative relationship. By subtracting the odds ratio from
1and multiplying by 100, I can estimate the percent change in the odds for each unit change
in the independent variable.
Remittance behavior is complex and as pointed out previously, the NIS has several
limitations. As with the studies cited, my goal is not to establish causality but to examine the
likelihood that immigrants will send money to friends and relatives outside the United States.
Logistic regression offers a means to express that the likelihood of remitting will or will not
occur when considering variable taken from globalization theory, but cannot definitely
determine the cause of remitting.
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Logistic regression is used ideally with a large sample in which many respondents fall
into the 1 or (p) category. My sample is large, but fewer than 500 respondents fall into the p
category for either cash or goods remittance sending. In such cases it is better to use an exact
form of logistic regression to obtain maximum likelihood estimates (Derr 2000)
unfortunately, the one known statistical program that can produce Fisher’s Exact test for
logistic regression, Stata 10, is still in developmental stages. Convergence could not be
achieved at the system’s maximum memory capacity in attempts at using the exlogistic
command with Stata 10. Consequently, I used the logistic and logit commands on Stata 9, but
I also conducted Chi-squared () test for independence and Fisher’s Exact Test on bivariate
analyses of the dichotomous dependent variables against variables derived from globalization
theory to test for statistical significance with small sample size. Although coefficients
presented in the logistic regression here should be interpreted with caution, the results of the
Fisher’s Exact Test add additional support for the findings.
Analysis II: Dollar amount of earned income remitted
In the second analysis, I examined the factors that predict the dollar amount of
income remitted from among those that remit (and a percent of income given by those who
give). The sample is limited, therefore, to immigrants who sent cash remittances. The
dependent variable is amount remitted in US constant dollars. Using multiple regression
allows me to examine those variables that impact the amount of money sent to relatives and
friend outside the United States or dollar amount of wages remitted. The general formula for
multiple regression is written as:
Ŷ= b0 + b1X1 + b2X2 +b3X3…..bkXk
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where Ŷis the predicted value of the dependent variable, b0 is the intercept or constant, b k is
the regression coefficient for the effect of Xk and X is the independent variable. When
holding all other variables constant (controlled), I can observe the impact on the dependent
variable of a one unit change occurring in the selected independent variable. Truncated
regression coefficients and standardized coefficients (i.e., betas) are reported on models. An
examination of betas will also allow me to determine the relative importance of the
predictors, while coefficients will allow me to check variables against the hypothesized sign.
Analysis III: Goods remittance
In the third analysis, I examine the characteristics of immigrants who send non-cash
remittances. This will have two parts. In the first analysis, the dependent variable will
differentiate goods senders versus cash only senders. In the second analysis, the dependent
variable will differentiate good senders versus immigrants sending nothing. Ideally, one
multinomial logistic regression analysis would be conducted to simultaneously compare all
three groups, but small sample sizes limit the use of multinomial regression, which requires
at least 500 cases in each category (Leon 2004). Instead, logistic regression analysis was
used based on the same logic described for Analysis I. Because two analyses are used, the
probability of error doubles, so the results of the two analyses will not be used
comparatively. Logistic regression coefficients (with significance levels) are reported.
Control variables and variables of interest remain the same in all of my analyses.
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Chapter 8

The Propensity to Remit

Remittance behavior represents a complex interaction between immigrants and
individuals who remain in their country of origin. Often migration and remittance decisions
are made by households and the immigrant. However, once the member of the household has
emigrated, a number of factors may influence their desire and ability to send money home to
family and friends left behind. The purpose of the study is to suggest that a more holistic
approach may be used to examine remittance behavior rather than to establish causal
characteristics. This chapter examines a number of predictors that may indicate immigrants
who are likely to remit cash while residing in their host country.
I used previous demographic studies and globalization theory to construct two models
for examining characteristics that might influence the propensity to remit. Data from the NIS
were used to generate the dependent variable remitters who are defined as immigrants who
reside in the United States as LPRs and send cash to friends or relatives that live abroad (=1)
or did not send money(=0). Remitters are distinguished from givers who are defined as
immigrants who reside in the United States as LRPs and send cash to someone somewhere
(see Appendix C for an analysis of givers). Using a series of questions asking if the
respondent sent money to their spouse, child, or parent (see Appendix B) combined with
specific questions about the location of these individuals abroad (versus in the United States),
I was able to identify 848 respondents that could be classified as remitters. Because the
dependent variable is dichotomous, I constructed logit and logistic regression models to test
my hypotheses and to obtain log odds and odds ratios for the independent variables.
Specifically, I examine three models: a modified replication in which known demographic
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predictors are tested in their ability to differentiate remitter sand non-remitters in the NIS
sample (referred to hereafter as the demographic model), a model in which variables taken
from various globalization theories and studies are tested in their ability to differentiate
remitters from non-remitters (referred to hereafter as the globalization model), and a model
combining all predictors (referred to hereafter as the full model). The logit and logistic
results for all three models are presented in Table 10.
The results of the demographic model indicate that many of the variables selected
from the demographic literature behave as expected with this sample of immigrants. The
overall model is significant at the p<.001 level according to the model chi-square statistic and
has a McFadden pseudo R2 of .13. Males are 23% less likely to remit than females (p<.001)
and as respondent’s age increases by one year, they are 2% less likely to remit (p<.001). In
the demographic model, neither years of education nor being married affected the propensity
to remit. Respondents reporting close relatives living outside the United States were more
likely to be remitting (p<.001). Individuals who reported a spouse living abroad were four
times more likely to remit than those whose spouse resided in the United States (p<.001).
Respondents with at least one child abroad were 5.6 times more likely to remit than
individuals whose children resided in the United States (p<.001) while respondents with at
least one parent abroad were three times as likely to remit than individuals with no parent
abroad (p<.001). The length of time spent in the United States was not significant in the
demographic model nor were income categories, marital status, refugee status or educational
attainment. Only 58 remitters identified themselves as refugees and represented less than 7%
of the remitter population. Since my data are limited to a single cohort of legal immigrants,
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this may account for the small differences between my findings and those of previous
studies.
The results of the globalization model show that the model is significant at the p<.001
level according to the model chi-square statistic with a McFadden pseudo R2 of .11. When
compared to respondents who originated in LDCs, respondents who came from MDCs were
37% less likely to remit (p<.001) while respondents from HDCs were 57% less likely to
remit (p<.001). Respondent’s rural background was not significant, but this may be due to
measurement difficulties. Remittances supply essential capital flow to rural areas with an
agriculture base (Rwelamira and Kristen 2003), and 37 percent of the sample used here
identified themselves as living in a rural area at the age of ten. It is possible, however, that
respondents may have moved by age 11 and established residence in an urban area.
Unfortunately, this cannot be established with the data available. Making one or more
international moves increases a respondent’s likelihood of remitting by 21% with each
additional move (p<.001). Fulltime employment (versus not) was not significant but the class
of employment proved to have a significant impact on the propensity to remit (p<.001).
Respondents who were self employed were approximately five times more likely to remit
than individuals with no employment(p<.001) while individuals who worked for wages were
seven times more likely to remit than unemployed individuals (p<.001). Respondents who
reported some form of self-employment and who state they also worked for wages were 8.4
times more likely to be sending cash to individuals abroad than individuals who reported that
they were not working (p<.001). Owning assets abroad and ownership of a home in the
United States were not significant in the globalization model but may be a reflection of the
small number of respondents claiming ownership. Only 98 remitters (11%) stated that they
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possessed assets outside the United States while less than 1% (n=7) stated that owned a home
in the United States. For the defined sample, English proficiency was negatively related to
the propensity to remit with those speaking English very well being 39% less likely to remit
than individuals who did not speak English at all (p<.001) and those who spoke English well
were 24% less likely to remit than individuals who did not speak English (p<.05). Remitters
who spoke English poorly were not significantly different from non-speakers.
The full model had a superior fit to both the demographic and globalization models.
In a model to model comparison using a likelihood ratio test, the full model to demographic
model comparison yields a p-value of less than .001 allowing me to conclude that adding the
globalization theory-derived variables significantly improves the predictive power of the
model. The same is true in a full model to globalization model comparison, thus, suggesting
that the integration of globalization and demographic variables will allow a better
understanding of remittance behavior.
The full model is significant at the p<.001 level according to the model chi-square
statistic and has a McFadden pseudo R2 of .23. Males are 22% less likely to remit than
females (p<.001) and as respondent’s educational attainment increases by one year, they are
2% less likely to remit (p<.001). In the full model, neither age nor being married affected the
propensity to remit. Respondents reporting close relatives living outside the United States
were more likely to be remitting (p<.001). Individuals who reported a spouse living abroad
were three times more likely to remit than those whose spouse resided in the United States
(p<.001). Respondents with at least one child abroad were 6.2 times more likely to remit
than individuals whose children resided in the United States (p<.001) while respondents with
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at least one parent abroad were three times as likely to remit than individuals with no parent
abroad (p<.001). The length of time spent in the United States was significant in the full
model and for each year residing in the United States, remitters were 5% more likely to remit
(p<.001). Once again, income categories and refugee status were not significant in the full
model. Respondents originating in HDCs remained significant and were 42% less likely to
remit than individuals who originated in LDCs (p<.01). Respondents making one or more
international trips were 25% more likely to remit with each additional trip outside the United
States border (p<.001) Class of worker remained significant (p<.001). Respondents who
were self employed were 4.3 times more likely to remit than individuals with no employment
(p<.001) while individuals who worked for wages were seven times more likely to remit than
unemployed individuals (p<.001). Respondents who reported some form of self-employment
and who state they also worked for wages were nine times more likely to be sending cash to
individuals abroad than individuals who reported that they were not working (p<.001).
Assets abroad, US home ownership, and English proficiency were not significant in the full
model.
It must be noted that in the full model some regression coefficients increase with the
combination of demographic and globalization variables. For example, coefficients for
children and parents abroad increased from the demographic model to the full model as well
as development level of country of origin. As this suggested an interaction effect most likely
between location of parents and LDCs, I tested for differences in parents located in LDCs
versus parents not located abroad and found no significant interaction. I tested several other
logical interactions but was, likewise, unable to establish a significant interaction effect.
From this, I can only conclude that some results in the full model may indicate a suppressor
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effect that is being created by unexplained homogeneity that cannot be explained with these
data. Although some large significances changes occur with relatively small coefficient
changes, I believe this can be explained by the multicolineariry between the independent
variables and while this makes the models less stable, the intercorrelation is not enough to
nullify my results. I reiterate, however, that the importance of the analysis is that the models
give an expanded appreciation for the factors that may inform the propensity to remit.
Although the fluctuations in the coefficients cannot be explained, they are minimal and
perhaps not significant.
The results of this analysis of this sample of remitters reinforce the complexity of
remittance decisions and the variations in factors that may influence immigrants to send of
monies to other individuals. The importance of having close relatives residing outside the
United States is reinforced by the increased likelihood of sending monies and although, the
income categories were not significant the results suggests that the amount earned is not as
important as the ability to earn. While self-employment and working for wages are
significant (p<.001), the fact that remitters who seek some sort of wage job in addition to self
employment are nine times more likely to remit than those not employed supports the need to
examine types of employment as well as job categories (Brown and Connell 2006).
Immigrants’ plans to remain or return to their country of origin (Massey and Akresh 2006,
Sana 2005, Chew and Liu 2004) are identified as a important factor in determining
remittance behavior and was supported by the sojourning variable used in the study.
Unfortunately, the results, also, reflect the difficulties that occur when using
secondary data. Small cell sizes may yield some important variables non-significant. Other
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variables do not measure concepts as neatly as can be hoped. The NIS, however, does offer
the opportunity to work with a diverse cross section of the US immigrant population and the
establishment of a more holistic and globalized approach to study immigrant behavior rather
than the specific behavior of individual nationalities or ethnic groups. The likelihood ratio
test reinforces the suggestion that adding globalization variables to remittance models will
enhance our understanding of remittance sending, and the number of significant variables
attests to the importance of considering these additional factors.

93

Chapter 9

Dollars Remitted

Immigrants surveyed in the NIS who reported that they sent money to spouses,
children or parents living outside the United States also reported the dollar amount that they
sent. These amounts as expected vary in quantity. In the previous chapter I examined the
predictors that might identify immigrants who engaged in remittance behavior. In this
chapter, I use the same characteristics to examine the dollar amounts remitted by the sample.
The NIS asked a number of questions regarding the transfer of cash from the
respondent to various individuals (see Appendix B) that were followed by questions
regarding the amount of cash sent. Respondents were allowed to indicate various currencies
used in these transfers and these amounts were then converted to constant US dollars.
Respondents who reported transferring cash to other individuals were coded as remitters and
givers using the known location of receiving individuals (see Chapter 7 and Appendix B) as
an identifier. The reported constant US dollar amounts were matched to remitters and givers
thus allowing the creation of a dollar amount remitted and a dollar amount given variable. In
this chapter, I analyze the dollar amount remitted. An analysis and discussion of dollar
amount given is found in Appendix D. Remitted dollars represent cash sent to individuals
living outside the United States in contrast to transferred dollars that represent monies given
to others whose location may not be known. Using the same demographic and globalization
models created for examining the propensity to remit (see Chapter 8), I examined the
relationship of the variables to the dollar amount remitted. Because there is almost no
literature that attempts to examine the impact of remitter characteristics on the amount of
remittances sent, variables for both the demographic model and the global model were
94

chosen from studies that primarily examined the characteristics of individuals who engaged
in remittance behavior defined as sending cash to relatives outside the United States (Sana
2008, Gupta et al 2007, Airola 2007, Massey et al 2006, Boon 2006, DeVortez and Vadean
2006, Brown and Connell 2006, IMF 2006, Martin, Abella and Kuptsch. 2006, Sana 2005,
Vanwey 2004, Chew and Liu 2004, Guarnimo 2003, Alba and Nee 1999, Conway and
Cohen 1998, Jones 1998, Menjivar et al 1998, Portes 1997, Lianos 1997, Diaz-Briquets and
Perez-Lopez 1997, Glytsos 1997, Itzigsohn 1995, Salt 1992, Stark 1991, Lucas and Stark
1985).
OLS regression analysis rests on a set of underlying assumptions including linearity,
normality, and random distribution. In order to achieve linearity, I transformed dollar
amounts sent using its natural log. I also took steps to achieve normality and randomness.
Individuals in the sample who do not send remittances are send $0 and represent 7,539
respondents in the full model. Because of this, the distribution of the sample becomes
negatively skewed and assumptions of normality are violated. However, eliminating all of the
individuals who sent $0 violates the assumption of random distribution, and throws off any
weighting. Using truncated regression allows for the relaxation of the assumption of
normality without inflating error terms. Truncated regression will produce slopes and
standard errors that are less biased than those obtained from OLS regression in cases where
only a subset of the population is analyzed (Frone 1997). The results of the analysis are
shown in Table 11.
The demographic model is significant. The overall model is significant at the p<.05
level according to the model chi-square statistic but only one variable was significant. Age of
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the respondent was negatively related to the dollar amount sent (p<.01) and a one year
increase in age is associated with a 2% decrease in the dollar amount remitted.
The globalization model is also significant at the p<.001 level according to the model
chi-square statistic. The development level of the respondent’s country of origin is important
when determining the amount of money sent. A respondent originating from an MDC will
remit 46% (p<.001) more than respondents from LDCs while those coming from a HDC
remit 61% (p<.01) more than those from LDCs. A respondent who owns a US home will
remit 52% (p<.01) more than those who do not while those who speak English very well
send 94% (p<.001) more than those who speak no English. A respondent who reported
speaking English well sends 50% (p<.01) more than those who speak no English. Home
ownership and English proficiency may indicate a greater level of assimilation as well as a
sense of stability. Some scholars have found that remittance sending may have a long
lifespan up to 15-20 years (Haas 2007), and it indicates whether or not the motive of
remittance sending is altruistic or self-interested (Vanwey 2004, Lucas and Stark 1985).
Altruistic remitters may continue to remit after they have established themselves in their
country of destination because their motive remains the well being of friends and family left
behind. Self-interest remitters, on the other hand, attempt to build assets in their country of
origin as they plan to return. These variables may also reflect a stable and predictable income
thus allowing the respondent to send greater amounts. Arriving from an MDC or HDC may
provide an advantage (such as having a set of skills in high demand) not shared by
individuals coming from an LDC. Overall, the pattern tends to suggest that the most
advantaged respondents send the most money.
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The full model is significant at the p<.001 level according to the model chi-square
statistic. Age remains significant; for every one year increase in age, remitted amount
decreases by 2% (p<.05). Education is significant at the p<.01 level with remittance amounts
negatively related to increases in education. For each year increase in educational attainment,
remittance amount decrease 4%. A relative living abroad is positively related to the amount
remitted and a respondent with a child abroad will remit 44% more than respondents who do
not have children abroad (p<.001), while a respondent with a parent abroad remit 44% more
than respondents who do not have a parent abroad(p<.05). Development levels of country of
origin also remained significant in the full model (p<.001).
Origin in an MDC results in a 52% increase in the dollar amount remitted (p<.001)
over those living in an LDC while originating in an HDC represents a 77% increase in the
amount remitted over those living in an LDC. Coming from rural background (versus urban)
results in less money being remitted. Those from a rural background send 31% less than
those from an urban background (p<.05). US home ownership and English proficiency
remain positively related to the dollar amount remitted. Respondents owning a home in the
United States send 88% more than those who do not(p<.001) and those speaking English
send 84% more than those who speak no English (p<.001). Those who speak English well
send 48%more than those who speak no English (p<.01). The findings with regard to English
ability and home ownership run counter to suggestions that such factors are predictors of
intent to return to country of origin (and thus have greater motivation to feather a nest
abroad); however, the findings are consistent with the idea that those with greater resources
(as indicated by speaking the dominant language and owning a home) have more
discretionary income to send abroad.
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The demographic model does little to explain variations in the dollar amount remitted
by US immigrants but the globalization model provides more insights into who may send
more. The more holistic approach using the combination of predictors expands the
characteristics that one might observe when trying to determine which immigrants might
send greater amounts over time. The full model suggests that immigrants who have gained a
degree of economic stability through assimilation as represented by proficiency in English
and home ownership are more likely to be sending greater amounts. This fact may also
reflect that these immigrants arrive from MDCs and HDCs. However, the fact that the
respondent has a parent or child who lives abroad increases the dollar amount that they are
likely to remit.
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Chapter 10

The Propensity to Send Goods

In the previous chapters, I used demographic studies and globalization theory to test
models for examining characteristics that might influence the propensity to send cash money
to others and the amount of cash sent, but cash is not the only form of transfers that
represents sending something of value to others. People also send textiles, furniture, jewelry,
and other goods to family and friends living abroad. For example, migrant farmworkers
purchase fabrics unavailable in the home villages to send to wives and mothers in Mexico,
and Filipino immigrants may make return visits to their country of origin laden with boxes of
gifts for their former countrymen (Sana 2005, Pido 1985). In this chapter, I explore this form
of remittance sending.
Respondents to the NIS were asked if they provided assistance to others in the form
of clothes, furniture, household goods, tools, vehicles, or livestock. Data from the NIS were
used to generate the dependent variable transfers goods which is defined as indicating
immigrants who reside in the United States as LPRs and send goods to friends or relatives
that live abroad (=1) or did not send goods (=0). Goods are defined as any item sent to
friends and relatives other than cash transfers. The NIS, however, asked only about goods
were that sent to someone other than spouse, child, or parent and thus poses three difficulties
for the analysis. First, I am further limited in my ability to determine whether or not these
goods were sent abroad (see Appendix B)since the NIS does not reveal whether or not
individuals beyond spouses, children, or parents of the respondent are abroad or not. Second,
it is not entirely clear to whom these goods were intended. A child or elderly parent might be
under the guardianship of a friend or relative and their presence might influence the sending
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of goods to that guardian. Third, the variable does not capture the full range of remittance
giving because it does not include goods remittances sent directly to parents, spouses, or
children.
Despite these limitations, there is still some value in examining goods sending. The
analysis of remitters versus givers (see Chapter 8 and Appendix B) and other remittance
research (DeVortez and Vadean 2006) suggests that many transfers can be treated as
remittances even if the exact location of the receiver cannot be positively identified. There
are 246 respondents who reported transferring goods in the previous year. To examine the
propensity to send goods, I used logit and logistic regression analysis. However, because
logistic regression analysis is most robust in a model with this many predictors when there
are at least 280 cases in each category, I also conducted chi-squared () tests for
independence and Fisher’s exact test to determine the significance of the chi-squared
relationship on bivariate analyses of the dichotomous dependent variables against variables
derived from globalization theory to lend credence to any subsequent findings from the
logistic regression analysis. The results of the bivariate analyses are shown in Table 12.
Although the chi-square test only establishes a relationship between variables
(Singleton and Straits 2005), it is “the oldest and most widely applied test for statistical
significance” (Pollock 2006: 121) and gives the researcher inferential power to make
decisions about the variables. Larger chi-square values generally indicate a greater certainty
that a relationship exists. Because the overall sample size (n = 7971) would likely yield
statistically significant relationships for all chi-square test, the non-significant results are
particularly interesting. From these tests, a relationship is not observable between remitters
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and the globalization variables except originating in a country describes as less developed
(LDC) versus not. Rural background (p<.01), fulltime employment (p<.05), and assets
owned abroad (p<.001) are also significantly associated with transferring goods.
Based upon the appearance of a relationship between the propensity to send goods
and some of the globalization characteristics, despite the small cell size in the sending goods
category, I used logistic regression and logit modeling to examine three models similar to
those in the previous chapters: a demographic model, a globalization model, and a full
model. The logit and logistic results for all three models are presented in Table 13.
The results of the demographic model indicate that many of the variables selected
from the demography literature did not behave in the same manner as expected for cash
remitters (see Chapter 8) which is not entirely surprising since these variables were derived
from models that predict the likelihood of sending cash. The overall model is significant at
the p<.001 level according to the model chi-square statistic and has a McFadden pseudo R2
of .04. The model produced three significant variables education, marital status, and income.
For every one year increase in educational attainment, the respondent was 9% more likely to
send goods to others (p<.001) which may be an indication of highly skilled immigrants
whose families receive gifts or goods rather than cash remittances. Married individuals were
32% less likely to be sending goods to others (p<.05). Sixty percent of those who transferred
goods were married. The results likely reflect household strategies for survival and
assimilation as well as the establishment of the family in the host country since both spouses
are present. In so far as goods sending is an extra (something in addition to money) and since
the transfer of goods did not include transfers to spouses, children, or parents (see appendix
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B), we can expect that those who are not married may have more extraneous cash to spend on
gifts for friends and families abroad. This notion is supported by the results that indicate that
income may play an important role in the ability to purchase items to send. Individuals
earning more than $13,500 and less than $40,000 were 77% more likely to be sending goods
than respondents earning less than $13,500 (p<.01) and respondents earning greater than
$40,000 were 93% more likely to provide goods to others than those who earned less than
$13,5000 (p<.01). The fact that income is important in goods sending but less important in
cash sending signals that goods sending may not be considered the same type of survival
assistance strategy that cash sending is. Since immigrants appear to send cash whether or not
they have a lot of it and goods sending seems to be income dependent, this may mean that
goods are more reflective of gifts; a sharing of abundance among those who have it with
friends and family in their country of origin. This notion is further underscored by the fact
that neither gender, age, nor lengths of time in the United States were significant. About 10%
of the population claimed refugee status but refugee status was not significant to the
transferring of goods either.
The results of the globalization model show that the model is significant at the p<.01
level according to the model chi-square statistic with a McFadden pseudo R2 of .02. Two
variables were significant. Respondents from rural backgrounds were 37% less likely to send
goods than those from urban backgrounds (p<.01) while respondents who possessed assets
abroad were 75% more likely to be sending goods that those who did not possess assets
abroad (p<.01). These findings may simply be proxies for the income finding for the
demographic model. To the extent that those from rural background may be less skilled (and
therefore poorer), and those with assets abroad may be wealthier, those with more may be
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able to afford sending gifts abroad as well as money. No other global variables were
significant
The full model had a superior fit to both the demographic and globalization models.
In a model to model comparison using a likelihood ratio test, the full model to demographic
model comparison yields a p-value of less than .001 allowing me to conclude that adding the
globalization variables significantly improves the predictive power of the model. The same is
true in a full model to globalization model comparison, thus, suggesting that the integration
of globalization and demographic variables will allow a better understanding of remittance
behavior.
The full model is significant at the p<.001 level according to the model chi-square
statistic and has a McFadden pseudo R2 of .06. Educational attainment remained significant
with an 8% more likelihood of sending goods occurring with each additional year of
education (p<.001). Married respondents were 31% less likely to send goods than nonmarried respondents (p<.05). Individuals earning more than $13,500 and less than $40,000
were twice as likely to send goods than those earning less than $13,500 (p<.01) and
respondents earning more than $40,000 were twice as likely to send goods than those earning
less than $13,500 (p<.01). Since adding income to the model rendered rural background nonsignificant, this lends credence to my assumption that the variable is a proxy for income.
However, respondents possessing assets abroad remained 58% more likely to be sending
goods than individuals who did not possess assets abroad so that variable is not a proxy for
income, unless it reflects the wealth required to acquire assets abroad. Also, insofar as wealth
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and income are different, owning assets abroad may reflect a degree of financial confidence
that comes from the security of wealth that lends itself to sending goods.
The examination of the propensity to send goods to others identifies several variables
that are significant in correctly classifying senders and non-senders but it must be noted that
variables for both the demographic model and the global model were chosen from studies
that primarily examined the characteristics of individuals who engaged in remittance
behavior defined as sending cash to relatives outside the United States (Sana 2008, Gupta et
al 2007, Airola 2007, Massey et al 2006, Boon 2006, DeVortez and Vadean 2006, Brown and
Connell 2006, IMF 2006, Martin, Abella and Kuptsch. 2006, Sana 2005, Vanwey 2004,
Chew and Liu 2004, Guarnimo 2003, Alba and Nee 1999, Conway and Cohen 1998, Jones
1998, Menjivar et al 1998, Portes 1997, Lianos 1997, Diaz-Briquets and Perez-Lopez 1997,
Glytsos 1997, Itzigsohn 1995, Salt 1992, Stark 1991, Lucas and Stark 1985) . Although the
sending of goods to others may be important, it is an under-examined area of remittance
behavior. I suggest that the identification of several variables as significant lends support to
the need for a greater examination of goods sending. However, caution must be maintained
when applying the findings from this NIS population of LPRs to other immigrant
populations. The sample of goods senders is small (n=246), 71% came from MDCs or HDCs,
60% had some college education or a higher degree, and 24% earned more than $40,000 in
the twelve months prior to the interview. The variable most likely to determine the sending of
goods in the study was income category. The ability to purchase goods, the level of
education, and the development level of the country of origin suggests that good may be a
more a less appropriate form of support than cash for the population examined. Once again, it
must be noted that questions regarding the sending of goods did not include goods transferred
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to spouses, children, or parents which may or may not impact the results. This means,
therefore, that “goods sending” is not a form of remittance sending, insofar as remittance
sending is a means of supplementing survival for friends and family members abroad.
Instead, goods transfers seem to be similar to what they are for natives; the giving of gifts.
Those who can afford it, do it. Those who cannot, do not.
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Chapter 11

Conclusions

Remittance behavior is complex and entrenched in a myriad of personal, social, and
economic relationships. The purpose of this study was to clarify these complex relationships
and to bridge the gap between existing literature by combining demographic and
globalization predictors of remittance activity.
Wallerstein (2004) begins his explanation of World-Systems Analysis by explaining
the process by which various disciplines originated and then began to define the boundaries
of their perspective fields of study. This process has led to the development of discipline
specific approaches to numerous subjects including globalization, migration/immigration,
and the flow of remittances from country of destination to family and friends who remained
in country of origin. Discipline specific approaches can lead to the failure to properly specify
predictive models by omitting important predictors of behavior as each discipline focuses on
their specific areas of concern. I have demonstrated that demographers have a defined a set of
predictors that provide the lens for viewing migration and remittance behavior based on
demographic theories of migration behavior. Scholars working from globalization theory
tend to use other predictors when developing their models for explaining identical behavior. I
have presented models that suggest a combination of these approaches creates both better
specified models and a broader understanding of the factors that determine who will send
monies, the amounts that they might send, and their use of in-kind remittances (the sending
of goods in addition to cash or the sending of goods only). Although not an exhaustive list,
the combination of the predictors that I chose, based upon the limitations of the secondary
data available have offered additional insight into remittance behavior at both the macro- and
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micro-levels and have demonstrated the difficulty of disentangling the global and the local
when it comes to immigrants and their motivation to return both cash and goods to those left
behind. Similarly, I have been able to establish that a number of globalization variables can
serve as predictors not only for the propensity of immigrants to remit but also the amount of
cash that they may send to their country of origin. These predictors combined with
demographic variables provide a better image of the level at which the immigrant might
remit. Finally, the data suggest that cash remittance and in-kind remittances may represent
different remitting patterns, and although cash provides a mechanism for economic survival,
in–kind remittances serve as gifts. As remittance volume increases in the global economy,
their impact both locally and globally must be recognized.
Remittances and Migration
The flow of remittances through formal channels has continued to increase and it is
suggested that these flows only represent a fraction of the capital that moves from
immigrants to friends and family left in their country of origin. I have suggested that this
steady increase may be associated with the spread of global capitalism and the resulting
changes that accompany globalization. Globalization is neither a new phenomenon nor new
subject of interest, but in many academic circles and popular media, it has come to represent
a period of constant social change that has occurred since the mid-1970s in association with
changes in economic philosophy and policy. The shift from Keynesian economics to a neoliberal approach provided the background in which global financial institutions such as the
IMF and World Bank gained power that rivals the nation-state while the growth United
States financial hegemony was secured through trade agreements. As many countries sought
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to establish a position in the global economy, residents at the local level felt the impacts
especially when their country of residence had been subjected to “structural adjustment
programs” attached to loans procured through the powerful global financial institutions. This
globalization process often creates push/pull mechanisms that encourage individuals and
households to seek migration as an economic survival strategy as their home country often
meet the criteria demanded by SAP loan repayments by cutting social services and welfare
programs as well as engaging in new trade arrangements which open the country to foreign
investors. Loss of government subsidies and programs, new foreign competition for domestic
businesses and currency adjustments can lead to tougher economic times for nationals. This
process often takes place in countries described as less developed (Wallerstein’s periphery)
countries, and as profitable work becomes harder to find, households and individuals look to
the more developed countries (Wallerstein’s core) for work and the opportunity to supply
needed cash and goods for family and friends.
Simultaneously, developed countries such as the United States have a long history of
labor needs both in the developing stage and as mature nation-states. Currently, the United
States has a need for both skilled and unskilled labor and economic opportunity found in the
United States provides a powerful draw for individuals residing in countries that offer limited
opportunities for economic advancement and stability. Advancements in technology have
aided in this push/pull phenomenon not only by creating cheaper modes of travel and
communication for the immigrant but by producing worldwide images suggesting that the
United States is a country of opportunity. An ageing population in the United States also
produces the need for a greater number of imported workers. The results is a flexible and
mobile workforce traveling the globe in search of opportunity and serving the needs of global
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capitalism and often motivated by the survival of friends and family who remain in the
immigrant’s country of origin. However, flows of people like capital are subject to the
policies and programs of the receiving state.
The United States has historically been dependent on immigrant labor (Bacon 2008),
but it has simultaneously sought to control the number, quality, and ethnicity of those who
cross the border. Immigration cannot be understood outside of the policies that establish
control of sovereign borders (Donkor 2005). Evidence of this effort to control immigration is
reflected in the attempts to legislate immigration policy (see Table 2). The need for
immigrant labor, however, has not diminished (see Table 5) and the flow of remittances
leaving the United States has continually grown (see Table 5). Considering this history
within the frame work of globalization, this study has expanded the understanding of
immigrant’s remittance behavior.
Those Who May be Likely to Remit
The propensity to remit is determined by a complex set of social ties as well as
limitations that may exist in the immigrant’s ability to earn income. As suggested by this
study, various predictors are used by different disciplines but a holistic approach that
considers factors suggested by several disciplines may serve to better identify immigrants
who engage in remittance behavior. For example, using my demographic model, I am able to
determine that the immigrant most likely to remit is a younger female with family living
outside the United States and she is especially likely to remit if she has a child living abroad.
However, this is a limited description of an individual likely to engage in remittance
practices. Approaching the propensity to remit using my globalization model, I am able to
109

determine that the most likely candidate for sending remittances originates from an LDC,
tries to return home whenever the opportunity is available, may have a limited English
vocabulary, and works for wages while also engaging in some form of self-employment.
Once again, this limited approach describes an industrious individual from a developing
country who may travel home whenever possible either visiting or establishing a migration
pattern which allows for the accumulation of capital and periods of returning home to check
on investments thus suggesting they are what Schiller (1999) terms a transmigrant. Remitter
characteristics are identified by both models but both give a limited portrait of the immigrant
who is most likely to engage in remittance behavior. A more encompassing portrait is
available by combining the models. The fully-specified model suggests that the immigrant
most likely to remit is a less educated female originating from a developing country that has
lived in the United States for a longer period of time and has at least one child living in her
country of origin. She works for wages as well as engages in some form of self-employment
and visits her country of origin whenever possible. The combination of predictors from
demographic models and globalization approaches has given a much richer portrait of the
immigrant who may be sending monies home to family and friends. Using the full model, the
immigrant least likely to be sending cash to friends and relatives in country of origin is male
with a high level of education, without family abroad, who has been in the United States for a
short period of time, and who is unlikely to return to country of origin on a frequent basis; in
other words, a skilled professional who plans to make his life in the United States. Of course
predictors only give a description of the immigrant who is most likely to engage in
remittance behavior and in real world situations, we may find a variety of individual
engaging in remittance sending that do not fit our models. However, the holistic approach of
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combining demography and globalizations enhances our ability to profile the immigrant who
is most likely to be sending money home. Although these models enhance our ability to
determine who might remit, it must be remembered that remittance behavior is complex and
also involves many social psychological factors such as attitudes, beliefs and norms. These
factors would allow me to create better models but the NIS does not include to such
information.
Having established predictors that might allow us to describe immigrants who are
most likely to send cash home, I examined the possibility of using the same predictors to
explain the dollar amounts of cash remitted. Data from the NIS allowed me to examine the
dollar amounts that remitters reported sending to their country of origin. Once again, I used
the three models described to examine the ability of the predictors to give an explanation for
variation in dollar mounts sent. The demographic model suggests that as an immigrant grows
older, they may decrease the amount of money sent back to friends and families. This may
occur as social ties with their country of origin decrease either through length of absence or
as the immigrant grows older, he r she brings family to the United States. These factors may
be reinforced by the globalization model that suggests immigrants from more developed
countries who have invested in the United States by purchasing a home and learning English
send more dollars than immigrants who do not possess these characteristics. Both models,
however, offer a limited explanation for dollar amount variations. Once gain, a more holistic
approach that combines the demographic and globalization predictors, offers an expanded
explanation for the amount of cash remitted. Using the full model, we can predict that the
immigrant who is remits the greater amount of cash may be younger with a lower level of
education that has a parent or child living outside the United States. They are unlikely to
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come from a less developed country and are likely to have originated from an urban
background. They are more likely to own a U.S. home and to speak English at a proficient
level.
The newer model representing the holistic approach to remittances suggests a more
expansive portrait of the individuals who are likely to remit and offers additional insight into
the dollar amounts that a particular immigrant might potentially remit. The movement from a
discipline specific approach to a more inclusive approach drawing from one or more
disciplines has enabled me to create a better description of remittance behavior among U.S.
immigrants in this sample. The more inclusive approach has also offered new insight into the
use of in-kind remittances.
Goods: Survival or Luxury
Although the NIS data are limited on the use of in-kind remittances, the data are
sufficient for an examination goods use as a remittance practice. Using the three models
previously used to examine the propensity to remit and the amount of cash remitted, I
examined the ability of these variables to predict the propensity to use goods (instead of
cash) as remittances. The results indicate that income and wealth in the form of assets are the
only predictors that indicate the possible use of in-kind remittances. Although most of the
predictors in all three models do not clarify the likelihood that an individual will send goods
to friends and relatives, the models do provide a unique insight into the possible purpose of
in-kind remittances. Cash remittances represent an economic survival process (Jones 1998,
Lianos 1995, Iizigsohn 1995, Stark 1990) but in-kind remittances appear to resemble a form
of gift giving or possibly the provision of luxury items rather than items needed for economic
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survival. Immigrants who earn more and whose relatives need less financial support remain
attached to their country of origin. Social ties and obligations do not disappear. Immigrants
who visit “home” often carry gifts and support local festivities (Sana 2005, Pido 1999) as
well as send goods to relatives living abroad. A thorough examination of this practice is
beyond the scope of this study and the data available. However, this study does suggest that
in-kind remittances are not viewed the same as cash remittances by immigrants who engage
in one or the other or both.
Future Research
Globalization, migration, and remittances represent complex phenomenon that are
intertwined and an understanding of one is often dependent on an understanding of the other
two. The purpose of this study is to gain a greater understanding of immigrants and their use
of remittances. The findings presented here can only be generalized to the single cohort of
LPRs living in the United States. However, the results are important because they allow us to
view the complex nature of remittance behavior in a global economy. All three phenomenon
continue to expand and are unlikely to decrease. Policy makers and citizens need information
that will provide awareness as to the factors that often force individuals to leave their country
of origin and pursue life in a different environment. Migration is often done at a great
sacrifice from the immigrant both physically and mentally and the cost often means leaving
family and friends behind. However, the same expressive and instrumental ties that existed in
their country of origin accompany the immigrant to their country of destination. Remittances,
both cash and in-kind, represent a fulfillment of those ties
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Discipline specific examinations of remittances are valuable and provide a wealth of
information about immigrants and remittance behavior. They also provide unique portraits of
globalization and its impacts. However, they resemble the scrambled pieces of a picture
puzzle. Each piece provides a small portion of a larger picture but the picture cannot be
revealed until all the pieces are combined. Taking a more holistic approach to immigration
allows us to put the pieces together for a more defined portrait of remittance behavior.
I suggest that researchers in the future should draw predictors from multiple
disciplines and interdisciplinary communication should be increased. Macro and microapproaches to migration and remittance behavior should not be viewed as exclusive but an
understanding of the interaction of the global and the local is imperative to an understanding
of remittance behavior. Additionally, an understanding of informal remittance systems and
remittance behavior among the undocumented is needed. Finally, this study has suggested
that in-kind remittances and cash remittances represent exclusive behaviors. More research is
needed to understand the use of goods and their purpose in the global flow of money, goods,
and people.
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Appendix A Tables
Table 1: Factors Influencing Economic Migration Decisions

Emigration from sending country

Immigration to receiving country

Potential Advantages

Potential disadvantages

Potential Advantages

Potential disadvantages

Employment

Poor working conditions

Services that free women
to enter the labor force

Competition for jobs

Greater Income

Long hours

Cheaper goods and
services

Lower local wages

Training or education

Lower status work

Opportunities for
mobility

New cultural experience

Racism or discrimination

Richer cultural life

Strange language and
customs

Meeting new people

Separation from family

Experiencing other
countries

Creation of immigrant
ghettos

Source: Stalker 2000
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Table 2: Selected Immigration Acts of the United States
Year

1882

Provisions of the Act

Chinese Exclusion Act:
1. Restricted immigration of Chinese workers
2. Allowed for deportation of illegal Chinese immigrants
3. Forbade Chinese from becoming naturalized
4. Gave the Secretary of Treasure the power to examine new arrivals

1891

Immigration Act of 1891
1. Ended state involvement
2. Created Bureau of Immigration (BI) within the Treasury Department
3. Empowered BI to deport unlawful aliens

1917

Immigration Act of 1917
1. Required literacy test for immigrants
2. Implemented serious effort to screen immigrants
3. Created the “Asiatic Barred Zone”: banned immigrants from most Asian countries except Japan
(controlled
through a “Gentlemen’s Agreement”) and the Philippines

1921

Immigration Act of 1921 (temporary)
1. Imposed annual numeric ceiling on number of immigrants (358,000, not applied to Western Hemisphere)
2. Imposed first ethnic quotas

1924

National Origins Act
1. Set an annual admission goals
2. Set exact country quotas
3. Specified exclusions for the Japanese
4. Ended “open door” immigration

1948

Displaced Persons Act: allows war homeless to come to the United States
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Table 2: Continued
Year

1952

Provisions of the Act

McCarran-Walter Act
1. Allowed examination of ideology
2. Set quotas for skills desired by United States

1965
Immigration Act of 1965
1. Removed national-origin quotas
2. Created seven category visa system
3. Set first quotas for Western Hemisphere (120,000 ceiling)
4. Set 20,000 limit per country of Eastern Hemisphere (170,000 ceiling)
5. Required advance labor certification
6. Eliminated discrimination against Asians
7. Emphasized family reunification
8. Set quota for refugees (17,400 or 6%)
1980

Refugee Act of 1980
The definition of refugee made to conform to the United nations definition
Annual limitation of 17,400 refugees raised to 50,000 each year
Provides for orderly but flexible process to deal with “special humanitarian concerns” of the United States
Establishes an explicit asylum provision in the immigration law for first time
Creates the Office of the United States Coordinator for Refugee Affairs and the Office of Refugee
Resettlemant

1986

Immigration Reform and Control Act
Requires employers to check legal status of immigrants
Imposed fines and penalties on employers who hire unauthorized immigrants
Provided legalized status to unauthorized immigrants who could prove long-term residence
Increased border enforcement
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Table 2: Continued
Year

1990

Provisions of the Act

Immigration Act of 1990
1. Provided unlimited visas to family members
2. Reduced visas to unskilled workers
3. Increased visas for priority workers and professionals
4. Allocated 10,000 visas for investors with $1 million or more if creating jobs for at least 10
citizens
5. Created “diversity” visa for ‘underrepresented” countries
6. Created immigrant classification of “Temporary Protected Status” for some assylumseekers

1994

Immigration and Nationality Act (section 245i)
1. Created three year period for unauthorized immigrants to pay $1,000 fine and become legal
without leaving United States if proving family ties or employer sponsorship (renewed 2000,
2001)

1996

Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act (attached to fiscal budget)
1. Increased size of Border Patrol and INS investigators
2. Funded Mexican border fence
3. Specified that one day overstay voids visa stamp
4. Restricted public assistance to legal immigrants for first five years
5. Limits to five years public assistance over lifetime
6. Bars noncitizen immigrants in residence for more than five years from some
assistance programs
7. Creation of the “Visa Waiver Program” (VWP)
a. Reciprocal with 27 countries; tourist enter without visas
b. Two percent overstay results in probation or country removal from program
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Table 2: Continued
Year

2001

Provisions of the Act
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism Act (United States Patriot Act)
1. Invokes “enemy combatant” designation (United States)
a. Use of military tribunals
b. Individuals held indefinitely
c. Vigorous interrogation
2. Triples Northern Border Patrol
3. Creates department of Homeland Security (DHS) and empowers it to control INS
4. Calls for strengthening of entry/exit system (i.e. fingerprints and photographs)

2002

Homeland security Act
1. INS divided into three bureaus
a. U.S Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS)
b. Investigation and Customs enforcement (ICE)
c. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
2. Visa issuing moved from State Department to DHS
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Table 2: Continued
Year

2005

Provisions of the Act

Proposed legislation;
1. Comprehensive Enforcement and Immigration reform Act
a. migrant workers allowed three two year work periods with mandatory one year
gap at end
b. families cannot live with relative but visit for 30 days
c. eliminate diversity visas
d. Create temporary worker investment funds in sending countries to encourage
return of immigrant
2. Secure America and Orderly Immigration Act
a. 400,000 new visas for “essential foreign workers”
b. Two three year work terms; travel in and out of country during work time
c. At end of six years must leave, be inline for immigrant visa, $2,000 fee/fine

Source: Briggs 2003; Smith and Edmonston 1997; Kennedy 1981
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Table 3: Main Phases in Migration and Development Research and Policy
Period
Before 1973

Research community
Development and migration optimism

1973-1990

Development and migration pessimism
(dependency, brain drain)

1990-2001

Readjustment to more subtle views under
influence of increasing empirical research
Boom in publications, mixed, but
generally positive views

After 2001

Policy field
Developmentalist optimism: capital and
knowledge transfers by immigrants would help in
development take-off.
Growing skepticism; concerns about brain drain;
after experiments with return migration policies
focused on integration with receiving countries;
migration largely out of sight in development
filed.
Persistent skepticism; tightening immigration
policies
Resurgence of migration and development
optimism and sudden turnaround of views; brain
gain; remittances and diaspora involvement;
further tightening of immigration policies but
greater tolerance for high-skilled immigration.

Reproduced from Haas 2007
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Table 4: Relation Between Household Migration Stage, Consumption, and Investments
Stage

Migration

Consumption and investment patterns by migration
households

I

Immigrant in process of
settling

Most urgent needs are filled if possible: food, health, debt
repayment, education of children

II

Immigrant settled and has
more or less stable work

Housing construction, land purchase, basic household
amenities, continued education

III (option a)

Ongoing stay

(Higher) education of children. Diverse investments:
commercial housing and land, shops, craft industries,
agriculture. Magnitude, spatial and sectoral allocation
depending on household income, macro and local
development/investment context

III (option b)

Return

Continuing investments (as IIIa) if the household has access to
external income (for example, pension, savings or creation of
business)

III (option c)

Family reunification

Traditional view: no significant investments besides help to
family/community members: this view is challenged by
evidence that more and more immigrants seem to adopt
transnational lives and identities, which may be associated with
continued home country engagement and /or investments.

Reproduced from Haas 2007
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Table 5: Growth of US Foreign-born Population and Remittance Outflows

Year

Number of Foreign Born in US Remittances Outflow**
US*
(millions)

2000

29,985,000

30,961

2001

31,811,000

34,592

2002

32,453,000

36,126

2003

33,471,000

36,545

2004

34,244,000

39,305

2005

35,690,000

41,072

2006

37,548,000

42,974

Sources: *US Census (American Community Survey 2005 & 2006)
** World Bank
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Table 6: Variables of Interest for Remittance Models
Demographic Model
Gender
Age
Education
Marital status
Spouse abroad
Child abroad
Parents abroad
Years in United States
Earned Income
Less than $13,500
$13,500 to less than $40,000
$40,000 or more
Refugee status

Globalization Model
Development Level of Country of origin
Less developed
Moderately developed
Highly developed
Rural or urban background
Number of moves
Full-time Employment
None
Self-employed
Wage employed
Both
Asset abroad
Owns home in United States
English Proficiency
Speaks very well
Speaks well
Speaks poorly
No English
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Table 7: Variables Used in the Study
Variable

Description

Hypothesized
sign

Cash remittance

Sent cash remittance in the last year (=1) versus did not send
cash in the last year (=0)

n/a

Dollar amount of
wages remitted

Cash remitted in constant United States dollars

n/a

Goods versus cash
remittance

Sent goods in the last year (=1) versus sent only cash (=0)

n/a

Goods versus no
remittance

Sent goods in the last year (=1) versus sent nothing (=0)

n/a

Gender

Male (=1) versus Female (=0)

+

Age

Ordinal variable with 10 categories ranging from 1 (less than
20) to 10 (60and older)All categories in between are 5-year
cohorts (20-24,35-29, etc.)

-

Educational
attainment

Interval variable indicating years of education completed,
topcoded at 25+.

+

Marital status

Married (=1) versus not married or currently separated (=0).
Cohabiting partners coded 0.

+

Spouse abroad

Spouse or partner live in a foreign country (=1) versus
spouse or partner live in the United States (=0)

Children abroad

At least one child (biological, adopted, or stepchild) living in
a foreign country (=1) versus all children live in the United
States (=0)

+

Parent abroad

At least one parent living in a foreign country (=1) versus all
parents living in the United States (=0)

+

Time in United States

Interval variable indicating the number of years lived in the
United States since last move to the United States.

-
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Table 7: Continued
Variable

Description

Development of
country of origin

Respondent’s country of origin code as less developed
countries (LDC), moderately developed countries (MDC), or
highly developed countries (HDC) based on Braun’s (1998)
typology.

Hypothesized
sign

Less developed

Reference

n/a

Moderately

MDC (=1) versus LDC or HDC (=0)

-

HDC (=1) versus LDC or MDC (=0)

-

Rural

Lived in rural area at age 10 (=1) versus did not live in a
rural area (=0).

+

Sojourner status

Interval variable indicating number of international moves
reported by the respondent.

+

Full-time worker

Worked more than 39 weeks and more than 32 hours a week
in last 12 months (=1) versus working less (=0) in last 12
months

+

Class of worker

Reported sources of income were used to determine type of
employment.

developed
Highly developed

Self-employed

Earns income from self- employment and professional
practice (=1) versus wages and tips (=0). Reference

n/a

Work for wages

Earns income from wages and tips (=1) versus earnings from
professional practice and self-employment (=0).

+

Both

Earns income from self-employment and/or professional
practice and tips and/or wages (=1) versus other (=0).

+

None

No earnings from self-employment, wages, professional, or
tips (=1) versus other (=0).

-

Assets in country of
origin

Dichotomous variable indicating ownership of assets in
country of origin (=1) versus none (=0)

+

Owns US home

Dichotomous variable indicating ownership of home in
United States (=1) versus none (=0)

+
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Table 7: Continued
Variable

Description

English proficiency

Ability to speak English

Speaks English

Hypothesized
sign

Speaks English very well (=1) versus other levels of
proficiency (=0)

+

Speaks English well (=1) versus other levels of proficiency
(=0)

+

Speaks English poorly (=1) versus other levels of
proficiency (=0)

-

Reference

-

very well
Speaks English
well
Speaks English
poorly
Does not speak
English
Earned income
Less than $13,500
$13,500 to less than
$40,000
$40,000 or more
Refugee status

Dollar amount earned from employment
Reference

n/a

Earned $13,500 to less than $40,000 (=1) versus earning less
or more (=0)

+

Earned $40,000 or more (=1) versus earning less (=0)

+

Refugee/Asylee/Parolee status (=1) versus other immigrant
statuses (=0)

-
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Table 8: Variable Descriptions and Missing Percentages
Variable

Dataset
designation

Description

%
Missing*

Cash remittance

remitters

Sends cash to individuals outside United
States

0%

Cash amount remitted

remitamt

Dollar amount remitted

0%

Dollar amount of wages
remitted

remitamt

Dollars of respondent’s earned income
remitted

0%

Goods remitted

remitsgds

Sends goods abroad

.02%

Cash transferred

givers

Gives cash to other individuals

<.01%

Cash amount transferred

transamt

Dollar amount given to others

0%

Percentage of cash
transferred

tranprct

Percentage of respondent’s earned income
given to others

0%

Goods transferred

transgds

Provides non-financial assistance to others

22%

Gender

male

Male

0%

Age

age

Age of respondent

.5%

Educational attainment

educ

Years of education completed

.3%

Education category

edcat1

Less than High School

.3%

edcat2

High School education

.3%

edcat3

Some college or college degree

.3%

edcat4

Some graduate work

.3%

Marital status

married

Married

<.01%

Spouse abroad

spousabrd

Spouse lives outside United States

<.01%

Children abroad

childabrd

At least one child lives abroad

.5%

Parent abroad

parentabrd

At least one parent lives abroad

.5%

Time in United States

ustime

Years since last move to United SStates

2.2%
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Table 8: Continued
Variable

Dataset
designation

Description

%
Missing*

Development of country of
origin

ldc

Lesser developed country of origin

.4%

mdc

Moderately developed country of origin

.4%

hdc

Highly developed country of origin

.4%

Rural
Sojourner status

.3%
moves

Number of international moves

Fulltime
Class of worker

1.5%
<.01%

selfemp

Self-employed

0%

work

Works for wages and/or tips

0%

both

Self-employed and works for wages

0%

none

Does not work

0%

Assets abroad

assetabrd

Owns assets outside the United States

0%

United States home

homeus

Owns home in United States

0%

English proficiency

engvwell

Speaks English very well

<.01%

engwell

Speaks English well

<.01%

engnwell

Speaks poor English

<.01%

engnone

Speaks no English

<.01%

Earned income

income

Income earned from employment

0%

Income category

inccat1

Less than $13,500

0%

inccat2

$13,500 to less than $40,000

0%

inccat3

$40,000 or more

0%

refugee

Refugee/Asylee/Parolee

0%

Refugee status
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Table 9: Description of the Population
Total Sample( n=8573)
Variable

n

%

Cash remittance (remitters)

848

9.89

Goods remitted

195

2.27

1248

14.56

246

2.87

4133

48.21

Less than High School

2745

32.02

High School education

1308

15.26

Some college or college degree

3205

37.38

718

8.38

Marital status

5856

68.31

Spouse abroad

398

4.64

Children abroad

1932

22.54

Parent abroad

5751

67.40

Less developed

2563

29.90

Moderately

4907

57.24

1065

12.42

Rural

3340

38.96

Fulltime worker

4717

55.02

Self-employed

379

4.42

3567

41.61

Both

331

3.86

None

4296

50.11

Cash transferred (givers)
Goods transferred
Male
Education category

Some graduate work

Development of country of origin

developed
Highly developed

Work for wages
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Table 9: Continued
Total Sample( n=8573)
Variable

n

%

Assets abroad

967

11.28

81

.94

Speaks English very well

2353

27.45

Speaks English well

2177

25.39

Speaks English poorly

2475

28.87

Does not speak English

1548

18.06

6423

74.96

1248

14.56

899

10.49

554

6.46

United States Home
English Proficiency

Income category
Less than $13,500
$13,500 to less than
$40,000 or more
Refugee status

$40,000
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Table 10: Odds Ratios (and Logit Coefficients) Associated with Remitting in the Last 12 Months
Demographic Model
Male

Age

Years of Education

Married

Spouse abroad

Child abroad

Parents abroad

Years in US

Globalization Model

Full Model

.77***

.78*

(-.26)

(-.24)

.98***

.99

(-.02)

(-.01)

.98

.98*

(-.02)

(-.02)

1.00

1.05

(.01)

(.05)

3.93***

3.00***

(1.37)

(1.09)

5.63***

6.24***

(1.73)

(1.83)

2.82***

2.95***

(1.04)

1.08)

1.07

1.05***

(.06)

(.05)

1.23

.96

(.21)

(-.04)

1.12

.97

(.18)

(-.03)

1.00

1.00

(.00)

(.00)

Earned Income (<$13,500 = ref)
$13,500 to less than $40,000

$40,000 or more

Refugee
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Table 10: Continued
Demographic Model

Globalization Model

Full Model

.63***

.84

(-.46)

(-.18)

.43***

.58**

(-.84)

(-.56)

.92

.82

(-.08)

(-.20)

1.21***

1.25***

(.19)

(.23)

.93

1.06

(-.08)

(.06)

4.71***

4.32***

(1.55)

(1.46)

6.94***

7.24***

(1.94)

(1.98)

8.35***

9.15***

(2.12)

(2.21)

1.02

.98

(.02)

(-.05)

.58

.56

(-.54)

(-.59)

Country of origin (LDC = ref)
MDC

HDC

Rural background

Number of moves

Full-time worker

Class of worker (none = ref)
Self-employed

Wage employed

Both

Asset abroad

Owns United States home
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Table 10: Continued
Demographic Model

Globalization Model

Full Model

.61***

.82

(-.49)

(-.20)

.76*

.99

(-.28)

(-.01)

.81

.82

(-.21)

(-.19)

-2098.27

-2138.56

-1825.67

613.33

318.85

787.92

.13

.11

.23

8249

8364

8057

English proficiency (none = ref)
Speaks very well

Speaks well

Speaks poorly

Log pseudolikelihood
Wald chi-square
2

Pseudo R
n

SOURCE: New Immigrant Survey
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
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Table 11: Truncated Regression of the Natural Log of Dollar Amounts Remitted
Demographic Model
Male

Age

Years of Education

Married

Spouse abroad

Child abroad

Parents abroad

Years in US

Globalization Model

Full Model

.02

.12

(.13)

(.13)

-.02**

-.02*

(.01)

(.01)

-.03

-.04**

(.01)

(.01)

-.18

-.14

(.14)

(.13)

-.00

.12

(.19)

(.18)

.14

.44**

(.15)

(.16)

.24

.44*

(.21)

(.21)

-.01

.00

(.01)

(.01)

.07

.06

(.16)

(.17)

-.15

-.14

(.25)

(.23)

-.11

-.17

(.23)

(.23)

Earned Income (<$13,500 = ref)
$13,500 to less than $40,000

$40,000 or more

Refugee
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Table 11: Continued
Demographic Model

Globalization Model

Full Model

.46***

.52***

(.14)

(.15)

.61**

.77***

(.23)

(.23)

-.10

-.31*

(.12)

(.14)

-.03

.01

(.06)

(.06)

-.10

-.04

(.13)

(.13)

-.16

-.10

(.33)

(.33)

.25

.26

(.17)

(.18)

-.03

.00

(.29)

(.29)

-.11

-.16

(.16)

(.18)

.52**

.88***

(.21)

(.27)

Country of origin (LDC = ref)
MDC

HDC

Rural background

Number of moves

Full-time worker

Class of worker (none = ref)
Self-employed

Wage employed

Both

Asset abroad

Owns US home.
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Table 11: Continued
Demographic Model

Globalization Model

Full Model

.94***

.84***

(.20)

(.22)

.50**

.48**

(.17)

(.18)

.25

.07

(.16)

(.17)

English proficiency (none = ref)
Speaks very well

Speaks well

Speaks poorly

Log pseudolikelihood

-1095.65

-1075.47

-1037.38

Wald chi-square

27.89**

88.77***

151.64***

.0024

.0028

.0155

710

710

695

2

Approximate R
n

SOURCE: New Immigrant Survey
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
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Table 12: Chi-squared and Fisher's exact test of Globalization Variables on Propensity to Send Goods
Chi 2

Fisher’s exact

Less developed country of origin

.07

.43

Moderately developed country of origin

.52

.26

Highly developed country of origin

2.06

.09

Rural background

8.38

.00**

Sojourner status

8.24

.12

Fulltime employment

3.94

.03*

Self-employed

1.00

.20

Works for wages

2.26

.08

Self employed and works for wages

.02

.54

Not employed

1.22

.15

Assets abroad

13.99

.00***

Owns home in U.S.

3.32

.08

Speaks English very well

1.46

.13

Speaks English well

.01

.50

Speaks English poorly

2.05

.08

Does not speak English

.18

.36

Variable

SOURCE: New Immigrant Survey
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
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Table 13: Odds Ratios (and Logit Coefficients) Associated with Sending Goods in the Last 12 Months
Demographic Model
Male

Age

Years of Education

Married

Spouse abroad

Child abroad

Parents abroad

Years in US

Globalization Model

Full Model

1.22

1.31

(.20)

(.27)

1.00

1.00

(.00)

(.00)

1.09***

1.08***

(.09)

(.08)

.68*

.69*

(-.38)

(-.38)

.89

.85

(-.18)

(-.17)

.92

.97

(-.08)

(-.03)

.86

.81

(-.15)

(-.21)

.99

.99

(-.01)

(-.01)

1.77**

1.97**

(.57)

(.68)

1.93**

1.99**

(.66)

(.69)

1.50

1.70

(.41)

(.53)

Earned Income (<$13,500 = ref)
$13,500 to less than $40,000

$40,000 or more

Refugee
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Table 13: Continued
Demographic Model

Globalization Model

Full Model

.92

.88

(-.08)

(-.13)

1.33

1.28

(.28)

(.24)

.63**

.78

(-.46)

(-.25)

1.09

1.06

(.09)

(.05)

1.28

.78

(.25)

(-.25)

1.14

1.06

(.13)

(.06)

.83

.80

(-.19)

(-.22)

.85

.74

(-.16)

(-.29)

1.75**

1.58*

(.56)

(.46)

1.29

.95

(.25)

(-.05)

Country of origin (LDC = ref)
MDC

HDC

Rural background

Number of moves

Full-time worker

Class of worker (none = ref)
Self-employed

Wage employed

Both

Asset abroad

Owns US home.
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Table 13: Continued
Demographic Model

Globalization Model

Full Model

1.20

1.38

(.19)

(.34)

.96

1.03

(-.04)

(.03)

.99

1.05

(-.01)

(.05)

-1061.89

-1088.49

-1020.87

86.92

29.60

127.81

.04

.02

.06

8155

8276

7971

English proficiency (none = ref)
Speaks very well

Speaks well

Speaks poorly

Log pseudolikelihood
Wald chi-square
2

Pseudo R
n

SOURCE: New Immigrant Survey
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
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Table 14: Odds Ratios (and Logit Coefficients) Associated with Giving in the Last 12 Months
Demographic Model
Male

Age

Years of Education

Married

Spouse abroad

Child abroad

Parents abroad

Years in US

Globalization Model

Full Model

.79**

.81*

(-.24)

(-.21)

.99**

1.00

(-.01)

(.00)

.99

.99

(-.01)

(-.01)

.96

.97

(-.05)

(-.03)

3.14***

2.38***

(1.14)

(.87)

2.57***

2.68***

(.94)

(.98)

1.63***

1.64***

(.49)

(.49)

1.06***

1.04***

(.06)

(.04)

1.29*

1.06

(.26)

(.06)

1.22

1.05

(.20)

(.05)

1.25

1.30

(.22)

(.27)

Earned Income (<$13,500 = ref)
$13,500 to less than $40,000

$40,000 or more

Refugee
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Table 14: Continued
Demographic Model

Globalization Model

Full Model

.67***

.77**

(-.41)

(-.27)

.48***

.59***

(-.73)

(-.53)

1.00

.96

(00)

(-.04)

1.17***

1.18***

(.15)

(.17)

.94

1.00

(-.06)

(.00)

4.69***

4.20***

(1.54)

(1.43)

5.76***

5.68***

(1.75)

(1.74)

8.63***

8.23***

(2.15)

(2.11)

.96

.93

(-.04)

(-.07)

1.01

.99

(.01)

(-.01)

Country of origin (LDC = ref)
MDC

HDC

Rural background

Number of moves

Full-time worker

Class of worker (none = ref)
Self-employed

Wage employed

Both

Asset abroad

Owns US home.
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Table 14: Continued
Demographic Model

Globalization Model

Full Model

.82

1.00

(-.20)

(.00)

.98

1.18

(-.02)

(.16)

.97

1.03

(-.03)

(.03)

-2987.00

-2849.92

-2630.05

326.56

414.01

609.08

.06

.11

.15

8249

8364

8057

English proficiency (none = ref)
Speaks very well

Speaks well

Speaks poorly

Log pseudolikelihood
Wald chi-square
2

Pseudo R
n

SOURCE: New Immigrant Survey
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
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Table 15: Truncated Regression of the Natural Log of Dollar Amounts Given to Others
Demographic Model
Male

Age

Years of Education

Married

Spouse abroad

Child abroad

Parents abroad

Years in US

Globalization Model

Full Model

-.00

.03

(.12)

(.12)

-.00

-.00

(.00)

(.01)

-.01

-.02

(.01)

(.01)

-.08

-.04

(.12)

(.12)

-.02

.01

(.18)

(.18)

-.19

.09

(.14)

(.14)

.33

.41**

(.13)

(.13)

-.01

-.01

(.01)

(.01)

-.04

-.09

(.14)

(.15)

-.02

.00

(.24)

(.23)

-.07

-.09

(.21)

(.22)

Earned Income (<$13,500 = ref)
$13,500 to less than $40,000

$40,000 or more

Refugee
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Table 15: Continued
Demographic Model

Globalization Model

Full Model

.53***

.57***

(.12)

(.13)

.71***

.78***

(.22)

(.23)

-.03

-.15

(.11)

(.13)

-.08

-.08

(.06)

(.06)

-.00

.04

(.11)

(.12)

.11

.17

(.28)

(.27)

.28*

.33*

(.15)

(.15)

.23

.34

(.24)

(.24)

.02

.01

(.14)

(.15)

-.04

.07

(.42)

(.50)

Country of origin (LDC = ref)

MDC

HDC

Rural background

Number of moves

Full-time worker

Class of worker (none = ref)
Self-employed

Wage employed

Both

Asset abroad

Owns US home.
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Table 15: Continued
Demographic Model

Globalization Model

Full Model

.85***

.78***

(.18)

(.19)

.64***

.64***

(.16)

(.17)

.25

.17

(.15)

(.15)

-1669.98

-1647.47

-1595.11

Wald chi-square

18.31

87.92***

111.15***

pseudo_R2

.0001

.0088

.0114

n

1023

1027

1003

English proficiency (none = ref)
Speaks very well

Speaks well

Speaks poorly

Log pseudolikelihood

SOURCE: New Immigrant Survey
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
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Appendix B

NIS Questions used in Variable Construction

Cash remittance – this is a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the respondent gave an answer to
any of the questions below that indicated that they sent money to someone not living in their
house. Recipients were then checked to insure that they lived outside the U.S.
[I2] GIVE TO SPOUSE WHEN NOT LIVING SAME HOUSE
During the last twelve months , did you give any financial assistance (such as gifts, transfers,
bequests, or loans) to your spouse during periods when {Text fill: he/she} was not living
with you in the same house?
[I6] GIVE MINOR CHILDREN NOT LIVING SAME HOUSE
During the last twelve months, did you give or send any money to any of your children age
16 and under during periods when they were not living with you in the same house? Please
include only money you gave directly to your children and not any monies you may have
already told us about. Please include all biological children, stepchildren and adopted
children under age 16.
[I8] GIVE CHILDREN OVER 17 NOT LIVING SAME HO
During the last twelve months, did you give or send money to any of your children age 17
and over when they were not living with you in the same house? Do not count any financial
assistance that you may have already told us about. These children should include your own
biological children, adopted children and step-children.
[I13A.01] WHO DO YOU GIVE MONEY TO?
Which of your parents or step-parents did you give money to? Your mother?
[I13A.02] WHO DO YOU GIVE MONEY TO?
Which of your parents or step-parents did you give money to? Your father?
[I13A.03] WHO DO YOU GIVE MONEY TO?
Which of your parents or step-parents did you give money to? Your mother and father?
[I13A.04] WHO DO YOU GIVE MONEY TO?
Which of your parents or step-parents did you give money to? Your stepmother?
[I13A.05] WHO DO YOU GIVE MONEY TO?
Which of your parents or step-parents did you give money to? Your stepfather?
[I13A.06] WHO DO YOU GIVE MONEY TO?
Which of your parents or step-parents did you give money to? Your mother and stepfather?
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[I13A.07] WHO DO YOU GIVE MONEY TO?
Which of your parents or step-parents did you give money to? Your father and stepmother?
[I17A.01] WHO DO YOU GIVE MONEY TO?
Which of your spouse’s parents or step-parents did you give money to? Spouse’s mother?
[I17A.02] WHO DO YOU GIVE MONEY TO?
Which of your spouse’s parents or step-parents did you give money to? Spouse’s father?
[I17A.03] WHO DO YOU GIVE MONEY TO?
Which of your spouse’s parents or step-parents did you give money to? Spouse’s mother and
father?
[I17A.04] WHO DO YOU GIVE MONEY TO?
Which of your spouse’s parents or step-parents did you give money to? Spouse’s
stepmother?
[I17A.05] WHO DO YOU GIVE MONEY TO?
Which of your spouse’s parents or step-parents did you give money to? Spouse’s stepfather?
[I17A.06] WHO DO YOU GIVE MONEY TO?
Which of your spouse’s parents or step-parents did you give money to? Spouse’s mother and
stepfather?
[I17A.07] WHO DO YOU GIVE MONEY TO?
Which of your spouse’s parents or step-parents did you give money to? Spouse’s father and
stepmother?
[I21] GIVE RECEIVE FROM SIBS NOT SAME HOUSE
During the last twelve months, did you give or receive any financial assistance to or from any
of your siblings when they were not living with you in the same house? Do not count any
financial assistance that you may have already told us about.
[I27] GIVE OR RECEIVE SPOUSES SIBLING
During the last twelve months, did you or your spouse give or receive any financial
assistance to or from any of your spouse's siblings when they were not living with you or
your spouse in the same house? Do not count any financial assistance that you may have
already told us about.
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[I31] GIVE RECEIVE OTHER RELATIVES
During the last twelve months, did you give or receive any financial assistance to or from any
other relatives besides your spouse, children, parents, spouse's parents, siblings, or spouses'
siblings or friends when they were not living with you in the same house? Do not count any
financial assistance that you may have already told us about.
[I39M] WHERE GIVE TO FRIENDS
Did you give financial assistance to these friends when they were living outside the United
States or when they were living within the United States?
Percent of wages remitted
U.S dollar amount remitted divided by earned income reported multiplied by 100
Earned income
[G4] INCOME FROM WORK FROM SELF-EMPLOYMENT
Did any of your earnings from work in the last twelve months come from self-employment?
[G5] HOW MUCH SELF-EMPLOYMENT INCOME
Before taxes and other deductions, about how much did your self-employment income
amount to in the last twelve months, including any profits left in the business?
[G7] INCOME FROM WAGES AND SALARY
Did] any of your earnings in the last twelve months come from wages and salaries?
[G7A] HOW MUCH WAGES AND SALARY
Before taxes and other deductions, about how much wage and salary income did you receive
in the last twelve months?
[G9] INCOME FROM PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE
Other than what you may have already told me about, did any of your income in the last
twelve months come from a professional practice or trade?
[G9A] HOW MUCH FROM PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE
Before taxes and other deductions, about how much did you receive from a professional
practice or trade in the last twelve months?
[G11] INCOME FROM TIPS
Other than what you may have already told me about, did any of your income in the last
twelve months come from tips, bonuses, commissions, etc?
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[G11A] HOW MUCH FROM INCOME FROM TIPS
Before taxes and other deductions, about how much did your last twelve months of income
from tips, bonuses, commissions, etc. amount to?
U.S. dollar amount remitted
[I3] HOW MUCH GIVE TO SPOUSE
How much did you give during the last twelve months {Text fill if A142_X was in the past
two years: "or since you were married if it was in the last twelve months"}, to your spouse
during periods when {Text fill: he/she} was not living with you in the same house?
[I7] HOW MUCH GIVE MINOR CHILDREN
How much did you give in total during the last twelve months to all your children under age
16 during periods when they were not living with you in the same house? Please include only
money you gave directly to your children {Text fill if A52=1: "and not any monies you have
already told us about that you provided to your spouse"}.
[I10.01] HOW MUCH GIVE TO CHILD OVER 17
How much financial assistance did you give to {Text fill: CHILD NAME} during the last
twelve months during periods when you were not living together? Do not count any financial
assistance that you may have already told us about before.
[I14.01] HOW MUCH GIVE TO PARENTS
How much financial assistance did you {Text fill: "or your spouse"} give to your {Text fill:
PARENT NAME} {If I13a=RF or DK, text fill: parents or step-parents) during the last
twelve months during periods when you were not living together? Do not count any financial
assistance that you may have already told us about.
[I18A.01] AMOUNT I18 [spouse’s parents]
[I23.01] HOW MUCH GIVE TO SIBLING

How much financial assistance did you {Text fill if A52=1: "or your spouse"} give to {Text
fill: SIBLING NAME} during the last twelve months during periods when you were not
living together? Do not count any financial assistance that you may have already told us
about.
[I28.01] HOW MUCH GIVE TO SPOUSES SIBLING
How much financial assistance did you or your spouse give to {Text fill: SIBLING NAME}
during the last twelve months during periods when you were not living together? Do not
count any financial assistance that you may have already told us about.
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[I32A] AMOUNT I32 [relatives]
[I41] HOW MUCH GIVE TO FRIENDS OUTSIDE U.S.
Goods sent (remitted)- Respondents are assumed to have sent goods (coded 1) if they
answered yes to any of the following questions.
[I52] PROVIDE NON FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
During the past twelve months, did you provide any non-financial assistance in the form of
goods or materials to anyone other than your spouse or children during periods when they did
not live with you?
Gender
[A6] GENDER
I need to ask these questions of everyone, are you male or female?
Age
[A7MO] YEAR BORN
In what year were you born?
Educational attainment
[A20] YEARS SCHOOL COMPLETED
Now, I have a few questions about your education. How many years of schooling in total
have you completed?
Marital status
[A52] CURRENT MARITAL STATUS
Are you now: INTERVIEWER: IF R IS MARRIED AND ALSO LIVING TOGETHER
WITH SOMEONE ELSE IN A MARRIAGE-LIKE RELATIONSHIP, CODE 'MARRIED'
HERE.
1 Married
2 Living together in a marriage-like relationship but not married
3 Separated
4 Divorced
5 Widowed
6 Never married, not living with someone in a marriage like
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Spouse abroad
[A137MO.01] COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE FOR SPOUSE OR PARTNER
What country does your current husband/wife/partner live in?
Children abroad
[A270MO.01] BIOL CHILD COUNTRY CURRENTLY LIVING IN
What country is [this child] currently living in?
[A397MO.01] ADOPTED CHILD COUNTRY CURRENTLY LIVING IN
What country is [this child] currently living in?
[A526MO.01] STEP CHILD COUNTRY CURRENTLY LIVING IN
What country is [this child] currently living in?
Parent abroad
[A815MO.01] FATHER COUNTRY CURRENTLY LIVING IN
What country is [FOR X=1 / your father; FOR X=2 / your mother; FOR X=3 / this other
person] currently living in?
Time in U.S.
[K20] YEAR ARRIVED COUNTRY NOW LIVE
Development of country of origin
[A9AMO] COUNTRY BORN
In what country were you born?
Respondent’s country of origin code as LDC (less developed countries), MDC
(moderately developed countries), or HDC (highly developed countries) using
Braun’s The Rich Get Richer Table 2.1: Division of Countries into Core,
Semiperiphery, and Periphery in Modern World Systems
38 CANADA
44 CHINA, PEOPLES REPUBLIC
47 COLOMBIA
55 CUBA
62 DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
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65 EL SALVADOR
69 ETHIOPIA
88 GUATEMALA
92 HAITI
98 INDIA
105 JAMAICA
111 KOREA
135 MEXICO
152 NIGERIA
163 PERU
164 PHILIPPINES
166 POLAND
172 RUSSIA
215 UKRAINE
217 UNITED KINGDOM
218 UNITED STATES
224 VIETNAM
301 EUROPE & CENTRAL ASIA
302 EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA & THE PACIFIC
304 OTHER NORTH AMERICA
305 LATIN AMERICA & THE CARIBBEAN
306 AFRICAN SUB-SAHARAN
307 MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA
308 OCEANIA
310 ARCTIC REGION
Rural
[A964] CHILDHOOD LIVING IN A RURAL AREA
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Were you living in a rural area when about age 10?
Sojourner status
[K16.01] DID YOU LEAVE FOR AT LEAST 60 DAYS
Did you subsequently leave that country to live in another country for at least 60 days?
[K18B] IWER CODE DOES RESPONDENT CURRENTLY LIVE IN THE COUNTRY
LAST MENTIONED?
Fulltime
[C33.01] HOURS PER WEEK CURRENTLY WORK
How many hours a week do you usually work at this job?
[C37.01] WEEKS PER YEAR USUALLY WORK
Counting paid vacations as weeks of work, how many weeks a year do you usually work on
this job?
Employment
[G4] INCOME FROM WORK FROM SELF-EMPLOYMENT
Did any of your earnings from work in the last twelve months come from self-employment?
[G7] INCOME FROM WAGES AND SALARY
Did] any of your earnings in the last twelve months come from wages and salaries?
[G9] INCOME FROM PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE
Other than what you may have already told me about, did any of your income in the last
twelve months come from a professional practice or trade?
[G11] INCOME FROM TIPS
Other than what you may have already told me about, did any of your income in the last
twelve months come from tips, bonuses, commissions, etc?
Assets in country of origin
H33MO.01] COUNTRY OF HOME
In what country is your {Text fill: IF FIRST ITERATION: "second" }{Text fill: IF
ITERATION 2 TO 10: "next"} home located?
[H52] ANY REAL ESTATE OUTSIDE U.S
175

Is any of this real estate located outside of the United States?
[H69] HOW MANY FARMS YOU OWN
How many farms and businesses do you own? #______________{2-digits}{check:
<=10}[H70] {Specify number and then do questions H70 to H89 for each farm and
business.}
h70_1mo what country business located-modif
[H115MO] WHAT MAIN COUNTRY ARE ACCOUNT
In what main country are these checking or savings accounts held?
[H137MO] H135 WHAT MAIN COUNTRY HELD
In what main country is this transportation equipment kept?
English Proficiency
[J14]
HOW WELL SPEAK ENGLISH
CP-A9a=United states, skip} How well would you say you speak English? Would you say:
1930 1 Very well
2177 2 Well
2475 3 Not well
1548 4 Not at all
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Appendix C

The Propensity to Give

Table 14 replicates the analysis of findings presented in Chapter 8, but the sub-sample
used here includes all respondents who reported transferring cash to others, regardless of
current residence of the receiver.
The results of the demographic model indicate that many of the variables selected
from demography literature behave as expected with this sample of immigrants. The overall
model is significant at the p<.001 level according to the model chi-square statistic and has a
McFadden pseudo R2 of .06. Males are 21% less likely to given females (p<.01) and as
respondent’s age increases by one year, they are 1% less likely to give.01). In the
demographic model, neither years of education nor being married affected the propensity to
give. Respondents reporting close relatives living outside the United States were more likely
to be giving (p<.001). Individuals who reported a spouse living abroad were 3.4 times more
likely to give than those whose spouse resided in the United States (p<.001). Respondents
with at least one child abroad were 2.5 times more likely to give than individuals whose
children resided in the United States (p<.001) while respondents with at least one parent
abroad were 63% times as likely to remit than individuals with no parent abroad (p<.001).
The length of time spent in the United States was significant in the demographic model and
suggested that for each year spent in the United States, respondents were 6% more likely to
give (p<.001). The higher income category of earning more than $40,000 was not significant
but respondent earning more than $13,500 to less than $40,000 were 29% more likely to give
than respondents earning less than $13,500 (p<.05). The middle income bracket may suggest
an earning point that allows the immigrant both a living wage and the ability to send some
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funds to others. Refugee status was not significant in this model. Only 96 givers identified
themselves as refugees and represented less than 8% of the giver population.
Globalization variables were selected from various studies in the movement of people
and money around the globe. The purpose of my study is to suggest a more holistic approach
may be used to examine remittance behavior rather than to establish causal characteristics. It
is important to remember the limitations of the NIS (see Appendix E) and the process used to
establish and operationalize variables (see Chapter 7). Once again, caution must be used in
the interpretation of significance or non-significance of a variable in this study. Although the
use of the globalization variables selected (see Chapter 6) can be supported, rural
background, full time employment, assets abroad, US home ownership, and English
proficiency were non-significant among the giver population.
The results of the globalization model show that the model is significant at the p<.001
level according to the model chi-square statistic with a McFadden pseudo R2 of .11. When
compared to respondents who originated in LDCs, respondents who came from MDCs were
33% less likely to remit (p<.001) while respondents from HDCs were 52% less likely to
remit (p<.001). Thirty-eight percent of the population identified themselves as living in a
rural area at the age of ten and remittances supply essential capital flow to areas with an
agriculture base (Rwelamira and Kristen 2003). However, respondents may have moved by
age 11 and actually come from an urban background but this cannot be established with the
data available. Respondent’s rural background was not significant but when making one or
more international moves, respondent’s likelihood of giving increased 17% with each
additional move (p<.001). Fulltime employment was not significant but the class of
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employment proved to have a significant impact on the propensity to give (p<.001).
Respondents who were self employed were approximately five times more likely to give than
individuals with no employment(p<.001) while individuals who worked for wages were 5.6
times more likely to give than unemployed individuals (p<.001). Respondents who reported
some form of self-employment and who state they also worked for wages were 8.6 times
more likely to be giving cash to individuals than individuals who reported that they were not
working (p<.001). Owning assets abroad and ownership of a home in the United States were
not significant in the globalization model but may a reflection of the small number of
respondents claiming ownership. One hundred and forty-six givers (10%) stated that they
possessed assets outside the United States while less than 1% (n=13) stated that owned a
home in the United States. For the defined population, English proficiency was not
significant.
The full model had a superior fit to both the demographic and globalization models.
In a model to model comparison using a likelihood ratio test, the full model to demographic
model comparison yields a p-value of less than .001 allowing me to conclude that adding the
independent globalization variables significantly improves the predictive power of the model.
The same is true in a full model to globalization model comparison, thus, suggesting that the
integration of globalization and demographic variables will allow a better understanding of
giving behavior.
The full model is significant at the p<.001 level according to the model chi-square
statistic and has a McFadden pseudo R2 of .15. Males are 19% less likely to give than
females (p<.05). In the full model, age, marital status, and educational attainment were not
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significant. Respondents reporting close relatives living outside the United States were more
likely to be remitting (p<.001). Individuals who reported a spouse living abroad were 2,3
times more likely to give than those whose spouse resided in the United States (p<.001).
Respondents with at least one child abroad were 2.6 times more likely to give than
individuals whose children resided in the United States (p<.001) while respondents with at
least one parent abroad were 64% more likely to give than individuals with no parent abroad
(p<.001). The length of time spent in the United States was significant in the full model and
for each year residing in the United States, givers were 4% more likely to give (p<.001).
Once again, income categories and refugee status were not significant in the full model.
Givers originating in MDCs were 23% less likely to give than individuals originating in
LDCs (p<.01) while givers originating in HDCs were 41% less likely to give than those
originating in LDCs (p<.001). Respondents making one or more international trips were 18%
more likely to give with each additional trip outside the United States border (p<.001). Class
of worker remained significant (p<.001). Respondents who were self employed were 4.2
times more likely to give than individuals with no employment (p<.001) while individuals
who worked for wages were approximately six times more likely to give than unemployed
individuals (p<.001). Respondents who reported some form of self-employment and who
state they also worked for wages were 8.2 times more likely to be sending cash to individuals
than individuals who reported that they were not working (p<.001). Assets abroad, US home
ownership, and English proficiency were not significant in the full model.
It must be noted that in the full model some regression coefficients increase with the
combination of demographic and globalization variables. For example, coefficients for
children and parents abroad increased from the demographic model to the full model as well
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as development level of country of origin. As this suggested an interaction effect most likely
between location of parents and LDCs, I tested for differences in parents located in LDCs
versus parents not located abroad and found no significant interaction. I tested several other
logical interactions but was, likewise, unable to establish a significant interaction effect.
From this, I can only conclude that some results in the full model may indicate a suppressor
effect that is being created by unexplained homogeneity that cannot be explained with these
data. I reiterate, however, that the importance of the analysis is that the models give an
expanded appreciation for the factors that may inform the propensity to remit. Although the
fluctuations in the coefficients cannot be explained, they are minimal and perhaps not
significant.
The results of this analysis of this sample of givers reinforce the complexity of
remittance decisions and the variations in factors that may influence immigrants to send of
monies to other individuals. The importance of having close relatives residing outside the
United States is reinforced by the increased likelihood of sending monies and although, the
income categories were not significant the results suggests that the amount earned is not as
important as the ability to earn. While self-employment and working for wages are
significant (p<.001), the fact that remitters who seek some sort of wage job in addition to self
employment are nine times more likely to remit than the unemployed supports the need to
examine type of employment as well as job categories (Brown and Connell 2006).
Previous scholars have treated all individuals who participated in financial transfers
as individual who were engaging in remittance behavior (DeVortez and Vadean 2006). The
analyses of the remitter population (see Chapter 8 for discussion of remitters) and the giver
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population suggests that this practice may be appropriate. Significant and non-significant
variables were very similar for both populations suggesting that givers are actually sending
money to persons abroad. However, caution in generalizing and interpretation must be used
as slight differences do exist.
The results, also, reflect the difficulties that occur when using secondary data. The
NIS, however, does offer the opportunity to work with a large cross section of the US
immigrant population and the establishment of a more holistic and globalized approach to
study immigrant behavior rather than the specific behavior of individual nationalities or
ethnic groups. The likelihood ratio test reinforces the suggestion that adding globalization
variables to remittance models will enhance our understanding and a limited number of
significant variables attest to the fit of the models. Also, due to the small sample size,
variables identified as significant are important to understanding the remittance behavior of
US immigrants.
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Appendix D

Dollars Given

Table 15 replicates the findings presented in Chapter 9 using a sub-sample of all
respondents who reported sending cash to friends and family, regardless of where these
people reside.
The demographic model is not significant and has no significant variables. However,
the global model proves to be significant at the p<.001 level according to the model chisquare statistic. Respondents who originated in MDCs gave 53% more than those originating
in LDCs (p<.001) while respondents originating in HDCs gave 71% more than those
originating in LDCs (p<.001). Individuals working for wages gave 28% more than
individuals who did not work (p<.05). Respondents reporting that they spoke English very
well gave 85% more than those who reported speaking no English (p<.001) and respondents
reporting that they spoke English well gave 64% more than those who spoke no English
(p<.001).
The full model is significant at the p<.001 level according to the model chi-square
statistic. Respondents who reported having a parent abroad gave 41% more than those who
reported not having a parent abroad (p<.01). Respondents originating from MDCs gave 57%
more than those originating in LDCs (p<.001) while respondents originating from HDCs
gave 78% more than those who originated in LDCs (p<.001). Wage earners who worked for
others gave 33% more than those who did not work (p<.05). Respondents who reported that
they spoke English very well gave 78% more than those who spoke no English (p<.001)
while respondents who reported that they spoke English well gave 64% more than those who
did not speak English p<.001).
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The demographic model does little to explain variances in the dollar amount remitted
by U.S. immigrants but the globalization model provides insights as to may send more. The
more holistic approach using the combination of predictors expands the characteristics that
one might observe when trying to determine which immigrants might send greater amounts
over time. The full model suggests that immigrants who have gained a degree of economic
stability through assimilation as represented by proficiency in English and home ownership
are more likely to be sending greater amounts. This fact may also be reflected that these
immigrants arrive from MDCs and HDCs. However, the fact that the respondent has a parent
or child who does not reside in the United States increases the dollar amount that they are
likely to give.
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Appendix E

The New Immigrant Survey and Associated Problems

The NIS
The New Immigrant Survey (NIS) is the first attempt at a national survey of legal
immigrants in the United States, and it represents an effort to fill the gap between existing
data and informational needs concerning immigrants (NIS 2003). The ultimate purpose of the
NIS is the creation of a public use database containing both pre- and post-immigration
information. The longitudinal study represents a collaborative effort by RAND, Princeton
University, New York University and Yale University and was financially supported by the
National Institute of Child Health and Human Development, The national Institute on Aging,
and the Office of Behavioral and Social Science Research. Additional support was provided
by the National Science Foundation, The United States Citizenship and Immigration Service,
the Office of the Assistant secretary for Planning and Evaluation, and the Pew Charitable
Trusts. Research design was tested in a 1996 pilot survey (NIS-P). Principal Investigators
(PIs) were supplied lists of immigrants recently admitted to legal permanent residence (LPR)
by the United States Office of Citizenship and Immigration (USCIS) and the Office of
Immigration Statistics (OIS). Respondents are adult immigrants 18 and older who were
admitted to LPR during recently defined periods and who have visas as principals or as
accompanying spouses. Principals are defined as immigrants that the United States grants
visas because they have met the eligibility criteria set forth for various classes of admission.
The first full wave (NIS-2003) randomly sampled immigrants who received LPR
between May and November 2003. Respondents were interviewed the final five months of
FY 2003 and the first two months of FY 2004 (NIS). The original sample included 12,500
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individuals. A target response was set at 70% or 8,750 respondents and in March 2005, a
decision was made to use the 8,573 (68.6%) completed surveys. Respondents represented
four strata: spouses of United States citizens, employment principals, diversity principals,
and other immigrants. The sample includes both “new-arrival” immigrants who arrive in the
United States with documents obtained abroad and “adjustee” immigrants who were already
in the United States with a temporary nonimmigrant visa (NIS 2003). Most “adjustees” are
immigrants who spent at least some time in the United States as unauthorized immigrants.
The sampling area includes the largest 85 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs), and
respondents include those from the top 38 counties. Massey (NIS 2005) indicates that
immigrants demonstrate substantial geographic clustering as demonstrated by the fact that
89% of immigrants lived in the largest MSAs and 4-5% lived in the 38 top counties. The NIS
also includes a randomly selected sample of immigrants living in an additional 10 MSAs and
15 county pairs. One percent of immigrants lived abroad but these were excluded due to
difficulties in confirming addresses. Immigrants who had requested legal documentation or
“green cards” be mailed to them were randomly selected for the survey. The sampling
technique was as follows:
1) The OIS prepared electronic files and sent them to PIs.
2) PIs selected and adult sample using a random-number statistical routine.
3) PIs sent the sample to the survey organization: National opinion Research Center
(NORC)
Surveys were prepared in seven major languages with key concepts prepared in an
additional seven languages. Interviews were conducted as soon as possible to insure correct
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addresses. Sixty percent of the interviews were made by phone and conducted in the
respondent’s language of choice. The remaining interviews were conducted face-to-face.
The study established demographic background, health measures, pre-immigration
history, family connections and structure, the use of transfers (financial assistance), and
economic history including assets abroad and in the United Stated. Data was collected using
various questionnaires and store in numerous individual files. The data provided by the NIS
allow an examination of transfer behavior among the national immigrant population. At the
same time, the sample limits the ability to generalize beyond a single cohort of legal
permanent residents to the United States. Also, refugee status was derived from United
States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) data. Therefore, I was only able to
classify immigrants as refugees if they were awarded formal status by the courts. Individuals
who were forced migrants whose application for asylum were denied were excluded. Despite
this limitation, the NIS offers the first access to vital information concerning immigrant
capital flows or remittances. However, the NIS provides a number of challenges and is not
without problems.
Data Problems
Location of relatives and friend
Remittances are defined as monies and goods sent to friends and relatives residing in
the immigrant’s country of origin and originating from the immigrant’s country of
destination. The NIS asked a series of questions regarding the transfer of cash to several
categories of individuals including but not limited to spouse, child, mother, father, stepparent, in-laws, siblings, and spouse’s siblings (see Appendix B). Although general
187

“transfers” by immigrants have been used to represent remittance behavior (DeVortez and
Vadean 2005), a true reflection of cash remittances requires knowing the location of the
receiver. It is at this point the NIS becomes problematic. Transferees and receivers as well as
amounts transferred are recorded in transfers (file I and I-ppp) while location of relatives is
located in demographic (file A). Unfortunately, the demographic file established the location
of spouse, children, and parents and provides no other information concerning siblings or inlaws. The failure to obtain this information limits the ability to identify all individuals who
engage in transfer behavior as remitters. As a result, only transfers given to spouses, children,
or parents who are located outside the United States may be used as remittances. This
eliminated a number of individuals whose location cannot be established and required a
separate analysis of transferees and remitters.
Income
Income may be derived various sources and the NIS attempts to exhaust known
sources of income through numerous questions located in multiple files. Income questions
are located in income (files G and G-ppp), pre-immigration history (files B and B-ppp), and
assets (files H and H-ppp). However, no question occurs that establishes the gross or net
income of the respondent during the last twelve months. While a twelve month income figure
might be established, it would involve an extremely complicated process involving an
undeterminable number of lines of code. Due to the complicated process involved in
determining overall income and the relevance of earnings related to the ability to secure
economic stability, a simpler process of determining an “earned income” was employed.
Earned income can be determined by using the income file (G and G-ppp). However, this
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limitation fails to capture the use of other income sources such as interest on savings,
pensions, or earnings on investments.
Rural versus Urban
Socialization can often vary depending on the environment in which it takes place.
Transfers from rural immigrants have significant impact in their community of origin (Gupta
et al 2007, CBO 2005, Vanwey 2004). Therefore, the remittance behavior of immigrants
originating from a rural background may be different from immigrants originating from an
urban background. The NIS asked respondents if they lived in a rural area at the age of ten.
This information is located in the demographic (A file). However, there is no apparent
follow-up in the demographic file (A) or in any other file that would allow for the
determination of the respondent’s moving to an urban area after age ten or for the
confirmation that they remained in a rural area until they migrated. The ability to generalize
about rural significance can be severely limited due to this lack of information.
In-kind transfers
Two limitations exist in the transfer of goods questions (see Appendix B). Transfer of
goods is limited to relatives and friends and excludes spouses, parents, and children. As
mentioned earlier, spouses, children, and parents are the people who can be positively
identified as living outside the United States. Therefore, the precedent of using transfers to
represent remittance behavior must be employed when analyzing in-kind remittance
behavior. Also, spouses, children, and parents represent the main receivers of remittances.
The second limitation involves the use specific goods to determine transfer of goods. Using a
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limited number of specific goods automatically excludes a number of other possibilities that
might represent in-kind transfers.
Despite these limitations, the NIS offers the opportunity to examine transfer and remittance
behavior among U.S. immigrants.
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